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This report assesses the structure of Korea's external
liabilities in the,light of general principles of liability
management, current and anticipated country-specific
characteristics, and developments in international capital
markets. While stressing that neither the level nor the
composition of Korea's external liabilities poses an
immediate problem, the Report notes deficiencies with
respect to the sharing of risk, the correlation of debt
service with ability to pay and the diversification of
sources of financing which could present difficulties in
future periods of foreign exchange scarcity and economic
stagnation. It notes that Korea could take advantag& of
emerging opportunities in international capital markets to
overcome these deficiencies by giving preference to bonds
and equities over loans in future external financing
arrangements and by encouraging private non-guaranteed debt
instead of public debt. It argues that such actions are
consistent with Korea's evolving needs as well as with
lender preferences, and will provide Korea a status within
the international financial community commensurate with its
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Executive Summary
1. This Report assesses the structure of Korea's external liabilities
in the light ol general principles of liability management, current and anti-
cipated country-specific characteristics, and developments in international
capital markets. An examination of Korea's current external liability struc-
ture indicates that neither the level nor the composition of such liabilities
poses an immediate problem. On the contrary Korea currently enjoys a rather
comfortable external financing environment characterized by an excess supply
of funds and improvements in terms and conditions. Nevertheless, being a very
open economy, Korea is vulnerable t> external shocks, and some features of
Korea's external liability structure could generate problems for the country
in future periods of foreign exchange scarcity and economic stagnation.
Current market conditions are propitious for Korea to reexamine its external
liability structure in a long-term perspective and undertake measures with
respect to its eXternal financing arrangements that should improve its ability
to absorb and deflect future shocks that may emanate from the international
economic system.
2. Decisions regarding the composition of future fo-reig capital
inflows into Korea must be undertaken in the light of several ongoing develop-
ments. First, Government has been gradually withdrawing from active interven-
tion in the allocation of credit and investment in the economy. As a result,
the implicit guarantee of open credit lines (and Government "bailouts") can no
longer to be taken for granted by the Korean corporate seetor. Corporate
finance decisions, whether they involve domestic or foreign funding, must take
this development into account. Second, Korea's industrial structure is
changing towards industries which are inherently riskier, require more market-
ing -kowledge and face export market uncertainty because of protectionism.
This, too, has implications for corporate financing decisions, especially with
regard to the use of foreign equity investment.
3. Third, lender preferences for foreign capital instruments are chang-
ing. These preferences are expressed in the emerging trend towards "securiti-
sation" in the international financial markets and involve a shift in capital
flows away from bank lending towards marketable debt instruments (such as
floating rate notes) and equities. Indeed, the distinction between bond and
equity markets is becoming blurred and there has developed a considerable
demand for hybrid securities (such as convertible debentures). In addition,
technical innovations (such as currency and interest rate swaps) have occurred
in the market which permit both borrowers and lenders a wider range of oppor-
tunities to achieve desired asset and liability structures.
Assessment of Korea's External Liability Structure
4. It is generally agreed that in addition to low cost the following
are desirable objectives for the structure of a country's external liabili-
ties: (a) a maturity profile that allows a wide dispersal of repayment over
time; (b) diversified currency composition; (c) a sharing of risk between
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borrowers and lenders; (d) a dispersal of risk inside the economy; (e) a
correlation between debt service and the ability to pay, and (f) a diversified
lender or investor base. An assessment of Korea's external liability
structure in terms of the above characteristics shows that the most notable
deficiencies occur with respect to the sharing of risk, the correlation of
debt service with the country's ability to pay and diversification of the
sources of financing. Each of these deficiencies Can be overcome by obtaining
external financing in the form of equity rather than debt. A major
conclusion, therefore, is that Korea should seek to obtain an increasing
proportion of its future external finance in the form of portfolio and direct
foreign investment.
5. Maturity Structure. Korea's short-term debt has declined steadily
as a proportion of total debt since 1983 and now stands at about 20Z. Short-
term debt is now equivalent to about 3,5 months of imports, a fairly safe
level by conventional standards. Thus, Korea's debt maturity structure is
quite sound at present. Nevertheless, there is no harm in lengthening maturi-
ties should it be possible to do so at reasonable cost. Such an opportunity
appears to be available under present market conditions, especially given the
context of Korea's excellent economic fundamentals (see paras. 1.09-1.11).
6. Currency Composition. The currency composition of Korea's debt (801
US dollars, 12.51 Japanese yen) is reasonably balanced from the point of view
of the currency composition of its export receipts. To the extent, however,
that the relative importance of the US as a destination for Korean exports may
decline in the future as Korea pursues trade diversification and/or if trade
frictions with the US intensify, it would be useful to diversify into non-
dollar OECD currencies. Diversification away from the dollar would be justi-
fied also from a pure hedging point of view because of the presently heavy
representation of the dollar in Korea's debt. Diversification would probably
also be suggested by the application of the principle that variations in the
cost of debt-servicing should as far as possible be offset by changes in
Korea's ability to pay as measured by its terms of trado. However, decisions
regarding currency composition must also take into account the likely
direction of future exchange rate movements. For example, a substantial shift
into non-dollar obligations might not be desirable until such time as the
prospects for dollar depreciation become dim. At any rate, given the
increased volatility of exchange rates and Korea's sensitivity to terms of
trade, it would be desirable for Korea to adopt an active currency management
strategy in the future. Such a strategy would involve (i) tapping different
capital markets directly or (ii) arranging currency swaps if direct access
should not be possible (see paras. 1.12-1.17).
7. Project Risk Sharing. At present about 951 of foreign capital in-
flow into Korea is in the form of bank loans and bonds. With such general
obligation finance the downside risk of project failure is borne entirely by
the borrower. Since most Korean borrowing is, for all practical purposes, at
sovereign risk, this places a rather heavy burden on Government. If Govern-
ment is to extricate itself from intervention in the market economy, it must
encourage a greater amount of risk sharing between foreign lenders and domes-
tic corporate borrowers. This can be done by encouraging the inflow of both
direct and portfolio foreign investment. In recent years initiatives have
been taken by Government to enhance such foreign equity flows and the response
has been quite encouraging. Further initiatives are planned under the ongoing
liberalization program. It is reconmended that advantage be taken of the
exceptionally favorable current outlook for direct and portfolio foreign
investment and the pace of liberalization be quickened (see paras. 1.18-1.20).
8. Dispersal of Risk. At present 90% of Korea's external debt is
covered by government guarantees. While such gurantees have resulted in
better borrowing terms and enhanced access to external finance for public and
private Korean borrowers they have the disadvantage of (a) encouraging exces-
sive risk-taking by both borrowers and lenders; (b) involving Government too
deeply in industrial investment decisions; and (c) placing a potentially large
financial burden on Government. All these disadvantages have been evident in
the recent experience of the Korean construction and shipping industries in
which firms grew recklessly on the strength of (explicit or implicit)
Government-guranteed credit and had to be bailed-out and restructured when
slumping demand for their outputs exposed their financial weaknesses. (see
paras. 1.22-1.23). In the long run it would be beneficial to have a wider
distribution of default risk within the economy. This can be done by encour-
aging a shift from public to private non-guaranteed debt and by encouraging
the replacement of debt by equity.
9. Correlation Between Debt Service and Ability to Pay. Korea's highly
unbalanced external liability structure (95% debt, 5% equity) fails to provide
it with a hedge since debt-service obligations are inflexible and bear little
correlation with the country's ability to pay. Korea's openness and the size
and nature of its debt ($45 billion with about 60X at floating rates) make it
vulnerable to even small changes in the international trade and finance envir-
onment. In view of the importance of the external sector to Korea's economic
welfare, it would appear useful to pursue external financing arrangements
whose servicing obligations are pro-cyclically related to the country's
ability to pay.
10. Perhaps the most appropriate instruments for this are equity invest-
ments. It is generally observed that the annual service payments associated
with direct foreign investment are more correlated with movements in national
income than are debt service payments. The same is the case with portfolio
foreign investment for which dividend pay-out rates and share prices tend to
fluctuate pro-cyclically with national income. A potential instrument that
would also possess this particular characteristic of linking repayments to
ability to pay is the trade-linked bond. Such a bond would offer a return
linked to the value of Korea's exports or, perhaps more realiscically, to a
generally accepted index of world trade growth. Such a bond has not appeared
in the market yet and there may be considerable technical difficulties in
bringing it to market. Nevertheless, it is an attractive possibility. It
would permit a close correspondence between debt service payments and export
revenues, thus reducing Korea's vulntrability to external disturbances. Such
an instrument would appeal to the same investors who are attracted by Korean
equities since it would be similar in many respects to a mutual fund comprised
of the stocks of major export-oriented conglomerates. Korea's debt managers
may find it worthwhile to explore the market for such a bond; it may be an
acceptable alternative to faster internationalization of the Korean equities
market (see paras. 1.24-1.28; 2.46).
..... 
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11. Diversification of Sources. A secure flow of external finance faci-
litates the planning process, permits the smooth utilization of real resour-
ces, avoids disruptive balance of payments adjustment and maintains debt ser-
vicing capacity., One way to enhance the stability of foreign capital inflows
is to diversify as much as possible among sources of financing, both geogra-
phically and by type of instrument. This is especially important for Korea
because its external liabilities are extremely concentrated in the form of
bank loans provided by Japanese and American commercial banks. Significant
difficulties would ensue if these sources were to become less accommodating in
the future as a result of economic or political frictions or unforeseen events
external to Korea. Instrument diversification could be achieved by increasing
the rate of substitution of bank credits with such forms of financing as
international bonds and direct and portfolio investment. Geographical diver-
sification would involve tapping as many capital markets as possible and tar-
geting a wide range of investor groups within each market (see paras. 1.29-
1.30).
Elements of Desirable External Financing Strategy for Korea
12. If the objectives of risk sharing, correlation of servicing with
ability to pay, and liversification of sources of funding are accorded high
priority in Korea's future plans it would follow that the future inflow of
foreign capital into Korea should be largely in the form of equity instru-
ments. In the short run, however, such a financial strategy would not achieve
significant modification of the external liability structure since the exist-
ing pattern of capital inflows into Korea is overwhelmingly debt-oriented.
Despite the many perceived problems with general obligation financing, it is
difficult to foresee a rapid shift away from the dominance of syndicated bank
loans and floating rate bonds. Furthermore, as far as portfolio investments
are concerned, it will take time for Korea's absorption capacity to be
sufficiently enlarged (through promotion and reform of the stock market) so as
to permit such investments to play a significant role in external liability
management. These observations have consequences for a future strategy for
external financing: in the short-run efforts should be concentrated on
adjusting the existing array of instruments to bring them more into line with
the desirable inflow characteristics; this would involve giving preference to
bonds over loans in financing arrangements and encouraging private non-
guaranteed debt instead of public debt; in the longer run, however, it should
be recognized that the existing external liability structure is not immutablc
and efforts should be made to increase the proportion of equity in foreign
capital inflows.
13. The main elements that would characterize a desirable future exter-
nal financing strategy for Korea within this framework are discussed below.
14. Bond Market Strategy. Korea should continue to substitute bond
financing for syndicated credits but should attempt to exploit the bond mar-
ket's potential to a fuller extent. International bond markets hold consid-
erable promise for a country in Korea's position provided they are approached
strategically with clear long-term goals in mind rather than opportunistically
with a view to making the cheapest short-term deals. Among bond market
instruments floating rate notes (FRNs) warrant attention because they can be
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superior to syndicated credits, hitherto Korea's most heavily used instrument,
in terms of cost, maturity and diversity of investor base. The cost of FRN's
i, likely to remain below that of syndicated credits because of their marlketa-
bility (or liquidity) and the fact that syndicated loan makers (i.e. banks)
are being affected by higher capitAl-aeaet requirements and deposit interest
rate deregulation. The potential liquidity of bonds also enables longer matu-
rities to be established since a wider group of investors, and not just banks,
are potential buyers and a broader range of buyer-preference exists. The
wider investor base also offers the potential for greater diversification
among sources of funds (see paras. 2.37-2.40).
15. Public Borrowing. How bond market potential is exploited depends
partly on the situation and partly on the strategy of the issue:- To date,
Korea's experience, especially in the Eurobond market, has not been satisfac-
tory in terms of maturities and diversification. While some'reasons for this
experience are to be found in Korea's tight economic situation in the early
1980s, the illiquidity and narrow holding of Korean paper has also been due to
the Korean practice of coming to the market many times with small issues, of
preferring cost over other desirable characteristics in most deals, of avoid-
ing issues in the name of the Government and of not emphasizing the importance
of marketing and presentation to the extent necessary for a relatively new
participant.
16. A bond market strategy that would stand the best chance of overcom-
ing the present perception of Korean sovereign or "semi-sovereign" paper
should contain the following elements:
(a) Large Size of Issue: The size of typical future bond issues should
be large, say a minimum of $250 million, so as to generate liquidity
in the secondary market. Dealers need to maintain inventories of
each issue in order to effectively make markets in these issues.
There are, however, considerable economies of scale in the holding
of inventories and thus large issues do better than small issues.
In this context it is also worth noting that the size of swap-
related issues needs to be quite large in order to make the swap
worthwhile to all participants.
(b) Marketing. Korea should engage in a major marketing effort to at-
tract the interest of international money managers and to overcome
their imperfect knowledge of Korea's economic and political situa-
tion. The marketing effort should also identify lead managers who
have a good track record of non-bank placements. The greatest
potential would initially appear to be in the Japanese market, but
the European, especially the Swiss, markets also warrant further
consideration. Now that Korea's economic situation has taken a
sharp turn for the better, presenting Korea's case to the financial
community should be easier and should generate high returns.
17. Private versus Public Debt. The sharp improvement in Korea's econ-
omic prospects occasioned by the decline in the price of oil and the apprecia-
tion of the yen relative to the won heralds new opportunities for Korea in
international capital markets. Korea now anticipates sizable balance of
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.payments surpluses over the near future and its major private corporations are
now in a position to establish significant market shares and brand-name
presence in OECD markets. As a result the need for public or semi-public bor-
rowing for balance of payments purposes is declining while the prospects of
Korean corporations being able to borrow in their own names, and without
government guarantees, are improving. The opportunity exists, therefore, for
Korea to encourage a shift from public debt towards private non-guaranteed
debt. This would have the benefits of dispersing default-risk away from the
Government and increasing the familiarity of Korean ccrporate names in
international capital markets. Towards this end Government should encourage
private borrowers to adopt financial management, accounting and disclosure
practices thtit-wii help teihvem in-converting their bright.economic prospects
into enhanced access to external finance. Any marketing effort undertak-en-o
promote the semi-public names can also have positive spillover effects for
private Korean corporate names. The recent assignment of favorable credit
ratings to Korean sovereign risk by Moody's and S&P also bodes well for
private Korean names although the advantage is more likely to be perceived in
short and medium term financing arrangements then in access to long-term
funds.
18. Short and Medium Term Financing. Good opportunities exist for both
public and private Korean entities to expand access to short and medium term
financing at better terms than available through standard syndicated credits
while, at the same time, diversifying away from bank finance (see paras. 2.25-
2.29).
(a) Euronotes: The Euronote market which offers very attractive medium-
term financing in the form of underwritten note issuance facilities
should be further explored. Recent forays by Korean entities into
this market have been successful and Korea's sharply improved
economic prospects can only make access better. The substantial
presence in this market of corporations should make it possible to
reduce reliance on bank finance.
(b) Commercial Paper: The commercial paper (CP) markets in both Europe
and the US can also be profitably explored. In the past Korea had
limited access to these markets because of the lack of a US credit
rating. Korean corporate names could only issue in the US CP mar-
ket, for example, on the strength of a letter of credit guarantee by
US banks. The recent acquisition of US credit ratings should open
up international short-term finance markets to Korean paper to a
greater extent and at lower cost than is presently the case. There
exist large numbers of investors in both the US and European CP
markets v,ho are restricted by regulation, prospectus or custom from
buying non-rated paper.
19. Swaps: Korea should also continue altering the currency and
interest-type mix of its liabilities through the use of swaps. For example
Korea has virtually no direct access to fixed-rate US or Eurodollar facilities
but has excellent access to fixed and floating rate yen facilities. It should
consider trading on its comparative advantage and swap some of its floating
rate yen or dollar liabilities into fixed rate ones. Of course, the timing of
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swaps should be carefully considered since terms and conditions vary from day
to day. What is being recommended here is that an active currency management
strategy be adopted as part of the overall debt management program. Appro-
priately conceived and timed swaps can help Korea diversify its sources of
finance as well as lower its currency and interest rate risk (see paras. 2.47-
2.54).
20. Convertible Debentures: Advantage should be taken of the current
market preference for hybrid securities in general and the strong interest in
Korean convertible debentures in particular. The three issues floated so far
have met with an enthusiastic response despite their carrying terms which were
very favorable to the issuers'. Further issues should be encouraged and the
program of equity 'market tiberAlization in this pairticular regard should be
accelerated to take advantage of market conditions. Bonds with equity
warrants attached are also an attractive possibility. Since Korean equities
are in high demand it would be opportune to include them in bond packages in
such a way as to benefit from that demand. Further action in this area would
be consistent with Korea's need to redress both the public-private and debt-
equity imbalances in its liability structure.
21. Equity Enhancement Strategy: Korea can take the following measures
to increase the inflow of equity investment (see paras. 3.31-3.43 and
paras. 4.12-4.14):
(a) expand existing investment funds for foreigners to purchase Korean
stocks;
(b) establish additional funds, similar to the Korea Fund, on other
foreign stock exchanges;
(c) accelerate the program of opening further industries for direct
foreign investment;
(d increase the limit under which automatic approval is granted for
direct foreign investment;
(e) strengthen the domestic capital market by undertaking a number of
technical, fiscal, institutional and market-promoting measures; and
(f) increase confidence in the domestic capital market by undertaking a
number of reforms to improve corporate disclosure and accounting
practices, to curb insider trading, and to protect the small
investor.
22. Risks and Safeguards. The rccommendation to enhance direct and
portfolio foreign investment would involve lifting certain restrictions on
capital movements to facilitate the sale and purchase of Korean equities and
the repatriation of dividends and profits. As equity inflows increase so will
potential outflows in the form of repatriable funds. Greater capital market
openness can carry two sorts of risks, the risk of macroeconomic instability
and the risk of loss of control of domestic assets to foreigners. Both risks
can be contained, however, in ways that would be consistent with the attrac-
tion of greater amounts of equity inflows into Korea.
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23. The risk of macroeconomic instability arises from the possibility of
large and volatile capital flows. Large inflows can occur in response to high
domestic interest rates and stock prices--this would tend to lead to exchange
rate appreciation-which, in turn, would damage export competitiveness. At
other times, when the economy is sluggish or political instability prevails,
large amounts of capital could flow out--this would reduce the resouces needed
to pull the economy out of recession. The experience of Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay during 1979-81 is often cited in support of this contention. If large
inflows and outflows occur within a short period of time the costs of adjust-
ment and readjustment to them (in terms of resource movements across sectors)
might be quite large.
24. The above-described risk of macroeconomic instability is limited in
Korea's case by the fact that, unlike in the Latin case, such liberalization
of capital movements as will be necessary will be occurring in a very strong
macroeconomic context featuring a modest fiscal deficit, a strong current
account, a relatively undistorted exchange rate, low inflation and a tradition
of economic policy-making of high calibre and credibility. Thus th1e best way
for Korea to contain the possible risk of macroeconomic instability would be
to maintain the economic policy regime it has in place currently. Moreover,
complete or immediate liberalization of the capital account will not be
necessary to attract greater amounts of equity inflows--partial and selective
liberalization should suffice. At the same time, monitoring of "large"
capital movements should be continued.
25. As far as the risk of losing control over domestic assets is con-
cerned, several measures can be undertaken to ensure that liberalized
portfolio foreign investment does not lead to management take-overs by
foreigners. Several safeguard mechanisms have been experimented with in other
countries, and Korea can easily adopt one or the other of such mechanisms (see
paras. 3.36-3.41). It is recommended here that foreign holdings be restricted
to a separate class of non-voting or restricted voting shares. Both the
amount and the allocation of such investment can be adequately controlled in
the context of a strategy of encouraging a greater amount of equity inflows
than allowed at present.
26. External Financing in the Sixth Plan. The external financing pro-
gram of the Sixth Plan indicates that Government is cognizant of the need to
modify Korea's existing external liability structure. Many of the deficien-
cies identified in this report have also been recognized in the Plan and
several of the objectives listed in this report are in keeping with the goals
of the Plan. Among the more notable financing goals of the Plan are the
reduction of the ratio of short-term debt to total debt, the diversification
among sources of funds, the increase of the share of equity inflows in total
foreign capital inflows and the promotion of the domestic stock market through
various pricing, technical, and institutional reforms. This report endorses
the external liability management program of the Sixth Plan since this program
would move Korea towards a model of financing consistent with its future needs
and with prospective entry into the group of developed industrial economies, a
group which on the basis of tvsny economic fundamentals Korea is ready to join.
I. ASSESSMENT OF KOREA'S EXTERNAL LIABILITY STRUCTURE
A. Introduction
1.01 This report considers external financing choices for Korea. It
assesses the structure of Korean external liabilities in the light of (a)
general principles of liability management; (b) economic characteristics and
programs specific to the country and its future evolution; and (c)
developments in international capital markets. It also assesses, in the
framework of these factors, the desirability and feasibility of various future
financing options.
1.02 It should be emphasized at the outset that neither the level nor the
composition of Korea's liabilities poses an immediate problem - they may
invite attention but they do not provoke concern. Unlike most developing
countries, Korea currently faces a most comfortable external financing
environment characterled by an excess supply of funds and improvements in
terms and conditions.- It is precisely this sort of "borrower's-market"
environment that provides the latitude to negotiate desirable changes in
external financing arrangements. Furthermore, recent developments in inter-
national financial markets have made some such modifications technically
possible. A major theme of this report is that Korea should take advantage of
current opportunities in international capital markets to develop better
mechanisms to absorb and deflect future shocks that may emanate from the
international economic system.
1.03 International Financial Market Developments. The pace and variety
of innovations occurring over the last few years in international financial
markets have been remarkable. The creation of new instruments which help to
integrate markets has blurred the traditional role performed by the various
credit, bond and equity markets. There have also been significant improve-
ments in the marketability and, consequently, in the liquidity of funding
instruments. This development, in turn, has widened the appeal of inter-
national financial markets, thereby attracting significant new sources of
funding. Betvsen 1982 and 1985 total borrowing in in Prnational capital
markets increased by US$88 billion to US$267 billion. This increase
occurred despite a fall, during the same period, in syndicated bank lending
from US$98 billion to US$42 billion. The trend reflects a shift towards dis-
l/ The currently favorable external financing situation has been created by
the sharp drop in the price of oil, declining interest rates and an
appreciating yen. Lower oil prices and interest rates have resulted in
large cost savings on the import bill while the appreciating yen has
facilitated Korean exports to OECD markets. As a result the current
account is set to show a substantial surplus in 1986 and the demand for
external finance is correspondingly lower.
2/ Financial Market Trends, OECD, No. 33, p.7. (The data exclude merger-
related standbys and renegotiations.)
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intermediation in international financial markets involving a change in
emphasis in the role of banks. They are now reducing the extent of their
traditional lending, placing greater emphasis on transferable or marketable
instruments and fAcilitating disintermediation by a greater emphasis on under-
writing of otherwise facilitating the flow of funds from investors to
borrowers. For example, between 1982 and 1983 the share of securitized forms
of financing in total borrowing in international capital markets increased
from 44Z to 80%. Finally, partly as a result of all of these developments,
significant progress has been made towards dismantling barriers that
traditionally have segregated national financial markets.
1.04 These integration, securitization, diversification and globalization
processes taking place in international financial markets are creating enor-
mous opportunities for both borrowers and investors. For those capable of
accessing these markets, the opportunities now exist for the attainment of
asset and liability portfolio structures which, if not ideal, should at least
be a vast,improvement on what could have been achieved only a few years ago.
The manner in which such structures are attained is also equally important,
since it can result in reduced costs for the borrower or enhanced benefits for
the investor: in many instances, these costs/benefits could be quite signi-
ficant. For example, in addition to the general decline in interest rates
which has been taking place over the past three years, there has -Iso been a
decline in spreads on international bank loans. This is partly attributable
to the competition being provided by new forms of financing in international
capital markets. In addition to these declines in spteads on international
syndicated credits, borrowers using other forms of financing have often
achieved very attractive spreads over LIBOR (or some other reference rate).
In fact, many prime quality borrowers have managed to receive sub-LIBOR
spreads. Although not yet ranked as a prime quality borrower, a country like
Korea, facing improved economic prospects, should be able to capitalize to a
greater extent on the opportunities now available in international financial
markets.
1.05 Aspects of Korean Economy Affecting Desired Composition of Future
Capital Inflows. The pattern of external finance that is most desirable for a
country depends to a great extent on existing and evolving features of the
country's economy. For Korea the following features would seem to be most
relevant.
(a) Dependence upon International Trade. Korea's trade-dependence is
remarkably high - the sum of exports and imports amounted to about
76Z of GNP in 1983-85. Because of a paucity of domestic resources
(minerals, forests, agricultural goods, etc.) the country has to
import in order to export and has made a living for the last twenty
years on the value its labor force has added in the process of
converting imports to exports. Korea's openness makes it extremely
vulnerable to shocks originating in the international trading
system. In particular, Korea is threatened by the recent increase
in protectionism.
(b) High Dependence on External Finance. Korea is one of the largest
users of external finance among developing countries. Changes in
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the terms and conditions at which international finance is available
have a large effect on Korea's macroeconomic performance because its
historical use of external finance has resulted in an outstanding
debt of about $45 billion (end-1986 4ta) of which almost 601 is
contracted on a floating rate basis.,
(c) Underdeveloped Financial Sector. The domestic financial system is
underdeveloped and despite some liberalization measures in the last
two years is still regulated by the authorities to a substantial
degree. A high proportion of banks are in public ownership,
including the three which effectively borrow on the Goveruient's
behalf and which set the benchmark terms for Korean debt., The
deposit money banks include some 45 foreign banks whose access to
local currency is restricted and who concentrate on wholesale and
foreign-currency business. Korean capital markets are also highly
regulated and the Seoul stock exchange is somewhat peripheral given
that the main industrial conglomerates have traditionally been
reluctant to relinquish control by making public share issues.
(d) Industrial and Corporate Finance Structure.' The manufacturing and
trading sector is dominated by about 15 large conglomerates. These
conglomerates operate across many industries, are generally
undercapitalized and consequently very highly geared financially.
The average (manufacturing sector) debt-equity ratio in Korea is
about 3.6, compared to 3.2 in Japan and 1.0 in the US. The ratio
for the conglomerates is even higher.
(e) Changing Role of Government. Since 1980/81 the Government has
followed a gradual process of withdrawing from industrial investment
and credit allocation decisions. It intends'to continue doing so in
the future with a view to creating an essentially market-run
business environment. One implication of this is that the implicit
guarantee of government support for failing industries will also be
reduced pari passu, and the private sector will have to develop
alternative mechanisms for handling business failures. It is very
likely that these mechanisms will involve a different corporate
3/ This is not to say that sheer size makes Korea's debt unmanageable.
Because of excellent export performance Korea has never had to reschedule
debt payments. While Korea was the fourth largest debtor among
developing countries in 1983, it ranked 16th in terms of its debt to
export ratio and 15th in terms of its debt-servicing ratio. Dependence
on external finance has been declining recently: foreign savings
declined as a percentage of GNP from around 10 in 1980 to about 2X in
1985. In 1986 Korea reduced its external debt by about $1.8 billion
thereby transferring domestic savings out of the country (on a net basis)
for the first time in its modern economic history.
4/ These are the Korea Development Bank (KDB), Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) and
the Korea Export Import Bank (KExim).
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financing strategy than the high leverage strategy prevalent until
now, a strategy that should spread project risks over a wide group
of investors rather than concentrate them in a narrow group of
banks .-
(f) Changing Industrial Structure. Korea is moving into manufacturing
sectors (e.g., automobiles, electronics) characterized by larger and
riskier investments. In order to become established in these
sectors Korean corporations will need more than a mastery of the
basic production technology. They will need a financial structure
that can see them through business downturns as well as fund an
extensive production and marketing network. In the past, Korean
corporations had easy access to the Government's vast financial
resources. In the future, the changing industrial structure may
have to be matched by a changing financial structure which spreads
risks more effectively.
Table 1.1: SELECTED FEATURES OF KOREAN ECONOMY
1983 1984 1985
Dependence Upon Trade (Z)
Exports G&S/GNP 37.7 38.9 37.8
Imports G&S/GNP 39.0 39.2 37.2
Trade/GNP 76.6 78.1 74.0
Debt/Exports 132.9 128.1 142.2
Dependence Upon External Finance
External debt (US$ billion) 40.4 43.1 46.8
Debt/GDP 51.4 50.4 54.3
Debt service ratio 18.8 20.4 21.7
Foreign savings/GNP 2.9 2.3 1.9
Financial Sector Features (Z)
Financial assets/GNP 300 329 350
National savings/GNP 25.3 27.4 28.4
Public bank credit/Total credit /a 52.6 53.5 54.4
Debt to equity ratio (Manuf.) 3.6 3.4 n.a.
Stock market capitalization/GDP (Z) 6.7 7.0 7.7
/a Public banks refer to all specialized banks and development institutions
as defined by the Bank of Korea.
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea.
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B. Desirable Characteristics of Foreign Capital Inflow
1.06 There are no simple and universal rules regarding debt management
nor is there a simple "optimal borrowing strategy" that can be widely applied.
The appropriate itructure of capital inflows will differ among countries and
over time and is affected by a variety of internal and external factors not
many of which may be subject to Government control. Nevertheless, a number of
characteristics that new capital inflows might possess can be identified,
which, if incorporated in the existing stock of external liabilities, would
alleviate the most fundamental debt servicing problems facing very many
developing countries. In order to act as a guide to debt management in Korea,
it will, of course, be necessary to adapt these general characteristics to the
particular circumstances of the country.
1.07 It is generally agrQed that in addition to low cost the following
are desirable characteristics of foreign capital inflow:
(a) a wide dispersal of repayments over time;
(b) a diversified currency composition;
(c) a sharing of risk between borrowers and lenders;
(d) a dispersal of risk of default inside the economy;
(e) a correlation between debt service and the ability to pay;
(f) a diversity of funding sources which promotes stability of supply.
1.08 Each of the above characteristics has a direct cost and may have
potential indirect costs as well. The direct cost, of course, consists of the
extra payment that will be demanded by ienders or investors to provide the
appropriate characteristic. For example, longer maturities typically (but not
always) require a larger spread than shorter maturities. Indirect costs are
more subtle. It is possible for example that longer maturities may reduce the
possibility of diversifying among lenders/investors since some of these (e.g.
pension funds) are often restricted by regulation to short or medium term
assets. This particular example also illustrates the possibility of conflicts
among characteristics: acquiring more of one characteristic (maturity length)
may require having less of another (diversification of sources). Clearly, the
decision concerning which characteristics to emphasize in a country's external
liability structure and how much of those characteristics to acquire will
depend on their total costs measured in relation to the benefits they are
expected to confer. Since these costs and benefits vary over time it is
necessary also to pay attention to timing in the "purchase" of desirable
characteristics.
Dispersal of Repayments over Time
1.09 That the maturity structure of capital inflows has important conse-
quences for debt service is adequately illustrated by the problems caused in
the early 1980s by a rapid build-up of short term borrowings. However, the
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finance literature has little to say on the issue of maturity, apart from the
traditional adage that long-term needs should be financed long. This prin-
ciple implies that for project related investments loan 5 aturities should as
far as possible match the economic life of the project.5
1.10 For non-project financing also there is a clear preference for
longer maturities since the annual amortization component of debt service
declines as the maturity of the loan increases and debt-service difficulties
are more easily avoided because the payments are smaller in each period than
would be the case with shorter maturities. These benefits are generally
purchased at the cost of higher interest charges, given the normal-shaped
yield curve. Indeed, considerable cost savings may exist at the short-end of
the market. These cost savings, however, need to be carefully weighed against
the risk of a sudden withdrawal of credit facilities and against the adverse
implications for creditworthiness implied by heavy short-term borrowing.
Moreover, while short-term borrowings should not be used for general balance-
of-payments support nor for financing longer-term investment projects, an
essential function of short-term debt is to finance imports. Given the normal
patteri of import financing by 90 to 120 day credit, this would suggest that
short-term debt should not exceed a level corresponding to three to four
months imports. Semi-industrialized countries such as Korea which tend to
import relatively large amounts of intermediate goods for further processing
can probably justify a higher share of short-term debt in capital inflows than
countries that import mainly consumption and investment goods.
Table 1.2: MATURITY RELATED FEATURES OF KOREA'S DEBT
1979 1981 1983 1985
Short-term/Total debt 26.9 31.5 30.1 22.7
Medium-term/Total debt 2.8 3.2 4.8 4.9
Long-term/Total debt 70.3 65.3 65.1 72.4
Nontrade related short-term debt/
short-term debt n.a. 24.5 22.1 32.3
Short-term debt in import months /a 3.2 4.7 5.6 4.1
International reserves
in import months/a 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.0
International reserves/short-term debt 104.3 67.2 56.9 72.0
/a Merchandise import.
Source: Ministry of Finance
5/ Economic life should be interpreted in general terms to mean a reasonable
pay-back period geared to the nature of the project and likely stability
of cash flow to be generated from the project.
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1.11 Application to Korea. It was common to hear alarums about Korea's
maturity structure as recently as a year ago. Observers pointed to the legacy
of the rapid build-up of debt in 1979-80 in the form of a sharp increase in
the proportion of short-term debt in total debt (see T&ble 1.2), a steady
increase in the share of amortization in debt service payments (up from 8% in
1980 to 11% in 1984), and a "bunching" of repayments in the late 1980's (see
Table 1.3). The level of concern with Korea's maturity structure has declined
perceptibly in the last year or so primarily because of two developments:
(a) a steady reduction in the proportion of short-term debt, from a high of
34% in 1980 to under 23% in 1985; improvement is also indicated when short-
term debt is measured in terms of import months, the level of having fallen to
the equivalenX of around four months of imports in 1985 and probably below
that in 1986;9- and (b) favorable developments in terms of oil prices,
interest rates and the relative competitiveness of the won which, if sustained
in the medium term, will generate current account surpluses, reduce external
financing needs and allow Korea to ride over the amortization hump, which is
of moderate proportions to begin with, with ease. Given these considerations,
the maturity structure of Korean debt seems quite sound at the moment.
Nevertheless there is no harm in lengthening the maturity structure should it
be possible to do so at reasonable cost. Given the relatively flat yield
curve characterizing international capital markets these days and given
Korea's excellent economic fundamentals it would appear that Korea could
indeed get longer maturities at low cost on future financing arrangements.
Longer maturities would serve to keep future debt service payments lower than
they might otherwise be, a feature that w?7ld prove very useful in the event
of renewed high external financing needs.-
6/ This improvement mainly reflected efforts by Korea to reduce the use of
trade credits. The maturity period allowed for trade credits was reduced
from 180 days to 90 days and the eligibility for such credits was
restricted to a narrower set of imports than before. Steps were also
taken to reduce the volume of outstanding short-term swaps with foreign
banks and to tighten the availability of foreign currency loans to fund
equipment imports.
7/ Some concern has been expressed about the fact that many Korean bonds
issued on international markets in recent years have five-year "put"
options (which allow lenders to redeem the bond at the put date) attached
which, if exercised, would reduce the average maturity of medium and
long-term debt considerably. In this regard it is worth noting that the
practice of attaching "puts" is widespread and Korean bonds are not an
exception, that "puts" are not generally exercised unless the repayment
ability of the borrower deteriorates drastically, and that removing such
options from the bond contract could reduce the appeal of the instrument
to many investors and thereby reduce the amount of diversification of
funding sources.
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Table 1.3: PROJECTED DEBT AMORTIZATION FOR KOREA, 1985 TO 1990
- 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Amortization /a (US$ millions) 4,192 4,700 4,470i 4,710 4,770 3,930
As Z of MLT debt at end-1985 11.9 13.0 12.4 13.1 1342 10.9
/a On the basis of projected amoirtization on medium end long term debt
outstanding of US$36.52 billion at end-1985.
Source: Economic Planning Board.
Currency Composition of Inflows
1.12 The literature is not at all clear as to what would ;epresent an
optimum currency composition for capital inflows. In theory,8 and in the
long run, the particular currency of denomination of debt should not matter
since exlliange rates will vary inversely with interest rates. However, as
recent currency movements illustrate, departures from the "purchasing power
parity" theory of exchange-rate movements can be of long duration and of
unpredictable magnitude. Indeed, Morgan Guaranty (1984) shows that in a
situation in which exchange-rate movements do not fully reflect interest-rate
differentials, significant savings can be made by borrowing in low interest
currencies.
1.13 In determining the currency composition of capital inflows borrowers
typically seek to minimize the variability of their debt service obligations
and to minimize the cost of borrowing. These objectives correspond to the
hedging and the speculative components of a borrowing decision. The hedging
component aims at minimizing risk by insulating the economy from currency
volatility and changes in the terms of trade. The speculative component
reflects the borrowers' expectations of changes in exchange rates and interest
rates. In view of the markedly increased volatility of exchange rates during
the period of floating exchange rates and the great difficulty in accurately
forecasting such movements, it is argued here that the hedging motive should
predominate for developing countries. This strategy implies that variations
in the costs of financing resulting from exchange-rate changes should as far
as possible be matched by shifts in a country's income or exports and that
borrowers should be willing to pay to alleviate the risk involved.
8/ On the assumption that the premium or discount between forward and spot
exchange rates reflects only nominal interest-rate differentials and that
the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future rate.
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1.14 A number of proposals aimed at reducing currency risk have been put
forward. Kalderen (1985) and others suggest that the currency composition of
debt should match a country's export income as closely as possible. As an
alternative for countries with currencies tied to a basket, he proposes a
correlation between debt and the basket. McDonald (1982) recommends choosing
the currency composition of liabilities (net of reserves) in the light of the
composition of the foreign currency returns of associated investment
projects. However, recognizing that many projects will not have directly
identifiable foreign exchange returns, he suggests linking the currency
composition of debt to the general structure of foreign exchange earnings.
Lessard and Williamson (1985) suggest that curvency risk would be avoided by
contracting debts in a bundle of currencies that match the destination of
exports. Another strategy put forward is that of basing the currency composi-
tion of a country's debt on the pattern of its trade, that is, countries
should borrow in the currencies they earn from exporting and hold their
reserves in the currencies in which their imports are denominated. Finally,
Morgan Guaranty (1984) recommends that developing countries should incur a
portion of their debt in currencies other than the dollar in order to diver-
sify their intertqt and exchange-rate risks. It is also suggested that the
lack of a hedge - does not negate the potential benefits of diversification
since borrowing a mix of currencies provides a degree of protection against
commodity price fluctuations stemming from changes in the dollar's exchange-
rate against other major currencies.
1.15 There is a high degree of consistency between the proposals set out
above. In effect, all the studies agree in principle that the curreucy
composition of debt should be closely related to the currency distribution of
export receipts. In this way changes in the debtors' terms of trade would
tend to offset, at least partially, the exchange-rate losses on debt amortiza-
tion. However, the pursuit of such a policy in practice would be impractic-
able since it would involve borrowing in numerous relatively miayr currencies
which would not be available on international capital markets.- Moreover,
the administrative cost of managing such a wide portfolio of currencies would
be prohibitive. In the light of this there would appear to be considerable
merit in Kalderen's approach that, where applicable, the composition of debt
should match the shares of individual currencies in a currency basket; this
effectively excludes the currencies of relatively minor trading partnerii.
Indeed, an even more selective approach could be taken under which debt would
be contracted only in a handful of major currencies which make up the btulk of
export receipts. Such an approach would economize on debt management
resources while at the same time ensuring that the debtor is adequately
protected against the exchange-rate movements of the major currencies.
9/ Because, for example, foreign-exchange receipts are largely in dollars or
because exports are priced in dollar terms in world markets.
10/ However, countries can use the technique of currency swaps to obtain
currencies that may not be available to them directly.
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1.16 Application to Korea. The existing currency composition of Korea's
debt would appear to be reasonably balanced in view of Korea's trade pat-
tern. Some 80% of the debt is denominated in US dollars and some 12.5% in
Japanese yen. While the dollar composition appears heavy relative to the
geographical composition of exports (see Table 1.4) it would appear to be
reasonable relative to the currency composition of exports since the bulk of
exports to countries other than Japan are paid for in dollars. However, the
currency composition of the debt could become unbalanced as the pattern of
trade changes. For example, it is possible that the relative importance of
the US as a destination for Korean exports will decline in the future as Korea
pursues export diversification and/or if trade frictions with the US inten-
sify. It is also possible that the dollar's role as the world's major trading
currency may decline and that of the yen and selected European currencies may
increase. These considerations would argue for greater representation of the
non-dollar OECD currencies in future borrowings. This would also be appro-
priate from the hedging point of view since so large a proportion of debt is
held in just one currency, the US dollar. Given Korea's macroeconomic sensi-
tivity to its terms of trade and given the increased volatility of exchange
rates it would be desirable for Korea to adopt a more active currency manage-
ment strategy for the future. This strategy should be based on the principle
that variations in the cost of debt-servicing that result from exchange rate
changes should as far as possible be offset by changes in Korea's ability to
pay as measured say by its terms of trade. It would be useful to develop a
set of correlations between Korea's terms of trade and various exchange rates
and use these expected correlations to guide the choice of currency in future
borrowing.
1.17 It is very likely that the application of this principle would
suggest a greater representation of the yen in Korea's liability basket. Thfis
is so because the Japanese and Korean economies are similar in fundamental
respects and are affected similarly by major changes in the international
trade and finance environment. For example, an increase in the price of oil
affects both economies adversely and, ceteris paribus, should tend to worsen
their external balances and depreciate their respective currencies. Under
such circumstances a yen-heavy liability basket would provide a hedge for
Korea since the value of its liability would decline together with the
deterioration in its ability to service its debt. Similarly, a positive
external shock, such as a decline in oil prices, would tend to strengthen the
external balances and currencies of both countries. Korea would then be faced
with a higher debt-service burden (as the yen appreciates) but it would also
be in a stronger position to accommodate such a burden (as its external
balance improves).
Table 1.4: CURRENCY COMPOSITION OF MEDIUM AND LONG TERM PUBLIC DEBT
Debt Outstanding Disbursed (Z)
1983 1984
US$ 7942 80.1





Geographical Trade Composition (Z)
Exports to US/Total exports 33.7 35.8
Exports to Japan/Total exports 13.9 15.7
Imports from US/Total imports 24.0 22.4
Imports from Japan/Total impoirts 23.8 24.9
Source: World Bank Debtor Reporting System; Economic Statistics Yearbook,
Bank of Korea.
Project Risk Sharing
1.18 A major role of financial markets in industrial countries is that of
assisting risk diversification and the transfer of risk from more risk averse
to less risk averse agents. This aspect of external financial relations of
developing countries has also received increasing attention in recent years.
Although both borrower and lender would be willing to pay a premium to shift
rink, it is possible that foreign lenders, either because of a greater ability
to diversify a specific risk or a greater tolerance for bearing risk, may
demand a smaller premium than the maximum the borrower is willing to pay.
Because of this comparative advantage in bearing risk, the shifting of risk to
the lender would make both the borrower and the lender better off. Large
multinational companies, with extensively diversified business Myerests,
typically possess such a comparative advantage in risk-bearing.-
11/ Reasons why direct foreign investment flows declined relative to bank
loans despite the above-detscribed comparative advantage of large multi-
national firms to spread and bear risk are discussed in Chapter 4. An
important reason was availability of loans at low (even negative) real
interest rates through the 1970s as a consequence of a petrodollar
deposit glut among international coiercial banks.
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1.19 Present developing country financing arrangements with their concen-
tration on bank credits involve a rather limited degree of risk sharing.
There is obviously no risk sharing by outside investors in the case of exist-
ing non-project financing. However, even with lending for a specific project
or program, the prevalence of government guarantees ensures that the repayment
of funds is not contingent on the success of the project. In effect, the only
situation in which risk is shared wjIj the lender/investor is in the event of
debt repudiation by the government. The costs of such repudiation are such
as to make this occurrence extremely unlikely and the loss experience of
lenders in the post-World War II period confirms this.
1.20 Application to Korea. The classic medium for risk diversification
is foreign equity participation, either direct foreign investment or portfolio
investment. Korea's situation is characterized by the fact that less than 5%
of outstanding external liabilities are in the form of equity investments.
Indeed, there have only been two or three years since 1970 in which this
proportion has been higher than 5% of annual flows. This situation can be
contrasted with that of many other developing countries in whose cases the
ratios of foreign investment to total capital inflows have ranged from about
13% (Mexico, Argentina, Philippines) to as high as 95% (Singapore).
1.21 An important reason for Korea to consider external financing instru-
ments which have the property of project risk sharing is that the sectors
which are likely to launch Korea into the next stage of economic and technolo-
gical development (e.g. automotive equipment and sophisticated electronics)
are characterized by larger and riskier investments. Given also that the
government intends to adopt a less interventionist role in the future it will
be important for domestic entrepreneyS to utilize financing arrangements
which help shift these larger risks.-' Greater reliance by Korea on direct
and portfolio investment would also be advantageous because it would reduce
vulnerability to external disturbances and because of the impact of such
investment on long-term growth prospects which may be improved by the transfer
of technology and managerial skills that are generally associated with foreign
direct investment. Moreover, the direct involvement of foreign firms in the
Korean economy could help to reduce protectionist pressures against Korean
goods in major export markets. Obstacles to be overcome include a traditional
reluctance to cede control over enterprises to non-residents and the under-
developed state of the Korean stock exchange which lenes itself to somewhat
erratic price movements. A strategy for increasing riaa sharing would,
1'1 While it could be argued that debt rescheduling involves some risk
sharing on the part of the lender, to the extent that it merely postpones
payments to some future date without modifying the underlying obligation,
this is unlikely to 5e significant.
13/ The need to develop private sector mechanisms (such as the stock market)
to deal with future business risk is also discussed in the context of a
desirable future industrial policy for Korea in a recent Bank report
entitled Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition (Report No. 6138-KO).
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therefore, have to look at ways of achieving such sharing while minimizing
non-resident control and maintaining stock market stability.
Dispersal of Risk Inside Economy
1.22 Developments in world capital markets in the 1970. encouraged the
concentration of default risk inside the debtor's economy through the tying
together of risks of individual developing country loans via public guarantees
and cross default clauses. As a result the risk associated with most commer-
cial bank loans to developing countries--even those earmarked for specific
projects--is ultimately borne by the government of the borrowing country. The
shift to publicly-guaranteed financing has resulted in greater flexibility for
borrowers and in better borrowing terms. However, it has the disadvantage
that, as lenders are generally unable to distinguish accurately the risk of
individual projects within a particular developing country, it leads to an
equalization of lending rates for different project risks, with adverse impli-
cations for project choice. Moreover, such concentration of risk in the
government can be harmful to the extent that (a) it encourages excessive risk-
taking on the part of both borrowers and lenders (the "moral hazard" problem);
(b) it involves Government too deeply in industrial investment decisions; and
(c) it places a potentially large financial burden on the government.
1.23 Application to Korea. Default risk is very heavily concentrated in
Korea. Such concentration is at two levels. First, the predominance of con-
glomerates in the Korean industrial structure means that a limited number of
parent companies is responsible for the debts of Aany individual borrowing
companies. Secondly, the bulk of public sector borrowing is contracted by
three state-owned banks (KDB, KEB and Kixim) which on-lend to resident compa-
nies. Thus risk is also highly concentrated in the banking sector. On top of
this already concentrated banking and private-sector risk, lenders generally
perceive that virtually all (inclu .rg private) Korean external borrowing is
effectively government guaranteed ,,and the recent experience of the Kukje
conglomerate tends to support this.IV Mot surprisingly risk concentration is
also high in the case of domestic credit. Again a few-conglomerates are
heavily indebted to a few banks and, because of the past use of the banking
system as an instrument of Government industrial policy, the ultimate risk is
considered to be borne by the Covernment whether or not eacplicit guarantees
14/ Over 802 of total external debt is formally guaranteed by the Korean
Government. However, the proportion of debt that is effectively
Government guaranteed is undoubtedly higher still.
15/ The Kukje conglomerate went bankrupt in 1985. None of its foreign
creditors were, however, adversely affected as the Government assured
them that their loans would be repaid. The moral hazard problem has been
particularly evident in the construction and shipping industries in which
firms grew recklessly on the strength of credit. Despite low profit-
ability and excessiv gearing on the part of borrowers, lenders were
willing to lend on the basis of government-guarantees which, indeed, did
not have to be explicit in all cases.
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exist. While methods of reducing this risk concentration would be beneficial
to project selection, this advantage might be partly offset if it were pur-
chased at the cost of higher borrowing rates for the already highly geared
private sector.!.. In the long run, however, there should be advantages to
pursuing instruments that maximize risk dispersal. In general, such instru-
ments include non-guaranteed corporate bonds, non-recourse finance (i.e.,
loans that can be serviced only out of revenues generated by the project),
equity investment and various new forms of investment such as production
shares or incentive contracts. Under all these alternatives the lender would
have a strong interest in assuring the project is well conceived and executed,
and would understand that government relief would not be forthcoming in case
of project failure.
Ability to Pay Considerations
1.24 The shift in the composition of capital inflows to developing
countries towards more reliance on bank credit and less on equity has resulted
in a pattern of debt service payments that is unrelated to, or (as has been
the case in the recent period of falling commodity prices) perversely related
to ability to pay. In the case of fixed interest debt, the existence of fixed
external obligations exacerbates the impact of sudden revenue shortfalls since
the absolute decrease will represent a larger proportionate decrease of net
revenues than of gross revenues. The experience with floating rate debt has
been even more painful for developing countries: such debt allied to the
record interest rates (both nominal and real) of the early 1980s greatly
increased the volatility of debt service obligations by spreading increases in
interest rates not only to newly contracted debt but also to all existing
floating rate debt. Moreover, the coincidence of high interest rates with
declines in national income of many developing countries impaired these
countries' ability to maintain debt service.
1.25 A desirable characteristic of capital inflows is, therefore, that
debt-service obligations should be related to the borrower's ability to pay.
In particular, the problems created by a repayment pittiern which is indepen-
dent of unexpected changes in terms of trade and of the success or failure of
particular projects have focussed attention on the need for equity type finan-
cial instruments that would link repayments to outcome. The attractiveness of
such instruments is borne out by a recent study of twelve developing countries
(not including Korea) which concluded that total returns on foreign direct
investment are more correlated with a country's ability to service its
external liabilities (as measured by growth of GDP) t Wr are interest payments
on external debt (International Monetary Fund, 1985), The greater the
association between movements in service obligations and in output, the less
the reduction in expenditure required to geaerate resources to meet service
payments and, consequently the greater the contribution to the external
adjustment process.
16/ The IMF (1985) study ktso showed that the incidence of debt rescheduling
was lower for countries that had a higher fraction of their external
liabilities in the form of equity investments.
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1.26 Too fine a point should not be placed on this role of equity
instruments in the external adjustment process because the foreign exchange
impact of such instruments arises not just from dividend remittances but also
from reinvested earnings, There is some evidence that suggests that reinvest-
ment earnings tend to decline as domestic economic conditions deteriorate and,
if this component is large relative to the dividend remittance component, the
net impact on the exterrA. adjustment process could be similar to that of
service payments on ext.enal debt. Nevertheless the evidence also indicates
that foreign investment inflows, whether new or reinvested are strongly
affected by the host country's economic policies. A set of appropriate
exchange rate, interest rate and other macroeconomic policies is likely to
have a stronger and more durable effect on the pattern of foreign equity
investment than transient phases of the business cycle. To this extent the
importance of such investment in aiding adjustment to an external shock is
partly subject to policy control. A related matter pertains to the relative
costs of dividend payments and interest payments. Since equity investment is
riskier than lending, the average dividend rate should be higher than the
average interest rate in order to compensate the investor for accepting higher
risk. Thus, while the payments on equity instruments may tend to correspond
better to the ability to pay, it should be remembered i t, on average, they
will also be highar than payments on debt instruments. -
1.27 Application to Korea. The size and nature of Korea's outstanding
debt (about $47 billion of which almost 60X is repayable at floating rates) is
such that macroeconomic performance is vulnerable to even small changes in
international trade and finance arrangements. Even under optimistic assump-
tions regarding the need for future inflows the annual debt service bill is
due to rise steadily i.nd substantiaiij from about $7-8 billion in 1985 to
$10.8 billion 1991 (see Table 1.5), { Given an optimistic export growth rate
projection of 11.5% during 1987-91 this debt service burden would appear to be
quite manageable. Should such export growth not be possible the task of
servicing the debt becomes daunting indeed. In view of the importance of the
external sector to Korea's economic welfare it would appear imperative for the
country to develop external financing arrangements that at least hasa the
potential of aiding in the process of external adjustment.
17/ The Economist (March 15, 1986, p. 67) reports that from 1978 to 1983 the
average foreign exchange cost of servicing direct investment was less
than 5Z compared to the average interest cost of 13Z on bank loans.
While this was probably due to the extraordinarily high interest rates in
the early 1980s this finding could also arise from high rates of rein-
vestment brought about by high expectations of future earnings.
18/ The scenario shown in Table 1.5 is based on the optimistic schedule of
external financing requirements that underlies the Sixth Plan. Should
Sixth Plan assumptions for export growth and domestic savings not be
validated by actual experience, the servicing of the debt accumulated in
the early 1980s will exercise a considerable drag on the economy for the
next several years.
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Table 1.5: KOREA's DEBT SERVICE
(US$ million)
1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
Historical Debt Service
Total debt service 1,479 2,971 5,772 6,351 7,879
Interest 650 1,354 3,476 3,187 3,687
Amortization 829 1,617 2,296 3,164 4,192
Debt service ratio (Z) 10.8 15.3 21.2 20.9 23.9
Projected Debt Service 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total debt service 7,920 8,820 9,420 10,005 10,440 10,790
Interest 3,920 4,220 4,370 4,455 4,540 4,590
Amortization 4,000 4,600 5,050 5,550 5,900 6,200
Debt service ratio (Z) 20.5 20.5 19.2 18.7 17.6 16.4
Source: 1977-85, Ministry of Finance; 1986-91, Economic Planning Board.
1.28 Whether external financing in the form of direct and portfolio
investment has this property in the Korean context cannot be conclusively
established from available data. The data, however, do support the general
presumption that repayments associated with such equity inflows tend to be
more related to the ability to pay than are repayments necessitated by debt
inflows. For example, simple correlations over the period 1977-85 show that
while the debt service ratio has been negatively correlated with GNP growth in
Korea (r = -0.32) the "investment service" burden (total remittances divided
by exports) has been positively correlated (r * 0.20). The low degrees of
correlation and the small sample sizes caution against forming definite con-
clusions, however. Furthermore, the cost of equity inflows relative to debt
has been declining since the early 1980s. Indeed, dividend payment rates have
typically been less than interest rates (See Chapter 4). Also, while during
the 1970s almost 75% of total annuta earnings on foreign investment was
repatriated and the rate of reinves4mont was accordingly low, this appears to
have changed ia recent years as a more encouraging environment has been
created for such investment. For all of the above reasons it would appear to
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be in Korea's interesy increase the proportion of equity inflows in future
external liabilities9
Assured Accesj to External Finance
1.29 One of the main features of the world economy since the early 1970s
has been increased instability in key variables which has resulted in volatile
capital flows to developing countries. An important objective for developing
countries therefore is to maintain a steady flow of finance, within limits
determined by creditworthiness considerations. A secure flow of external
finance facilitates the planning process, permits the smooth absorption of
real resources, avoids over-rapid balance-of-payments adjustment and maintains
borrowers' debt servicing capacity. The most effective method for developing
countries to enhance the stability of inflows is by pursuing credible economic
policies over a period of years. Apart from that, within the narrower con-
fines of debt management, stability would be fostered by avoiding an overcon-
centration of inflows from any particular capital market ir group of investors
or type of instrument. An optimal mix of various types of financing would be
such that changes in any one component could be absorbed by changes in another
without having excessive impact on either borrowers or lenders. The recent
trend in international capital markets towards shifting the financing of
developing countries from the commercial banks, where it is dominated by a few
key players, to securities markets, which are more atomistic and anonymous is
consistent with this strategy. It could be argued that the growing integra-
tion of international financial markets might undermine the effectiveness of
diversifying sources of borrowing since, if there was a significant positive
covariance across both lenders and instruments credit sources would dry up
simultaneously when crises occur. This conclusion, however, would not hold in
the presence of market rigidities and segmentation and there is indeed evi-
dence.that such imperfections continue to exist despite growing integration.
As a result, a policy of diversification of markets and instruments is likely
to increase the utability of a given capital inflow and, in certain circum-
stances, may even increase the level of inflows available to the debtor.
1.30 Application to Korea. The "stability" characteristic of capital
inflows suggests that other forms of external finance including international
bond., direct investment and portfolio investment should be substituted for
19/ This should not be taken to construe that bank finance cannot play a role
in adjustment. The evolution of bank lending to Korea since 1970 shows
heavy concentrations of net transfers around 1975-74 and 1979-82, a fact
which suggests that bank finance has played a countercyclical role his-
torically. However, more than half of the loans arranged during 1978-82
were short-term loans and carried extremely high interest rates.
Furthermore, the repayment obligations of such finance were both large in
scale and inflexible in character. Finally, the heavy borrowing of the
late 70's has brought Korea close to the country lending limits of most
of its traditional banks. This raises the possibility that these banks
may be less accommodating to Korea in the future than they have been in
the past.
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bank credits; that as many capital markets as possible be tapped and, within
the various markets, that a wide range of investor groups be targeted. Korean
external liabilities' are extremely concentrated in terms of instrumreilt,
currency and market. While the use of bond finance has increased in recent
years (to about 24% of total inflows) much of this paper is subject to four or
five year "put" options (which allow investors to redeem the paper at or after
the put date) and is held by internaticnal banks and not passed on to non-bank
investors. Thus, this type of finance is not very different from medium-term
bank credits. As regards other instruments, foreign equity investment in
Korean shares is confined to a limited number of investment trusts and con-
vertible debenture issues (see Table 3.4). With regard to diversification by
market, Korea is one of the few developing countries to have access to inter-
national bond markets. Although public issues have been made in the Japanese,
German and Swiss markets, because of fears of an inadequate credit rating,
Korea has not so far attempted to access the domestic United States or United
Kingdom markets. Thus, there is considerable scope for Korea to further
diversify capital inflows by market and instrument.
C. Comparison of Instruments
1.31 The previous section has discussed a number of characteristics that
are generally considered to be desirable features of a country's external lia-
bility structure. The next step is to select from the large number of pos-
sible instruments and financing arrangements those that embody to the greatest
extent the desirable characteristics just outlined. Since the number of
possible instruments is very large it is convenient to group them into three
broad categories, syndicated loans, bonds, and equity instruments. The
comparison of these instruments is summarized in Table 1.6 which cross-clas-
sifies instruments by desirable inflow characteristics in the light of Korea's
experience so far.
1.32 The comparison permits several broad conclusions. First, conven-
tional syndicated loans are found to rank lowest in all the characteristics
considered. Developing countries are not typically offered maturities in
keeping with project duration and payback considerations, and Korea has not
been an exception in this regard. Indeed there has been a shortening in the
average maturity offered on new medium and long term loans in recent years.
As far as debt service is concerned, Korea has never yet had to r-schedule or
renegotiate its obligations but this redounds to the credit of Ko--n economic
management, and not to the flexibility of the loan instruments concerned.
Indeed, the high level of servicing expected in the rest of this decade has
tied Korea to the wheel of exports even more tightly. A lower than expected
rate of growth of exports would significantly increase Korea's adjustment
burden given its present structure of external liabilities. Macroeconomic
policy is thus constrained to the extent that trade surpluses must be genera-
ted to meet debt servicing obligations. As far as diversity of funding sour-
ces is concerned a few large banks dominate the supply of international
syndicated credits to Korea: the bulk of its syndications are arranged by
large American and Japanese banks and participation by smaller regional banks
and European banks has tended to be low.
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Table 1.6: CLASSIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS BY INFLOW CHARACTERISTICS
Instruments
Desirable inflow characteristics Loans Bonds Equity
Long maturities L H H
Diversified currencies M M M
Risk sharing L L H
Risk dispersal within economy L L H
Correlation of debt service with
ability to pay L L H
Diversity of Sources L M H
Code: Extent to which instruments embody desirable characteristics
L = little, H - moderately; H = to a large extent.
1.33 A second conclusion is that bonds kave only been marginally better
than syndicated loans in respect of the characteristics being considered.
While Korea has shifted a significant portion of its debt to bond-type instru-
ments in recent years this has brought about only minor improvements in cur-
rency exposure, maturities, or lender diversification. Korea's access to
European currencies remains limited although there have been a couple of
forays into the West German and Swiss bond markets. Host Korean bonds carry
eight year maturities but with a five-year put option which effectively limits
the maturity to the put date. Finally, the market for Korean bonds has been
limited to a rather narrow group of commercial ',anks, many of whom have simply
substituted bonds for loans in their Korean exposures. Corporations, money
funds and individual investors have not been attracted to Korean bonds in
significant numbers. By and large, except for some lowering of cost (narrower
spreads), Korea does not appear to have benefitted significantly from replac-
ing co ",entional syndicated floating rate loans with conventional bonds and
notes. The experience of other countries, however, indicates that Korea has
not adequately exploited the bond markets potential for increasing maturities
and diversification.
1.34 A third conclusion that follows from the comparison is that equity
instruments score well on all characteristics: they do not give rise to
foreign exchange risk, their maturities are linked to the life of the project
being financed, debt service depends on degree of project success, risk is
effectively spread among the investors, the sources of finance tend to be
diversified and macroeconomic adjustment is typically made easier. A logical
inference to be drawn from the above is that Korea should seek a larger pro-
portion of future capital inflows in the form of equity investments.
1.35 In the case of Korea these general conclusions may merit some
refinement. First, the classification of instruments is too broad. Instru-
ment innovations are proceeding at a rapid pace in international capital
markets and it is well known that within each of the three categories consid-
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ered in Table 1.6, there now are many different instruments which vary signi-
ficantly in properties. Korea may be well placed to take advantage of some of
the more beneficial instruments. Second, the costs and benefits of each
instrument need to be examined in the light of the actual coastraints and
experience of Korea and not just in theoretical or conceptual terms. In some
cases, while some instrumenits may appear to be extremely beneficial to Korea,
they may not actually be available to it. In other cases the true costs can
only be determined empirically and after experience. These considerations are
dealt with in the next three chapters which discuss financing options for
Korea in the market for loans, notes and bonds (Chapter 2), the market for
portfolio foreign investment (Chapter 3) and that for direct foreign invest-
ment (Chapter 4). For each market, recent innovations and recent developments
are reviewed and the potential for Korean access is evaluated. Recommenda-
tions for future action are offered in Chapter 5.
1.36 Risks and Safeguards: The recommendation to enhance direct and
portfolio foreign investment would involve lifting certain restrictions on
capital movements to facilitate the sale and purchase of Korean equities and
the repatriation of dividends and profits. As equity inflows increase so will
potential outflows in the form of repatriable funds. Greater capital market
openness can carry two sorts of risks, the risk of macroeconomic instability
and the risk of loss of control of domeitic assets to foreigners. Both risks
can be contained in ways that would not be inconsistent with the attraction of
greater amounts of equity inflows into Korea.
1.37 The risk of macroeconomic instability arises from the possibility of
large and volatile capital flows. Large inflows can occur in response to high
domestic interest rates and stock prices--this would tend to lead to exchange
rate appreciation which, in turn, would damage export competitiveness. At
other times, when the economy is sluggish or political instability prevails,
large amounts of capital could flow out--this would reduce the resources
needed to pull the economy out of recession. The experience of Chile,
Argentina and Uruguay during 1979-81 could be cited in support of this conten-
tion. Whereas OECD countries with larger GNP's might be able to cope satis-
factorily with volatile capital flows (of the magnitude so far experienced)
Korea with its smaller GNP might be affected more severely. If large inflows
and outflows occur within a short period of time the costs of adjustment and
readjustment to them (in terms of resource movements across sectors) might be
quite large.
1.38 The scenario just drawn, however, is unlikely to occur in Korea
because, unlike the Latin countries, Korea will be liberalizing from a base
situation in which no large or unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances exist:
at present the fiscal deficit is modest, the current account is strong, the
exchange rate is not distorted and inflation is very low. Also, the policy
credibility factor which was missing in the Latin example, is strong in
Korea's case and the record of the Government in managing the economy is
excellent. Finally, the magnitude of the net annual inflows that might be
expected from further liberalization is not so large as to provoke concern.
Since Government seeks to reduce net borrowing sharply over the next few years
it is likely that the bulk of the expected equity inflows will simply replace
existing debt inflows. As already argued, the replacement of debt by equity
inflows should aid the process of adjusting to external shocks.
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1.39 Thus, the best way for Korea to contain the possible risk of
macroeconomic instability would be to maintain the economic policy regime it
has in place currently. At the same time, continued monitoring and control of
"large" capital account transactions could be continued. Complete or
immediate liberalization is not necessary to attract greater amounts of equity
inflows--partial and selective opening up should suffice.
1.40 As far as the risk of losing control over domestic assets is
concerned, several measures can be undertaken to ensure that liberalized port-
folio foreign investment does not lead to management take-overs by foreign-
ers. Several safeguard mechanisms have been experimented with in other
countries and Korea can easily adopt one or the other of such mechanisms (see
Chapter 3 for discussion). Both the amount and the allocation of such inflows
can be adequately controlled in the context of a strategy of encouraging a
greater amount of investment than allowed at present.
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II. FUTURE FINANCING OPTIONS: LOANS, NOTES, BONDS AND SWAPS
2.01 This chapter examines future financing options for Korea in inter-
national loan, note and bond markets. Before future financing options are
analysed, however, it is useful to consider the factors that influence Korean
access to international capital markets. An understanding of these factors
should help in assessing the scope and limitations of Korean initiatives to
affect the supply of foreign funds.
A. Determinants of Market Access for Korea
2.02 Discussions with market participants, a review of press conmnents and
the literature on the determinants of market access for developing countries
suggest that the following are the most important factors influencing Korea's
market access.
2.03 Debt Size. The &bsolute amount of Korea's foreign debt is undoub-
tedly the most significant factor affecting its access to external finance.
The effects of the second oil crises, the macroeconomic policies pursued to
overcome these effects, the increase in the, local won value of the US dollar
(in which the bulk of external debt is denominated) and high US interest rates
(in the context of a country relying to a large extent on floating-rate debt)
have push,ed Korea's external debt to the fourth highest level for developing
countries.
2.04 Debt Concentration. The bulk of Korea's external debt is concentra-
ted in banks. There would also seem to be a regional factor taken into
account in asset portfolio management by banks. In particular, banks
recognize regional instability factors. For example, developments in the
Philippines and the possibility of protectionism growing in the USA and the
EEC influence banks in assessing their appropriate degree of exposure to the
Asian region. Since lending to Korea tends to dominate certain banks' books
in that area and since other countries in the region have been more successful
in switching some of their funding requirements to non-banks, the movement of
some major banks' 'Asian books' to Asia may have tended to highlight the
extent of banks' exposure to Korea.
2.05 Creditworthiness Criteria. While Korea performs well in respect of
many of the economic factors influencing creditworthiness, it is clear that
some of these cause anxiety. The debt-service ratio at around 21% is high
relative to most cowntries in the area and is exceeded mainly by Latin-
American countries. ° Some banks may also be placing more emphasis on the
20/ If short-term external debt is taken into account the position is more
serious. While the IMF has accepted that the funding of foreign banks' A
accounts may be treated as long term, they are cited as a negative factor
in periodicals. The level of the guaranteed profit on these funds may
also be in conflict with the 'spread' objective on external debt financ-
ing. The extent of corporate external debt and the debt of overseas
offices of Korean banks also tend to be highlighted.
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ratio of net external debt to GNP. In the case of Korea, this ratio tends to
be high relative to other countries in the area due to SQea's low level of
foreign exchange reserves (currently about $8 billion).±A' The low level of
reserves also affects the imports/reserves ratio and the reserves/GNP ratio.
There are also some indications that banks take into account a country's net
position with the international banking system. Korea may, therefore, be
losing out from the fact that a significant portion of its reserves is not
held with banks.
2.06 Political Factors. The perceived threat from the north, civil
unrest and pending political changes introduce a risk factor into the Korean
situation. The hosting of the Olympic games and the Presidential election in
1988 tend to highlight this issue. Developments in the Philippines may also
have had a greater negative impact on lenders/investors perceptions of Korea
than on other countries in the region.
2.07 Aspects of Industrialization Process. There is some concern about
the overreliance on a few large conglomerates for Korea's industrialization to
date. In particular, the perception is that these conglomerates are too
dependent on debt financing and on the use of cross guarantees (between
companies). They have an overreliance on the United States and Japan for
technology and trade: inter-group trade is also quite significant. Poor
accounting and audit standards and a general lack of group consolidated
accounts make banks nervous about the possibility of weaknesses which are not
apparent from the data available to them.
2.08 Degree of Development of Financial System. The lack of a well
developed financial system, including the stock market, is a concern to lend-
ers/investors. The private banking system is weak and presently relies on
government assistance, while foreign banks are restricted in the type of busi-
ness they can condluct. Public sector banking institutions are assigned a very
significant role in Korea. The banking system is, therefore, perceived as not
being very well developed. Similar anxiety is expressed about the 'thin' and
(almost entirely) 'closed' stock exchange.
2.09 Degree of Awareneas of Korean Affairs. A lack of awareness of
Korean affairs and of (readily available) information about Korean develop-
ments constrains Korea's access to markets, particularly to non-bank invest-
ors. This may be partly attributable to the fact that Korean companies are
engaged in a considerable amount of intermediate sales to companies: the mar-
keting effort novrmally associated with (final) consumer sales would tend to
have the spin-off of also promoting awareness of the country of origin of the
companies marketing their products.
2.10 There is some evidence that Korea's market access, at least -^
Europe, may suffer from a lack of the type of traditional linkages enjoyed by
21/ There also appears to be some concern about the inclusion of receivables
in the reserves. This also helps to explain the relat1vely low level of
Korean funds held with foreign banks.
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ex-colonial countries. For example, countries like Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, and India have long historical links with Europe. Investors
(particularly nonbank) in Europe lack detailed knowledge of the Korean economy
and this, in itself, may make them reluctant to invest in that country. Among
outsiders, Japanese banks and companies are most familiar with Korea and, as a
consequence, have tended to be Korea's most prominent financiers. While
American banks have historically been the chief source of external funds,
there is a remarkable lack of awareness of Korea in the US capit&l market.
2.11 Assessment. A cdmbination of the above-mentioned factors has
produced a situation in which, despite its excellent economic performance for
almost two decades now, Korea does not enjoy the best terms on its external
financing among its pfer countries. It has typically had to pay higher
spreads and front-end fees and to settle for shorter maturities. A comparison
of typical spreads with other Asian countries is presented in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: TYPICAL SPREADS - SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1983-85
Singapore 1/8 Malaysia 1/8 - 1/4
Hong Kong 1/4 - 3/8 Thailand 1/4 - 3/8
China 1/4 - 3/8 Indonesia 1/2 - 5/8
Korea 1/2 - 5/8
2.12 While Korea continues to effect a lengthening of the maturity struc-
ture of its debt, there is evidence that banks are reluctant to extend long-
term facilities. The size and concentration of debt have also tended to re-
strict Korea's funding options and even when it has used securitized instru-
ments, these have tended to be restricted in maturity and have usually failed
to achieve the desired objective of diversifying the holders of its debt.
2.13 The foregoing also points to actions that Korea might undertake in
order to improve its creditworthiness. Among such actions might be reducing
the debt service ratio, increasing the proportion of reserves, diversifying
away from banks by reaching out to the nonbank investor community and improv-
ing the workings of the domestic stock market. Actions along the above lines
would help in providing Korea a status within the financial community commen-
surate with its (rapidly improving) status in the world industrial community.
B. International Syndicated Credits
2.14 The development of the international syndicated loan was considered
to be a major financial innovation in the early 1970. as it enabled enormous
amounts of medium-term lending to be channelled to developing countries with-
out seeming to place individual banks, the members of the syndicate, at great
risk. Nevertheless, the recession of the early 1980s combined with
unprecedented high interest rates and declining commodity prices (including
that of oil) resulted in severe repayment difficulties, difficulties that have
rocked both large international banks and many developing countries (e.g.
9.>..X .*. .k .>.: t+.J.. -v.os... no<se ...... S-. ..V Ass.s... ^ s.. s a. bH2r< . .. 5Q1S.$ X eS.*SS26
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Brazil, Mexico, Argentina), thereby casting doubt on the efficacy of the
international syndicated credit as a tool for development finance. Since the
early 1980s9 activity in the international syndicated credit market has slowed
considerably (see Table 2.2) iA reaction to the debt crisis while activity in
competing, more liquid, instruments such as bonds and notes has increased
substantially. The decline has been sharpest for developing countries as a
whole--the total amount of funds raised by such countries in the form of
syndicated loans fell to $9 billion in 1985 or less than 25X of the level
reached in 1982. Countries in Asia now dominate this segment of the market as
"voluntary" loans to the Latin America borrowers have dried up.
Table 2.2: INTERNATIONAL SYNDICATED CREDIT3
1982 1983 1984 1985
(US$ billion)
Borrowers
OECD 54.8 32.0 28.7 19.3
OPEC 8.0 7.3 3.0 3.0
Other LDCv 32.5 24.9 19.8 13.1
Other 2.9 3.0 5.5 6.7
Total 98.2 67.2 57.0 42.1
LDCs excluding 'managed' loans 40.5 17.9 11.7 9.0
Of which: n.a.
Korea - 3.5 3.7 3.6
Malaysia - 1.4 1.0 Oe_v
Thailand - 0.4 0.8 0.4
Indonesia - 2.0 1.6 0.1
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, various issues.
2.15 In one sense Korea has bucked this trend since it continuel to have
access to this market. Indeed it has been the single largest borrower from
the Asian region in recent years. Nevertheless the effects of the perturba-
tions in international financial markets are also being felt by Korea. Large
US banks, which provided the bulk of syndicated credits to Korea in the past,
have been reducing their exposures in relative, and in some cases, absolute
terms as their global portfolio allocation strategy has responded to changes
in domestic banking regulations and equity market pressures. Net lending to
Korea by US banks declined from $2.3 billion in 1981 to $700 million in
1983. In 1984 and 1985 the flow was actually reversed as net lending averaged
about minus $1.25 billion. The slack thus created has been largely taken up
by Japanese banks and by alternative financing arrangements such as notes and
bonds. The proportion of gross annual external financing arranged through
loans has dropped from an average of about 89X in 1977-81 to about 57% in
1983-85 (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: COMPOSITION OF GROSS BORROV'ING SZ)
1977-81 1982 1983 1984 1985
Loans 89 86 57 59 56
Bonds 2 6 13 23 31
Other 9 8 20 18 13
Source: Ministry of Finance.
2.16 The relative disadvantages of loans as financing instruments have
been detailed in Chapter 1 in the discussion of desirable characteristics of
external liability structure. Some of these disadvantages were brought home
forcefully to developing countries in the debt crisis that emerged in 1982.
In thinking about future financial options for developing countries it is
worthwhile considering some of the many innovations that have been developed
or proposed for consideration within the framework of the syndicated credit
market. Among these the ones most often proposed as being useful for develop-
ing countries2lye flexible maturity loans, graduated payment loans and shared
equity loans.
2.17 Korean Potential for Innovative Loans. Korea's relatively high
export/GDP ratio makes it vulnerable to external shocks. Therefore, in judg-
ing the contribution of any proposed instrument to improving the structure of
Korea's external liabilities, a major consideration must be the degree to
which variations in export earnings would be reflected in the time profile of
debt service payments. Judged by this criterion the smooth path of debt ser-
vice payments made possible by a variable maturity loan would generally be
welcomed: although it is not directly related to the economy's ability to pay
it does at least reduce uncertainty and permit the earmarking of funds for
future debt service. However, a lengthening of loan maturity would only be
justified when this coincided with a deterioration in Korea's ability to
pay. Thus, the postponement of amortization by way of extending loan maturi-
ties would have been appropriate for Korea in the mid-1970s. By contrast, the
persistent decline in inflation and buoyant export markets since the early
22/ Under a flexible maturity loan arrangement debt service payments are held
constant and the amortization period fluctuates to offset the effects of
changes in floating interest rates. Under a graduated payment arrange-
ment debt service payments begin below those applicable to a standard
loan for the same period and increase sufficiently over time to allow the
loan plus interest to be repaid by the maturity date. Shared equity
loans are loans offering a share in the equity of the enterprise in
return for below market rates of interest. A more detailed discussion of
these arrangements is provided in the Appendix to this chapter.
L.. 
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1980s, means that the use of this instrument would not have been suitable or
indeed necessary in this period.
2.18 One possible source of sharei equity loans to Korea would be
international venture capital funds which might be attracted by the opportu-
nity to share in the impressive growth of the Korean economy. Shared equity
loans would provide such investor3 with a means of avoiding some of the
controls restricting foreign portfolio investment or permit them to partici-
pate in the fortunes of unquoted companies, while at the same time avoiding
any dilution of control for the owners of the firms. Nevertheless, it must be
recognized that foreign demand for suzh instruments would be limited to a
relatively small portion of overall equity portfolios and that a concerted
marketing campaign would be required to ensure a worthwhile flow of capital
from this source.
2.19 Realistically speaking, it is difficult to imagine that such varia-
tions in trnditional syndicated credits will be available to Korea on
attractive terms. Until a large number of lenders are attracted to such
instrumants' it i! nlikely that competitive terms will be available on any of
these variations. 3 Given that many foreign (and particularly US) banks
involved in-lending to Korea already face binding country exposure limits,
these instruments are presently unlikely to appeal to international banks.
The existing features of syndicated credits, in particular 'grace' periods,
multi-option facilities and (to a lesser extent) available maturities would
appear to offer better, though not ideal, prospects for Korea. The cost of
improving available options on a standard syndicated credit (e.g. a longer
maturity) tend to better known and more competitively set than equivalent
features on an entirely new instrument.
2.20 Within the syndicated credit market there would appear to be room
for obtaining better terms and conditions through better coordination of the
three major "semi-sovereign" borrowers (KDB, KEB and Kexim) as well as by more
active marketing. These borrowers get varying terms despite the similarity of
the underlying risk involved which leads to the inference that better
coordination in terms of size and timing of requests may be warranted. Also,
as already noted, Korea's market access, at least in Europe, may suffer from
the lack of the type of traditional linkages enjoyed by ex-colonial countries
such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. This has affected the degree of
diversification of Korea's loan syndications and suggests the need for a
marketing effort aimed at making the larger banking community aware of Korea's
economic strength and potential.
2.21 Better still Korea should attempt to make greater use of the notes
and bonds markets in the future. In doing this it will be pursuing a strategy
23/ In 1985 three international syndicated credits for Korean entities
included transferability options for the original lenders entitling them
to sell all or part of their loan to other banks at a later time of their
choosing. However, it is difficult to isolate any significant benefits
from these options from the effects of other features of the facilities.
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that is congruent with the securitization trend prevalent in international
capital markets as well as consistent with the attainment of lower costs,
longer matu!rities and greater diversification. In order to do so, however,
Korea may have to employ a marketing approach that is different in several
respects from its past strategy. Notes and bonds are discussed in more detail
in the following two sections and market strategy aspects are picked up more
formally in Chapter 5.
C. Euronote and Similar Issuance Facilities
2.22 Short-term borrowing programs have developed very rapidly in recent
years and have proven very cost-effective for issuers. Most programs have
been in the form of the Note Issuance Facility (NIF) or the Revolving
Underwriting Facility (RUF), while Eurocommercial paper programs have
developed more recently. Note Issuance facility is a generic term for a
syndicated financing arrangement that guarantees an issue access to a certain
amount of funds for a prescribed length of time.24- At any time during the
term of the facility, the borrower may request that a portion of the facility
be a "drawn down," which results in an offering of short-term promissory
notes. These negotiable instruments usually have a maturity of one, three or
six months. The underwriting facility, however, typically extends from five
to seven years thereby making these instruments medium term from the
borrower"s perspective.
2.23 A Eurocommercial paper program (ECP) differs from the NIF in two
major aspects. The paper is not issued in large tranches but as and when
investor demand surfaces. Similarly, the maturity is flexible. In addition,
there is no back-up underwriting facility. Eurocommercial paper program, be-
cause of its flexibility in terms of timing of issuance and maturity are more
favored by investors, Both NIF and ECP programs have proven to be a cheaper
way to borrow compared to committed bank loans, syndicated revolving credit
arrangements or traditional bond finance, especially in view of the relatively
low cost of establishment of these programs. Besides their cost effectiveness
and their flexibility, these short-term borrowing programs can provide expo-
sure to a wider pool of investors and thus pave the way for long-term
offerings. Corporations are aow a significant presence in this market as both
borrowers and lenders. The bank/nonbank base is now considered to be 50/50.
2.24 Competition has significantly reduced the costs of arranging such
facilities, while the growth of more sophisticated features of facilities and
placement mechanisms provide great opportunities for accessing both a wide
range of markets and different options within those markets. A movement by
24/ The underwriting facility is designed to ensure that if the notes on
offer are not purchased by investors, they will be sold :o a group of
underwriting banks who, for an underwriting fee, are committed to
purchase the notes at a predetermined spread. Alternatively, these
underwriting banks may provide funds through a separate lending
arrangement. Underwriting commitmen'. can run as long as 15 years, with
the usual maturity in the five- to seven-year range.
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large sophisticated borrowers to the issuance of Euronotes without under-
writing facilities made it easier for a large number of new borrowers to enter
the market over the past year. A number of Asian countries have already
availed of NIF facilities, details of which are provided in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: NIF ISSUES: SELECTED COUNTRIES
1983 1984 1985
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
US$ million US$ million US$ million
Hongkong 1 36 4 102 15 944
India - 1 100 6 280
Indonesia 4 850 2 125 8 437
Korea 11 356 5 307 6 235
Malaysia 1 150 2 120 1 41
Singapore - 1 47 9 308
Thailand - 3 175
Source: International Financing Review Country Index.
2.25 Korean Potential. The note market would appear to present
significant opportunities for Korea to replace existing short- to medium-term
floating rate bank loans with facilities which are very cost effective (often
sub-LIBOR), which reduce reliance on bank finance and which may be available
to private Korean names without need of a government guarantee. Korea's
experimentation with these facilities received a setback in early 1984 when
KEB's US$100 million attempted RUF was cut back to US$75 million due to
reluctance by some US banks to participatee However, the situation has since
improved with the success of KEB's $150 million NIF in late 1984 and KExim's
US$100 million NIF in 1985 (both for five years at 0.25X). A number of Korean
companies and private banks have also used such facilities.
2.26 While such facilities do not improve the maturity structure of
Korean debt, they are more cost effective and provide for the possibility of
debt diversification. This is because of the substantial presence in these
markets of corporations as opposed to banks. It is also possible to obtain
more geographical diversification through such facilities (especially within
Europe) as some European corporations may be more familiar with Korean 'names'
than are European banks.
2.27 Another market that could be profitably explored is the US
commercial paper market. Historically, Korean corporate names could only
issue in this market on the strength of letter of credit guarantees by US
banks. The recent acquisition of a credit rating will open up the short-term
finance market to Korean paper to a much greater extent than is presently the
case since there exist large numbers of investors in both the US and the
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European commercial paper markets who gE restricted by regulation, prospectus
or custom from buying non-rated paper.
2.28 Even with a r4ting, however, enhanced access to the US commercial
paper market may require a "road show"--a presentation of the Korean case to
American money managers. Once such a marketing effort is mounted it should be
possible to float up to $200 million in short-term paper in the first year and
build up to about $1 billion (on an outstanding basis) in a few years. The US
CP market is very large (currently about $300 billion) and, if developed
strategically, can become a major source of short-term finance for Korean
businesses.
2.29 It is expected that Korea will need such funding in the future. The
Sixth Plan calls for a rapid growth of Korean assets overseas and especially
in the United States, as an element of an overall strategy of preserving mar-
ket share. Already several Korean conglomerates have set up manufacturing
plants abroad (e.g. Hyundai Motors in Canada, Goldstar Electronics in
Alabama). The working capital requirements of these operations can be met
through the US CP market. Given US credit ratings for Korean sovereign names,
Korean corporate names could benefit from "piggybacking." Comprehensive
disclosures are not required for CP issuance unlike the case for corporate
bonds; this should make such issuance convenient for overseas subsidiaries of
Korean conglomerates.
D. International Bond Market Instruments
2.30 The increase in the amount of bond issuance is one of the most
prominent current trends in international capital markets. Gross issues of
international bonds have increased from $75.5 billion in 1982 to almost $168
billion in 1985. While the market continues to be dominated by OECD area
countries and international development organizations, a number of developing
countries, j luding Korea, have recently increased their access to it (see
Table 2.5).V Within the overall securitization trend, a number of subtrends
have implications for the future pattern of finance available to Korea. Among
these are: (a) the resurgence of fixed interest bonds (straights) after a
substantial decline in popularity following the high inflation and high inter-
est rate experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s. With inflation under
control in a number of industrial countries and interest rates declining,
investors have been enticed back to the market in large numbers by high real
25/ Korea has recently been assigned a US credit rating by Moody's Investor
Service and a credit assessment by Standard and Poor. Moody's has rated
the Korea Development Bank an A2 (its sixth highest of 25 categories) and
S&P has rated Korean sovereign risk as "satisfactory'" (its third highest
of six categories). These ratings are equal to those of some
industrialized nations and were undertaken at the initiative of investor
groups keen to broaden their holdings.
26/ Developing countries accounted for $6 billion (or 10% of total) of FRN
issues in 1985.
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yields. Lengthening maturities together with the facility to issue callable
debt, which prevents issuers being locked into long-term high real borrowing
costs--shourd future interest rates decline--are attractive to borrowers, such
as Korea, who need to reduce their exposure to the effects of (possible)
future periods of high nominal interest rates while at the same time reducing
their dependence on short-term debt; (b) the recent easing of regulations in a
number of countries (including Japan and Germany) which should improve the
prospects for currency diversification in this market; (c) the increasing
popularity of equity-related bond instruments such as convertible debentures
and warrant issues. Issuing equity-related debt can be attractive option for
certain types of corporations. In particular, it can be a cheap form of debt
finance for a company with high earnings potential (a characteristic of many
Korean firms at present) since issues by such companies would not result in
any significant reduction in earnings per share. Also, coupons on such
equity-related issues are often substantially below those applicable to
comparable straight issues. Since strong equity markets tend to come in
cycles, the timing of issuance of equity-related debt can be quite important.
Table 2.5: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES
(US$ billiorL)
1982 1983 1984 1985
OECD area 63.6 67.0 98.8 146.6
International development
organizations l 7.3 6.6 7.9 11.2
Other non-developing countries 0.5 0.9 1.2 2.0
Developing countries of which: 4.1 2.6 3.6 7.9
South Korea (0.1) (0.5) (1.1) (1.7)
Malaysia (0.8) (0.9) (1.2) (2.0)
Thailand (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.9)
Total 75.5 77.1 111.5 167.7
Source: OECD: Financial Market Trends (33).
2.31 Korean Potential. Korea has had a mixed experience in the
international bond market so far. Several aspects of its experience are
particularly notable.
2.32 Firstly, in structuring its liabilities among currencies and between
fixed and floating rate finance, Korea has had very few degrees of freedom.
In the Eurodollar market, Korea currently only has access to floating rate
finance and investment bankers do not foresee any significant change in this
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situation. In contrast, in the jpncipal non-dollar markets, its access is
primarily to fixed rate finance.-
2.33 Secondly, except in Japan, the creditworthiness of Korea has
generally been perceived to be poor relative to peer group countries such as
Malaysia, Spain and Portugal. This has be8 particularly apparent in both the
FRN dollar market and the Euronote market.
2.34 Thirdly, the customer base for Korean issues remains very limited
and primarily restricted to Far East financial institutions. The Euro FRN and
FRCD (floating rate note and certificate of deposit) market has to date been
dominated on the investor side by Japanese banks. The combination of these
instruments and the yen bonds issued by Korean borrowers amounts to almost 90%
of their total securitized debt. Recent marketing efforts in Europe have paid
dividends, however, in the form of successful issues. The Swiss and German
markets appear receptive to further bond issues.
2.35 Fourthly, the large number of Korean issues and the small size of
each issue has resulted in highly illiquid secondary market trading. Korea
27/ Lender familiarity and lender risk aversion are probably the two most
important reasons why less than top tier credits, such as Korea, are able
to tap the fixed rate market in some currencies but not in others. For
example, Korea's excellent access to the yen bond market is explained by
the fact that this market is dominated by Japanese financial institutions
who have traditional financial links with Korea and are generally better
informed about the country. In addition to unfamiliarity, lender risk
aversion appears to explain Korea's lack of access to the US corporate
bond market since this market is dominated by institutional investors
(such as pension funds) who are very conservative and may even, in some
cases, be restricted by regulations from high-risk investments. By
contrast, markets such as the EuroDM market, are dominated by investors
who appear to be less risk-averse and less restrained by regalations.
Access to the Yankee bond market has hitherto been restrictedl by the lack
of a credit rating for Korean sovereign or corporate risk but it is
widely believed that, even with a credit rating commensurate with its
present economic and political circumstances, Korea would not be be able
to float Yankee bonds at terms as attractive as those available to it in
the Euromarkets.
28/ An econometric study by Kyle (1985) indicates that spreads on Korean
bonds have far exceeded the levels that can be explained by the various
macroeconomic and international liquidity variables typically used as
indicators of creditworthiness. Why Korea's perceived creditworthiness
has been poorer than is warranted by generally accepted indicators is an
issue that goes beyond the scope of this report. A factor that seems to
be prominent in discussions about Korea relates to political risks. In
addition it should be stressed that credit evaluation in the Eurobond
market is somewhat primitive. There is no official rating service that
provides systematic analysis.
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has pursued a strategy of coming to the market frequently under a variety of
names, principally, KDB, KEB and KExiim--in relatively small sizes. For
example, in 1985 in the Eurodollar FRN market, the average size of issue by
KDB, KEB and-KExim was $100 million compared to Malaysian issues that averaged
$600 million. Korean borrowers, both public and private, came to the market
ten times in 1985 compared to two issues by Malaysia.
2.36 Dealers in the secondary market need to maintain inventories of each
issue in order to effectively make markets in these issues. There are, how-
ever, considerable economies of scale in the holding of inventories, which
tend to raise the costs of secondary market trading in small issues and thus
impair liquidity. This in turn implies that Korean issues typically have to
carry a yield premium to compensate for the lack of liquidity.
2.37 Bonds versus Loans. Korea's historical experience in the Eurobond
market has not been very successful especially when viewed from the
perspective of maturities and diversification and when compared to the
experience of such countries as Malaysia and Thailand. Nevertheless this
market holds considerable promise provided it is approached strategically with
clear long term goals in mind rather than opportunistically with a view to
making the cheapest short-term deals. Floatjng rate notes, in particular,
warrant further attention because they are superior to syndicated credits,
Korea's most heavily used instrument, in terms of cost, maturity and diversity
of investor base. Furthermore, while the recent acquisition of US credit
ratings is expected to help Korea principally in the short-term finance
markets, favorable spillover effects are also likely in the Eurobond markets.
2.38 The cost of syndicated credits is likely to remain above that of
floating rate notes (of the same effective maturity) for several reasons in
addition to the obvious one deriving from the lack of marketability (or
liquidity) of most loans. Higher capital-asset ratios have been mandated for
commercial banks by regulatory bodies (e.g. in the US) in the wake of the
Latin debt crisis. As each unit of existing capital now supports fewer assets
the per unit cost of maintaining risk assets has been going up. Furthermore,
as banks have themselves gone to the capital markets to increase their capital
they have found that they often cannot borrow as cheaply as some of their best
customers. At the same time, deregulation continues to increase the
competition for deposits and to bid up the deposit interest rate, thereby
increasing the cost of the historically most significant source of funds for
commercial banks. While interest rate deregulation may have run its course in
the US, it has just began in Japan and ought to increase the cost of funds of
Japanese commercial banks over the foreseeable future. Non-banks such as
investment and securities firms have not experienced, nor do they face, a
similar increase in cost of funds.
2.39 The potential liquidity of notes and bonds, in addition to reducing
their cost to the issuer, also enables longer maturities to be established
since a wider group of investors, and not just banks, are potential buyers.
Thus, while it is unlikely that Korea will be able to obtain syndicated
credits with maturities of more than 10 years, it would be possible for it to
build up to maturities of 15-25 years in FRN's as for example has been done by
Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed, Korea has already begun moving in this
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direction in the FRN market: four US$100 million FRN public issues were done
in 1985 with effective maturities of between 10 anh)5 years at the cost of an
extra one-eighth of a percentage point in spreads.-
2.40 The wider investor base of the debt securities market offers the
potential for diversification among sources of funds. How this potential is
exploited depends on the marketing strategy of the issuer. To date Korea has
not been very successful in reaching out to non-bank investors. However, over
time, such acdess can be established provided a long term strategy is
developed involving decisions on spreads, issuer name, a formal credit rating,
marketing and choice of lead managers. Individual elements of such a strategy
are discussed in Chapter S.
2.41 Application to Korea of Innovative Bonds. The debt crisis of the
early 1980s has highlighted the problems of volatile debt service payments and
of the lack of correlation of such payments with borrowers ability to pay at
different times. Among the instruments proposed to deal with these problems
are index-linked bonds, constant debt service bonds and trade bonds.
2.42 In the case of the index-linked bond the principal would be
regularly revised in accordance with some price index, while the interest rate
would move with inflation so as to yield a fixed real rate thereby achieving a
smoothening of the debt service profile. An alternative version would fore-
cast inflation rates over the maturity of a floating rate note and then apply
this forecast to both principal and interest in such a way as to ensure
constant real debt service payments over time. (See Appendix for details).
2.43 A common feature of both instruments is that they would probably be
more appropriate to general obligation finance than to project finance and
hence would have poor risk-sharing and default-spreading characteristics.
Judged from the borrower's perspective, however, the index linked bond might
be preferred to the FRN. Although both instruments may have roughly equal
smoothing characteristics, the index-linked bond would tend to be preferred
from the point of view of diversifying sources away from banking markets and
towards groups of investors less exposed to Korean paper. Thus the develop-
ment of index-linked bonds could broaden the sources of capital available to
Korea. Moreover, by issuing index bonds in several currencies Korea would be
able to obtain a liability structure more suited to hedging its i-terest and
currency exposure. A bond may also be available in somewhat long, maturities
than an FRN.
2.44 Neither the index-linked bond nor the constant debt payment FRNs
have been used in the international capital markets. Investors are generally
29/ As in the case of syndicated credits, after allowing for maturity
differences, there appeared to be some variation between the terms
achieved by the three public banking institutions, with KExim obtaining
the finer terms. Surprisingly the remaining 'public' issue was by one of
the conglomerates and the terms it achieved appear to be more favorable
than those obtained by two of the public banking institutions.
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conservative and prefer instrument innovations to be used initially for prime
borrowers. Thus, from the supply side, there may be a lack of acceptance and
in the case of-Korea this may be equally strong in the FRN market (because of
the high level of Korean paper in existing bond portfolios) and in the bank
market where the inability to achieve a prime rating may raise doubts about
the success of an issue. An additional disadvantage of FRNs is that banks
would not be attracted to these instruments since with liabilities that are
short-term and nominal there could be a maturity and interest-rate mismatch if
claims were longer-term and real.
2.45 The appropriateness of instruments that smooth real debt payments
depends to a large extent on the external events that accompany changes in the
rate of inflation. If inflation is associated with a commodity boom, Korea as
a major comodity importer, would benefit from using these instruments. How-
ever, if export markets generally are expanding rapidly it would not be
desirable to postpone interest payments in this way. In the current period of
declining and less volatile inflation the need for this type of instrument is,
in any event, somewhat less urgent.
2.46 Borrowing via a trade-linked bond would have obvious attractions for
I}orea given its vulnerability to fluctuations in export markets. A trade
bond, by linking payments to rates of export growth, would embody many of the
desirable characteristics of capital inflows outlined in Chapter 1: debt
service on such a bond would obviously be related to ability to pay, the bond
would probably be issued at the longer end of the maturity spectrum, would tap
new markets thereby facilitating future flows of funds, and would result in
significant risk sharing between debtor and creditor. A trade linked bond,
however, would undoubtedly require a government guarantee and hence would not
spread the risk of default within the economy. The major difficulties with
such a bond are that of attracting a significant body of investor support and
of overcoming certain technical hurdles. Given the existing overhang of
Korean debt in bank portfolios, the investors in such a bond would have to
come from non-bank sources, and more particularly from institutional investors
who require a diversified equity portfolio. With an average increase in the
value of Korean exports of 12.5% between 1980 and 1984, Korean trade-linkced
bonds would be expected to offer a high return. Indeed, there is a risk that
rapid export expansion would lead to the payment of larger amounts than would
have been due under conventional syndicated loans. In view of Korea's large
external commitments this may be a risk worth running. Moreover, if the bonds
proved popular it would be possible to modify the relationship between exports
and bond yield for subsequent bond issues.
E. The Swap Market
2.47 In addition to accessing different markets and indeed different
segments of those markets in order to achieve a desired portfolio, it is also
possible to adjust the composition of asset and liability portfolios by engag-
ing in swaps. Indeed, through the use of swaps it is usually possible to
obtain certain desired characteristics of a portfolio in a more cost effective
way than by accessing those market segments directly. The basic swap struc-
tures available currently allow for trades across interest rates, currencies
and combinations of both (see Table 2.6).
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2.48 The availability of these various swap techniques to borrowers and
investors in international financial markets has significant implications for
external asset and liability management. It means that it is now possible for
the theory of comparative advantage to be applied to a significant extent to
international financial markets. Its application to such markets would imply
that borrowers should maximize their borrowing in those markets where they
have a comparative advantage in raising funds, irrespective of the suitability
of such funding for their own particu3,Er needs, as long as such funding can be
swapped, in a cost-effective manner,- to enable the borrower to achieve an
optimum funding structure. Of course, whereas it is possible to specialize
completely in producing a particular good, a borrower's "comparative advant-
age" in any particular market (or niche thereof) may be lost if 'over borrow-
ing' occurs. However, subject to such constraints, and the availability of
suitable swaps, significant opportunities would now appear to be developing
for quite sophisticated asset and liability management for participants in
international financial markets.
2.49 Currently, the swap market offers the greatest depth and opportunity
for restructuring existing debt, by moving intu another currency or from
floating rate to fixed rate debt. It is also a vehicle for reducing the cost
of new borrowings. It enables borrowers to gain access to certain financial
markets often at a lower cost than borrowing directly and to avoid saturation
in traditional markets. In just five years, the swap market has swelled to an
estimated volume of $200 billion: about $180 billion involving interest rate
swaps and $24 billion involving currency swaps. It is not an esoteric or
transitory market, but as demonstrated by the volume of transactions, rather
it is considered by users (corporations, banks and sovereigns) as simply one
of numerous funding mechanisms.
30/ Including taking account of the additional risks involved in the use of
any particular swap mechanism.
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Table 2.6: BASIC SWAP STRUCTURES
Interest Rate Swap
This involves the conversion of an underlying fixed-rate asset/liability into
a floating-rate asset/liability or vice versa. It facilitates arbitraging and
can also enable a borrower to obtain the desired effects of accessing a
particular (fixed or floating-rate) market, or segment thereof, which, for
reasons such as excessive use, lack of name within that market or inadequate
credit quality, could not be accessed directly. It allows interest-rate costs
and exposure to be managed without affecting the underlying source of funds.
The US dollar is the most significant currency involved in such swaps, while
underlying instruments include CDs, Eurobonds, etc.
Fixed Rate Currency Swap
This involves the transformation of a fixed-rate debt raised in one currency
into a fully-hedged fixed rate debt in another currency. It facilitates
arbitraging and allows borrowers to access markets which might not otherwise
be available in a cost-effective way. Borrowers may also be able to obtain
longer. maturities than might otherwise be available to them if they had opted
instead for direct access to a given market.
Cross-Currency Interest Rate Swap
This involves the same basic exchanges as in the fixed rate currency swap
with, however, fixed rate interest in one currency swapped for floating rate
interest in another currency. The main motivating influence behind this swap
is the willingness of major funders, especially banks and sovereigns, to
access markets for particular instrumente for which they have no natural
requirements, but which the swap market can use, in order to reduce costs of
gaining (greater) access to a particular required currency. This swap mechan-
ism is also used simply to restructure, or 'hedge' exposures, in existing
portfolios. US dollar instruments are swapped mainly against SF, yen, DM, ECU
and, to a limited extent, sterling and the Canadian dollar, while other swaps
include yen/SF, yen/ECU, DM/SF, etc.
Basis Swap
This is the same as an interest-rate swap with the exception that floating-
rate interest calculated on one basis is exchanged for floating-rate interest
on a different basis. The basis-rate swap market may involve swapping bases
such as e US dollar prime for a LIBOR, a 1-month US dollar LIBOR for a 6-month
US dollar LIBOR, a US dollar LIBOR for a US dollar commercial paper, etc. It
permits arbitraging spreads between different floating rate funding sources
and for nonUS entities it is a way of obtaining a US commercial paper funding
basis without the necessity (or expense) of complying with the stringent US
requirements for a commercial paper program.
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2.50 The liquidity of the swap market in general has been greatly
enhanced by the fact that swaps have become traded instrtunents in their own
right. The major commercial banks, employing their substantial capital base,
now offer immediate execution as counterparties. In other words, they have
started running "swap books", entering into swapa even without intermediate
counterparties. Investment banks, originally only arrangers of deals, have
now also established swap books, although much smaller in size. These banks
now make a market in swaps which means swaps are no longer dependent on new
Eurobond issues or paticular counterparty matches.
2.51 Korean Potential. Korea's lack of a credit rating and of substan-
tial numbers of non-bank foreign investors limit its potential use of swaps.
Nevertheless, the market is so deep that there should be opportunities for the
country to restructure its debt advantageously, gain access to preferred mar-
kets and reduce the cost of new borrowings. A considerable part of Korea's
debt is at floating interest rates; the country has limited access to bond
markets which offer fixed rate funds. It could use the swap market to move
some of its floating rate debt to fixed rate, locking in low interest fixed
rate debt which may be available at the present time. It may also want to
lock in gairis from low interest debt in one currency by switching into another
currency, particularly if there is fear of currency appreciation. For
example, Korea currently has very good access to the yen market at competitive
rates, but may prefer liabilities in other currencies. It could transform
some of its low interest yen liabilities into, say, fixed rate dollars, taking
advantage of its preferred access in the yen market to achieve advantageous
dollar borrowings. The fact that Korea has very low coupon yen may put it in
a good bargaining position with respect to sharing basis point differen-
tials. The country may also want to diversify its liability portfolio to
include borrowings in currmyies other than dollars or yen. The swap market
may provide opportunities.
2.52 A&out 85% of swap transactions are conducted with a comnercial bank
in the middle as an intermediary between the two counterparties, absorbing the
credit risk (for a fee) on both sides of the transaction. Bank intermediation
has been central to the rapid evolution of the swap market by providing
liquidity. A number of these banks have also played an important role as
principals in the market, as mentioned above, through inventorying various
swap positions and laying them off over time as opportunities arise, thereby
further enhancing the depth and liquidity of the market. This means that
swaps do involve further taking up available credit lines of banks. Hence,
Korean access to the swap market may be limited to the extent that banks are
unwilling to increase their exposure to Korea. The risk exposure is not
31/ Before entering the swap market, it is important to develop a strategy
with respect to debt management, whether it is one of watching liabili-
ties with trade flows and expected exchange rate movements of trade
partners or achieving a more diversified liability structure in terms of
currencies, maturities, and sources of funds. Obviously all of these
goals will have to be evaluated in terms of the cost associated with the
necessary swaps.
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calculated on the full asset, however, thus making it more attractive than
straight debt to a lending institution (or investment banks). Moreover, to
date, swap elpsure is not considered for purposes of reserve requirements on
risk assets, However, this situation may change: the accounting treatment
of swaps is coming under aggressive scrutiny by several central banks.
2.53 Changes are also occurring with respect to management of swap credit
risk. For example, the World Bank has recently announced a swap insurance
arrangement whereby a major insurance company provides the Bank with a line of
insurance in respect of individual swap counterparties, with variable usage
and pricing, depending on the magnitude of credit exposure at a given point in
time. Hence, the World Bank will no longer need to use triple-A intermediary
banks to undertake swaps. The swap insurance will enable it to enter swiaps
directly with other parties, whose credit rating may not be as strong. This
present 31n opportunity for Korea since it does not as yet have a triple A
rating.-
2.54 In sum, the swap market continues to be dynamic and growing and, as
seen in the case of credit risk management, is also maturing. It is,
therefore, a market that Korea, as a strong industrializing country, should
now be entering. By being a sensible user of the swap market, Korea would
demonstrate its own sophistication as a borrower and as a market participant
concerned with liability management and least cost funding opportunities.
Both KDB and KEB have undertaken a number of swaps in recent years but it is
clear that as yet utilization lags behind potential. This is due partly to
the lack of expertise and partly to the fact that current foreign exchange
regulations constrain innovations in this area.
32/ At the time of a swap contract, the present value of the cash flows
exchanged (interest and, in the case of currency swaps, principal
payments) are equal. Over time, the value of the two counterparties'
cash flows will change because of exchange rate and/or interest rate
movements. If one party defaults, the cther party assumes its original
debt obligation; it ma/ then face higher costs or a potential profit,
depending on which direction currency and interest rates have moved.
Thus the credit risk is the potential adverse exposure at the time of
default (i.e., any positive difference between the new present value of
one's remaining original debt obligation and that of the swap
obligation). The range of potential risk is considered to be 30-40% of
the par value of the swap, depending on the type of swap (interest rate
swaps are less risky because they involve only the exchange of interest
payments).
33/ It is anticipated that, over time, numerous insurance companies will
enter the swap field, perhaps by forming synd'.ates to distribute the
risk. This should enable many swap counterparties to set up multiple
insurance facilities. In the future, it may be possible to utilize
insurance companies in various regions of the world to provide coverage
for potential counterparties ire heir own geographical areas. These
trends may eventually enable developing countries to obtain swap




A. Innovative Loan Instruments
1. A transferable loan instrument (TLI) entitles an original partici-
pating bank to sell all or part of its loan asset in the secondary market.
The borrower retains the flexibility of the syndicated loan agreement; while
facilitating participation by a larger number of banks. The large banks are
attracted to the syndicate because of the options available for offloading
part of their commitments, while other banks are attracted by the varying
maturities and denominations available under TLIs. Such instruments should be
more cost effective for borrowers. While, at first sight, the instrument
appears to introduce much-needed flexibility into the syndicated loan market,
it has a number of drawbacks. In effect, it is simply a device that recog-
nizes and brings into the open the practice of silent sub-participations which
has been taking place for some time among banks. Under such ani arrangement a
bank overexposed to a particular borrower arranges for another bank to 'parti-
cipate' in its loan commitment. In effect, the second gives an indemnity to
the first bank regarding part of its exposure. This device, since it is a
secret arrangement between banks, avoids the adverse effects on a borrower
from a lender attempting to offload in public part of its exposure to that
borrower. The TLI on the other hand brings such a practice into the open. If
the creditworthiness of the borrower deteriorates, 'the marketability of the
TLIs would not ensure its sale at close to par value. Under such circum-
stances the restriction of the market to banks (a comuon feature of TLIs)
could result in a more serious undermining ,f the borrower's creditworthiness
than would be likely to result from a capital market instrument under similar
circumstances.
2. The flexible maturity loan keeps debt service payments constant by
allowing the size of the amortization payments to vary to offset changes in
interest rates. A rise in interest rates implies a fall in amortization and
hence an automaitic extension of the maturity of the loan. This type of
instrument would brirng considerable benefits to the borrower. To the extent
that interest-rate variations are random rather than procyclical, the variable
maturity proposal would increase the debtor's ability to pay by smoothing
debt-service payments. (If interest-rate movements are counter cyclical, as
in 1981-82, benefits would be even greater). Moreover, in terms of the
desirable inflow characteristics, loan maturities would be automatically
increased and, givern their indefinite maturity, which would be unsuitable for
banks, such loans would tend to attract a new type of investor to the devel-
oping country market.
3. Under a graduated payment arrangement debt service payments are
initially below those applicable to a standard loan for the same period and
increase over time. The graduated payment loan would also possess most of the
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benefits (from the borrower's perspective) of the variable maturity loan.ll
In addition, by relating debt-service payments to the expected profile of
project earnin&s, ability to pay would be considerably enhanced and, depending
on the particular arrangements in the event of actual earnings differing from
projected earnings, graduated payment loans would have the further advantage
of sharing project risk with the lender. The ability-to-pay and project-ri7k
sharing characteristics of capital inflows are embodied to an even greater
extent in the shared-equity instruments in which an equity share is offered in
return for below-market rates of interest. Moreover, all three instruments -
variable maturity, graduated payment and shared equity loans - being project-
type financing, would increase risk dispersal within the borrower's economy as
compared with general obligation finance.
4. The major difficulty with these instruments is that, from the
investors' point of view, they appear to be going against the recent securiti-
zation trend in bank assets. The desire for greater asset liquidity has been
one of the factors leading to securitization, that is, the tendency to
increase the marketability of bank assets which traditionally had been held to
maturity. The risk sharing element inherent in both graduated payment and
shared equity loans together with the fact that the latter instrument would
probably require lender involvement in project management (Saini, 1985),
suggests chat these two types of instrument would not be attractive to
banks. Similarly, variable maturity loans would offend against the desire of
banks for greater liquidity. Looking to other segments of the international
capital market, however, it is possible that variable maturity loans could
appeal to some long-term institutional investors for whom uncertainty regard-
ing maturity dates is less important. Moreover, wi'th regard to shdred equity
loans, these could be attractive to equity funds as a means of participating
in enterprises whose shares would not otherwise be available (because, for
example, they are not publicly quoted or because foreign holdings are restric-
ted). It would be unrealistic to expect, however, that a significant volume
of funds would become available from these sources. While flexible maturity
loans have been a feature of certain mortgage markets, they have not, to date,
become a feature of the international syndicated loan market.
B. Innovative Bond Instruments
Instruments that Smooth Real Debt Payments
5. This is a particular response to the problem of volatile debt ser-
vice obligations. The smoothing of real debt payments, while not being as
favorable to the borrower a; mechanisms that relate payments to capacity to
pay, does at least facilitate the planning of future debt service obligations
and permits the earmarking of resources to meet these obligations.
1/ The exception being the automatic lengthening of maturity, although this
feature could also possibly be combined with the graduated payment loan
(see Saini, 1985).
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6. There are two basic methods of smoothing real debt payments.
Williamson (1981) outlines a scheme whereby this can be achieved by issuing
index-linked bonds. Under this arrangement the principal would be regularly
revised in accordance with some price index, while the interest rate would
move with inflation so as to yield a fixed real rate. To the borrower index
linked bonds would have the advantage of significantly reducing uncertainty on
a major item in the balance of payments by fixing the real value of debt
servicing obligations. The appeal of index-linked bonds to lenders is more
difficult to ascertain. It is felt, however, that some institutional inves-
tors would be attracted by the prospect of maintaining the real value of
assets. The major problem with index-linked bonds, of course, is the choice
of index. The use of an export price index computed for the borrowing country
would be unlikely to appeal to investors. In practice it would be necessary
to use a price index of the capital market in which the bond was issued. By
issuing index-linked bonds in several currencies or by using a composite
currency such as the SDR or ECU a borrower could obtain a liability structure
that helped offset its trade or other financial exposure (Lessard, 1985).
7. An alternative to index-linked bonds involves issuing floating rate
notes (FRNs) with constant real debt service attributes (Goodman, 1982). This
is an attempt to reconcile the preferences of many investors for stable
receipts in nominal terms with the desire of borrowers to achieve smooth real
debt service flows. This instrument makes use of two separate rates, a
debiting factor, which is the interest charge on the outstanding balance, and
a payments factor, which is the amount that the borrower has to pay each
period. The debiting factor would vary with market interest rates while the
payments factor would be chosen with a view to yielding equal real payments
over the life of the contract. This involves forecasting future real rates
over the maturity of the loan. Errors in forcasting the future real interest
rate would tend to cancel out over the life of the loan since a too high
forecast would acceLerate payments and this would reduce the outstanding
principal and hence future repayments. If inflation were high in the early
years of the loan the payment factor could be less than the debiting factor
with the result that amortization would be negative and the outstanding
principal would increase.
8. Both index-linked bonds and constant debt payment FRNs avoid the
cash flow squeeze that can arise durinig inflationary periods as interest costs
rise immediately while the corresponding gain in the erosion of principal only
becomes relevant at the time of amortization. However, the borrower's posi-
tion may not always be improved by the use of such instruments. For example,
if periods of high inflation are associated with rapid growth in commodity
prices and exports (as occurred in the mid-1970s) loan indexation could have
the perverse effect of postponing interest payments from a period when foreign
exchange was readily available to a later period when exports are stagnant.
On the other hand, if rising inflation is accompanied by recession (as
occurred in the early 1980s) the delay of the inflation premium in interest
rates until amortization would considerably enhance ability to pay. Thus, the
appropriate use of these instruments would require a knowledge of the cova-
riances between inflation, interest rates and export receipts. Moreover,
relationships between these variables would undoubtedly change over time with
the result that the instruments may be appropriate when issued but may have
adverse effects on ability to pay during the life of the bonds.
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Trade and Commodity Bonds
9. As an alternative to risk diversification through equity participa-
tion and direct investment much interest has been zhown in the possibility of
using commodity bonds. Lessard (1977) suggests that commodity bonds would be
more successful than foreign direct investment in balancing the relative
requirements of creditors and debtors. Interest or amortization or both on a
commodity-bond would vary with the price of a commodity or basket of commodi-
ties. An essential requirement is that the price- of the commodity would be
precisely determined in a market largely free from price manipulation. The
major attraction is that the developing countries issuing such bonds would be
able to hedge the return on the bonds to the market price of its main commod-
ity. From the investors' perspective, commodity bonds could be used either as
a vehicle for speculation in commodity markets or for hedging reasons by com-
modity users whose income might vary inversely with a particular commodity
price. Tie expected yield on commodity bonds would have to be higher than
that on conventional bonds to compensate the purchaser for accepting a more
uncertain payment stream.
10. While Korea, not being a primary producer, is unlikely to issue
commodity bonds, it may well have an interest in a close relation, the trade-
linked bond. These bonds would offer a return linked to the value of a
country's exports. The principal advantage for the borrowers is that trade
linked bonds would permit a uniquely close correspondence between debt service
payments and export revenues, thereby significantly reducing the debtor's
vulnerability to external disturbances. It might also increase pressure in
industrial countries against protectionism since this would directly affect
the returns to bond holders resident in these countries.
11. The disadvantageo of the trade linked bond relate partly to diffi-
culties with the definition and computation of the value of the exports of the
issuing country. Decisions would have to be taken on whether to include
exports of services and factor income as well as merchandise trade. The
collection of data on non-trade items is notoriously difficult even in indus-
trial countries. Another major difficulty concerns the problem of transfer
pricing. Variations in tax rates in different countries enable multinational
corporations to price intra-company trade so as to minimize overall liability
to taxation. The scope for such practices is particularly large where a
country's exports contains a large proportion of intermediate products. Thus,
the value of a trade-lined bond could be quite sensitive to changes in
corporate taxes among countries and to the pricing policies of multinational
corporations. Such factors might undermine some investors' confidence in a
trade-linked bond although it should be said that other statistical measures
used in bond financing (e.g., various price indices) also suffer from measure-
ment difficulties. The problem of moral hazard might also be considered in
this context. A large proportion of trade linked debt in total liabilities
might reduce a debtor's incentive to engage in export promotion or, more
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likely, to reduce re urces devoted to ensuring a comprehensive statistical
coverage of exports.-
12. Another major imponderable is the market for trade linked paper.
Such paper has none of the attractions of commodity linked bonds for either
hedging or speculative purposes. Trade related bonds represent a form of
speculation on a debtor's future export revenues and, when exports are well
diversified over the range of industry represented in a country, could be
viewed as an investment in the performance of the economy as a whole. As such
it could be regarded as an alternative to some of the equity funds of Mexican,
Korean, Indian and Brazilian shares which have been organized in recent
years. Given that investment in these funds is not without difficulties
(related to thin domestic stock markets and less than rigorous accounting
standards) trade linked-bonds could have attractions. If this motive for
holding these bonds proves to be realistic, the investment institutions would
constitute the main market for trade-linked bonds, rather than the banking
sector.
C. Non-Recourse Financing
13. This type of finance aims at increasing effective risk diversifica-
tion between debtor and creditor by linking borrowings to particular enter-
prises or projects without a Government guarantee. Since the return to the
lender is dependent on the success of the project, this instrument would
provide effective risk transfer. In contrast with equity or quasi-equity
instruments, providers of non-recourse finance would not share a project's
upside potential. The lender will require to be compensated with a higher
expected return for the greater risk inherent in non-recourse financing.
14. The attraction of non-recourse finance is that the failure of a
project will not result in a loss to the government in the form of honoring
guarantees to foreign creditors. There may also be other benefits since, when
lending on a stand-alone basis, financial institutions have a direct interest
in ensuring adequate project appraisal. Under this form of financing govern-
ments have to make it clear that they will not be liable for debts in the
event of a project's failure. However, even in these circumstances, where
there is doubt about the effect of a project default on a country's general
creditworthiness, governments frequently assume the debts of private
creditors.
15. The combination of a largely publicly-owned banking system and the
concentration of much manufacturing and trading activity in a few large
conglomerates means that effective risk dispersal is extremeLy low in Korea.
This was confirmed when one of the conglomerates failed in 1985 and the
2/ A considerable amount of work would be necessary before a decision on the
feasibility of a trade bond could be taken. The areas to be considered
include the definitional questions mentioned above, the manner in which
export returns would be reflected in bond yields and the appeal to
particular categories of investors.
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government compensated all foreign creditors. The international markets
regard all Korean liabilities, whether contracted by the private or public
sectors, as effectively government guaranteed. In these circumstances greater
use of non-recourse financing would bring benefits in the areas of risk shar-
ing and spreading default risk within Korea. However, these advantages must
be set against higher expected costs of servicing non-recourse lending. More-
over, given the large gross financing requirements over the remainder of the
1980s which render Korea extremely vulnerable to market sentiment, it would
obviously be necessary to move cautiously in reducing the proportion of
Government guaranteed debt in total debt.
D. Interest Rate Caps
16. Another promising instrument which has developed over the past three
years is the interest rate cap. In effect, capped FRNs are a stream of
interest rate options, stretching out to longer maturities than are traded on
exchanges and are available in currencies such as Deutshemarks for which there
are no exchange-traded interest rate options. Interest caps allow borrowers,
for an upfront fee, to lock in the maximum interest rate paid. If the rate
goes beyond the maximum, the cap seller pays the differential. There is con-
siderable potential for this market, depending on the future yield curve
expected. Right now the market for three to five year caps is deep and
deepening further. But there are maturities going out to nine years. Inter-
est caps tend to be in the 12Z-12.5X range. Also, caps are often stripped
from one security and sold to another borrower. An estimated $8 billion worth
of capped floating rate instruments have been sold. Another $8-10 billion
have been sold by banks. Citicorp and Salomon Brothers are the biggest market
makers; they hedge themselves against the risks of the instrument by using
other security markets. The users of caps are borrowers requiring protection
against floating rate loans. American thrifts are buying them to cap funding
costs for their portfolios of capped mortgages.
17. There are three drawbacks to caps. First, the upfront fee can be
substantial, say $1-4 million on $100 million of principal for a three to four
year cap, depending on the strike level. It can go up to 5X of the principal
depending on the maturity. However, as competition increases *7d more insti-
tutions find ways to hedge the risks, these costs may decline.- Second, the
protection this option offers is always a second-best strategy. By its
nature, it is never the most advantageous approach. But it protects against a
worst case situation. Third, the present flattening yield curve makes the use
of caps seem more risky than simply doing nothing -- though expectations for
the future may be different. The interest rate cap market is a market worth
watching however, and holds potential for developing countries, holders of
considerable floating rate debt, to limit future interest obligations to
manageable levels.
3/ One way of minimizing the cost of a cap is to enter into a "collar",
which creates an interest rate floor as well as ceiling, for example
creating a range of 8-12% for a five year maturity. Collars are usually
30% cheaper than an equivalent cap.
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III. FUTURE FINANCING OPTIONS: PORTFOLIO FOREIGN INVESTMENT
3.01 Equity financing can be of two sorts, direct foreign investment
(DFi) and portfolio foreign investment (PFI). The essential distinction
between these is that the former involves the provision by the foreign
investor of a package comprising capital, technology and management whereas
the latter typically involves only the provision of capital. Since the costs
and benefits (to the host country) of these two types of equity inflows are
different and since their institutional and policy determinants are also
different, they are treated separately in this report. This chapter considers
the role of PFI and the next chapter that of DFI (and quasi-DFI) inflows in
Korea.
A. The Potential of Portfolio Foreign Investment
3.02 Foreign portfolio investment is an important source of foreign
capital which has not been tapped to any significant degree in Korea. Mean-
while, individual equity markets are rapidly being "internationalized" due to
improved communications, better available information and the continued search
for higher returns and portfolio diversification. As part of this phenomenon,
international investor interest in Korea is growing, as witnessed by the
strong showing of the Korea Fund on the New York stock exchange over the past
two years. An opportunity exists for Korea at the present time to take
advantage of prevailing investor confidence to expand its use of equity fund-
ing, an opportunity that it should not ignore.
3.03 Advantages of Portfolio Foreign Investment. Portfolio foreign
investment, first of all, offers diversification through the opportunity to
raise additional long-term funds from a new pool of capital--primarily
institutional investors abroad. That pool is considerable and growing
rapidly. Moreover, the nature of institutional investment is attractive; 1".
generally seeks long-term capital gains appreciation, rather than short-term
gains. Also, in contrast to foreign direct investment, the motive of such
investment is portfolio returns, not control. Once diversification through
internationalization begins, it can be self-fulfilling. The more Korean com-
panies are known by foreign portfolio investors and in different capital
markets, the more opportunities for greater access to funding sources. The
experience of the Japanese since the mid-1970s is a pertinent reminder of the
gains from liberalizing corporate access to international capital markets and
investors. It has improved stock valuations and dramatically increased the
funding options of Japanese companies, especially medium-sized, high-growth
companies.
3.04 Second, foreign portfolio investment represents risk capital rather
than inflexible debt capital. Greater reliance on equity capital, both domes-
tic and foreign, would help strengthen the capital base of Korean industry,
improve its financial flexibility and thus its capacity to withstand adverse
industry or economy-wide shocks. Debt capital must be serviced no matter what
the profitability or cash flow situation of a company (and country). Equity
capital earns rent only when the firm generates profits and at the discretion
of corporate management; in that sense, it is a more flexible, reliable source
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of funding. The corporate finance literature is filled with discussions on
the debt vs. equity trade-off. Whether one relies more on debt or equity
depends on the relative tax-adjusted cost of each financing instrument and the
risk and profit characteristics of the business concerned. Financial
flexibility-is essential in an environment like that of Korea's corporate
sector, where the growth of exports and corporate revenue are especially
vulnerable to rapid changes in international demand and market
competitiveness, where profit margins remain low and where a strong corporate
funding capability is essential to assure financing for continued expansion.
Greater use of equity would strengthen corporate balance sheets, thus expand-
ing firms' capacity to fund long-term capital and research spending. Also,
just by reducing interest expense, it could help to improve corporate
profitability, augmenting retained earnings and internal sources of funds.
Healthier corporate balance sheets would then alleviate pressure on the
banking system and ultimately on the government by reducing the need to assist
financially distressed companies.
3.05 Third, internationalization could have a demonstration or feedback
effect. Exposure to foreign markets and investors could help to encourage a
stronger, more developed stock market, with benefits to the capital market as
a whole. It would do so by encouraging competition, market-oriented pricing,
improved disclosure standards and more sophisticated industry and company
analytical techniques. Moreover, foreign investors could provide market feed-
back; in some cases, they might see the growth potential of Korean firms more
clearly from abroad.
3.06 Fourth, foreign portfolio investment may help to enhance market
valuations and prospects for higher capital gains by injecting further demand
into the market. Those stock markets which have been more open to foreign
portfolio investment have seen remarkable growth in market capitalization
through higher share values. As confidence develops that strong future gains
are possible, further investors are attracted. And higher share valuations
stimulate equity issues--by lowering the cost of equity to a firm and creating
incentives for reluctant owners to go public.
3.07 Finally, a stronger equity market--supported by foreign portfolio
investment and enhanced domestic investor interest--provides an environment
where an active over-the-counter market, accessible to relatively small- or
medium-sized companies, could also develop and flourish under an appropriate
regulatory framework. It aliso makes it easier to raise equity capital for new
comp*nies, since venture capital companies seem to do best in countries with
active stock markets, where a successful new venture may more readily be
divested profitably through a public offering.
3.08 The Pool of Foreign Portfolio Investment. In recent years,
institutional investors, particularly the US and European pension funds, have
dramatically increased their investments in international securities. This is
due to the large amounts of capital they have accumulated and continue to
accumulate, their ongoing need for portfolio diversification, and their con-
tinuing search for undiscovered markets and higher returns. The foreign com-
mitments of US pension funds reached an estimated $16 billion at the end of
1984--more than double their level only two years earlier. At the end of
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1982, foreign equity investments of British and other European pension funds
represented 151 and 8.51, respectively, of total portfolios equivalent to
$100 billion and $335 billion; Jt proportion has risen since, in the British
case to perhaps as much as 251. Japanese pension funds, which since 1979
have been allowed-to place up to 10X of their funds in foreign assets, by 1985
had placed abroad about 81 of total assets (equivalent to over $55 billion).
3.09 The OECD countries have been the primary beneficiaries of this surge
in interest by international investors. Japan, which liberalized its market
only relatively recently, has also taken advantage of this phenomenon.
Japanese companies, for example, have raise 57ver $2 billion in new capital
through foreign issues since the mid-1960s.- The Tokyo stock market has
benefited from inflows of capital from American pension funds, European insti-
tutional investors and OPEC countries seeking to diversify away from dollar-
denominated investments.
3.10 The principal beneficiaries among developing countries have been
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Israel. The first three of these markets
are completely open to foreign investors, while Israel's market is considered
relatively free. Stimulated by foreign investment, the growth of these mar-
kets has occurred primarilv through capital increases and growth in earnings
of already listed companies, rather than through government incentives to
promote new listings. An informal estimate of total foreign equity investment
in marW s of developing countries is US$700-750 million, which is still very
small.'- But the potential is significant; much will depend on the policies
of host countries to open up equity markets and promote the availability of
good corporate information.
3.11 Surveys indicate there is considerable openmindedness among
institutional investors towards portfolio investment in developing countries.
Some investors take the position that the rewards of careful, discriminating
investment in certain developing countries outweigh the risks. Some would
place 1-21 of their portfolios in LDC markets, just as they invest a small
percentage in venture capital funds. The annual increase in foreign portfolio
investment worldwide is projected to reach over $10 billion by the end of the
decade. Of this between $1 and $2 billion could easily flo 17o developing
countries should they provide an accommodating environment. Continued high
rates of economic growth in many newly industrialized countries offer the
potential of higher rates of return on their corporate stocks than those
realizable in OECD countries, where potential growth may be lower. The desire
to stabilize returns (reduce variance) through portfolio diversification
34/ Lessard and Williamson (1985).
35/ Barth and Wall (1985). The Japanese experience with capital market
liberalization is discussed in Appendix 3B.
36/ Lessard and Williamson (1985).
37/ Lessard and Williamson (1985).
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should also contribute to future demand for the equities of countries such as
Korea.
B. The Development of the Korean Equity Market
3.12 Traditional Reliance on Debt Financing. Traditionally, the Korean
government has played a very activist role in corporate finance -- through
financial policy and directed lending via the banking system (at one time
largely government-controlled). Interest rate ceilings during the 1970s
reduced the cost of debt, making it attractive for the corporate sector to
rely on debt financing to fund its rapid expansion. The real cost of bank
loans was, in fact, negative during most of the 1970s for both domestic and
foreign loans.
3.13 In addition, a number of the larger preferred industries were
favored with loans through directed credit programs at further preferential
rates, sometimes irrespective of their underlying competitiveness or the
profitability of a specific investment. This further increased corporate
access, particularly of the larger companies, to debt finance, ironically,
some of the more established companies would have been obvious candidates to
raise capital through the fledgling equity market. There was also a presump-
tion that companies, at least in preferred industries, would be bailed out by
the government-supported banks if they encountered financial problems. This
reduced the perceived riskiness of debt finance.
3.14 Moreover, there was heavy reliance on foreign borrowing, channeled
through the banking system since domestic savings alone were not large enough
to fuel the economic expansion. The combination of low interest rates abroad
(especially in the late 1960s), tight credit rationing domestically and the
import privileges of exporters produced a strong demand for foreign loans that
was difficult to control.
3.15 As a result of the above-mentioned factors, an environment was
created which tolerated high corporate debt-to-equity ratios and company debt
structures heavily weighted towards the short term. There was little or no
incentive to raise investment capital through the equity market. Consequent-
ly, the corporate debt/equity ratio increased significantly throughout the
1970s to over four to one by 1980 (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: COMPARATIVE DEBT - EQUITY RATIOS (Manufacturing Sector)
Countries 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1983
Korea n.a. 3.65 3.67 4.88 3.86 3.60
USA 0.88 0.86 0.93 1.01 1.06 1.04
Japan n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.85 3.92 3.24
Germany 1.96 2.12 2.09 2.14 2.16 2.18
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3.16 The lack of accountability created by government control of finan-
cial intermediation also inhibited the quality of credit assessment, effici-
ency and product development of the banking system, as well as the indepen-
dence and diversification of the financial sector as a whole. As in Japan up
until the mid-197Os, the predominant role of indirect finance resulted in
delaying the development of meaningful alternatives to banks for both bor-
rowers and investors.
3.17 Regulatory policies, institutional constraints and traditional prac-
tices have also constrained demand and supply in both primary and secondary
markets. Some of the major factors affecting the supply of stock issues have
been the high financial cost of raising equity and the negative attitude of
private owners towards sharing ownership and control. Two government poli-
cies--concerning pricing and dividends--in particular adversely affected the
cost of issuing equity; they are now being progressively eased.
3.18 Up until 1984, all stocks were issued at par value, irrespective of
true market value. Firms, whose stock value had appreciated in the market,
were issuing stocks at an undervalued price. This prevented owners and exist-
ing shareholders from enjoying capital gains that might have accompanied the
rapid expansion of the economy. Further dampening the interest of potential
issuing companies was the fact that low prices also meant they had to offer a
larger number of shares to raise a desired amount of funds. This diluted the
original owner's control and ultimately added to the dividend burden. At the
other extreme, firms with shares at market values considerably below par found
it extremely difficult to issue new shares at par.
3.19 The government also used its influence to set dividend rates, speci-
fied as a percentage of par value and aligned closely to long-term deposit
rates. In this environment, stocks took on tha characteristics of bonds--
bought and sold on the basis of yield (the dividend), rather than capital
gains based on the earnings and growth potential of each firm. It also pre-
vented the buildup of equity by firms. Both these practices failed to provide
incentives for firms to list their shares or float new issues voluntarily,
constricting the volume and value of the market, and reinforced their inclina-
tion for debt financing.
3.20 Growth in the Domestic Bond Market. Meanwhile, alternative funding
through commercial banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, the c.urb market
and corporate bond issues was easily available, with no loss o0. c trol and
often at lower cost (considering virtually mandatory dividend payments on an
&fter tax basis for equity vs. tax deductions and guarantees available for
some types of debt). In fact, as financial liberalization in the 1980s
encouraged diversification from straight bank lending, the corporate sector
has increasingly relied on debt securities for fund raising. The major surge
in funding during the last five years has been through the domestic bond
market. The trend in bond issues relative to equity issues is dramatic: of
corporate funds raised through the securities market in 1978, 50% came from
equity issues and 50% from bond issues; by 1984, despite a slump in the bond
market that year, 79% of funds came from bond issues vs. 21% for equity issues
(see Table 3.2). The value of secondary bond trading has also increased
exceeding trading in shares.
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Table 3.2: FUNDS RAISED TEVROUGH SECURITIES MARKET
Stock Bond Total
Amount Component Amount Component Amount
(bil. Won) Ratio (Z) (bil. Won) Ratio (X) (bil. Won)
1975 122.80 78.6 33.45 21.4 156.26
1976 175.95 67.1 86.28 32.9 262.23
1977 185.97 51.3 175.48 48.7 362.45
1978 326.72 50.0 326.34 50.0 653.06
1979 216.80 25.8 624.63 74.2 841.43
1980 171.15 15.1 963.70 84.9 1,134.85
1981 306.04 22.8 1,036.15 77.2 1,342.19
1982 276.87 11.6 2,112.17 88.4 2,389.04
1983 462.57 24.5 1,426.52 75.5 1,889.09
1984 479.06 21.0 1,804.06 79.0 2,283.12
Source: Securities Supervisory Board, Seoul, Korea.
3.21 Yet the corporate bond market as presently constituted is very
limited and does not offer diversified, long-term jancing. Despite efforts
to liberalize the market over the past four years, there is little
differentiation among bond issues; most bonds still are issued on standard
terms and conditions, with maturities being only 3-5 years. Moreoverp the
majority of bonds continue to be issued with financial guarantees from banks,
thus perpetuating reliance on the banking system. Unguaranteed bonds today
make up less than 1OZ of new boad issues. Bank guarantees of bond issues
create a bias towards bonds relative to stocks as they lower the risk of the
former. This dampens investor interest in equities--at a time when that
market offers the only source of flexible, long-term financing.
3.22 Potential of the Stock Market. The Korean government began to
encourage the growth of the equity market in the late 1960s. The Korean Stock
Exchange (KSE) was established in February 1956, but activity was very slow
until the government took measures to encourage businesses to go public
through preferential tax measures and some jawboning. Through additional
legislation in 1972, the government put prossure on firms to go public, again
supported by incentives in tax and financing areas. All of these measures led
to a rapid expansion of the market. But by the early 1980s, interest in the
equity market had leveled off--in part, because tax incentives were reduced
38/ The government recently liberalized conditions of bond issuance, urging
companies to issue new types of bonds -- unguaranteed bonds, convertible
bonds, bonds with warrants, etc. Since 1981, it has also allowed some
flexibility in the determination of corporate bond rates within a range
of 2% above and below a base rate.
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substantially as a result of tax reform in 1978 and, in part, because of the
economic downturn and some incidents of insider trading in the securities
markets.
3.23 BecaTse of the improved economic outlook and recent measures by the
government, stock market activity has improved since 1984, with an upsurge in
activity in 1986. Various measures taken by the Ministry of Finance in 1985
contributed to the stronger interest in the market: reduction of taxes on
dividends for small private investors; liberalization of listing requirements;
lower nArgin requirements; encouragement of equity purchases by institutional
investors; and increases in permitted foreign portfolio investment (through
new investment trusts). The sharp improvement in Korea's economic funda-
mentals has probably been the most important factor behind the stock market's
bullish rally through most of 1986.
3.24 Still, despite recent strength in the Korean stock market, the
potential of the market is much greater. Its overall size, volume of activity
and valuation remain low in comparison with US, Japanese or major European
exchanges. On the supply side, according to several observers, there are over
a hundred significant companies which could go public immediately. Indeed,
over 800 companies have issued corporate bonds compared with, at the peak, 356
companies issuing equity. Hence, there is greater scope for increasing new
issues of equities. The government's recent liberalization of listing
requirements--now only a minimum of 20Z of equity must be issued for a Listing
in the second trading tier of the KSE--should help stimulate new issues by
offering companies the flexibility to issue shares without losing control. In
many cases, however, even when a company is publicly listed, most of its
shares are unavailable for public trading as they are closely held by the
original owners or "insiders." Much of recent issue activity has in fact,
been through rights issues (sales of shares exclusively to existing share-
holders). This affects the "float"--the number of shares available to the
general public and outside institutional investors for trading. This practice
restricts the growth and liquidity of the market.
3.25 Low share valuation is a serious problem in Korea, and it perpetu-
ates the trend of low new issue activity mentioned above. Table 3.3 compares
company listings and market capitalizations of several different countries.
Korea's market capitalization is low relative to countries with a similar or
lower number of listings. It is also low relative to GDP and volume of finan-
cial assets. Korea's P/E ratio has been about 5.2 times earnings although
because of recent interest it has moved up to 7-8 in 1986. This compares
poorly with P/E ratios of 25 in Japan, 10 in Hong Kong, 14 in London and 13.7
in the United States (1984/85 data). This is surprising considering the
strength of the Korean economy. With specific efforts to strengthen the
domestic equity market and encourage investor demand, the valuation of Korean
shares should tend to move towards international levels--to at least 10 times
earninrS As private entrepreneurs see the opportunity for significanit capi-
tal gains, they will then have greater incentive to go public or issue shares
to outside parties.
3.26 Less than 2X of the economically active population in Korea invests
in stocks, compared to 10Z in developed countries. Individual investors shy
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away-from the market because of its perceived riskiness, sluggish secondary
market which affects liquidity, lack of corporate information and lack of
information generally about operations of the stock market. Also, institu-
tional investors, which are the driving force in most developed country stock
markets, are-still relatively inactive in Korea's stock market. Thus the
potential for increasing demand in the stock market is substantial. Increased
foreign portfolio investment would supplew-'- and indeed could encourage
domestic demand. Broader participation, along with regulatory improvements,
would reduce the likelihood of boom and bust cycles which have occurred in the
Korean stock market. As potential investors see profitable opportunities and
gain confidence in the market, they will be wooed away from other investments
such as the bond market or the traditionally attractive real estate and curb
markets.
Table 3.3: STOCK MARKET DATA FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1984
No. of Market Capitalization Market capita-
Listed Companies (US$ billion) lization/GDP
(%)
Matura Markets
New York (lNYSE) 1,490 1,530.0 42
Tokyo 1,427 644.0 51
London 2, 171 243.0 57
Toronto 943 135.0 40
Germany 449 78.0 13
Australia 1,009 49 9 27
Stockholm 159 25.7 29
Brussels 197 12.2 16
Copenhagen 231 7.6 14
Developins Markets
Malaysia 278 15.3 53
Brazil 608 28.9 15
India 3,882 7.9 5
Korea 336 6.1 7
Thailand 89 1.7 4
Argentina 236 1.2 2
Indonesia 24 0.1 0.1
Source: International Finance Corporation.
Notes The market capitalization to CDP ratios for mature markets are
biased downward to the eztent that multiple stock markets may ezist
in those countries; this applies particularly to the US where
markets other than the NYSE account for a substantial chunk of total
market capitalization.
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3.27 Korea's Internationalization Policy. Spurred by the need to
diversify funding and liberalize its financial sector, the Korean government
has already taken significant steps to open its equity market to international
investors. In 1981, it introduced a four-stage plan for internationalization
to be implemented over ten years:
(a) The first stage permitted indirect securities investment by foreign-
ers. This has occurred through investment trusts established in
Seoul over the past four years (now five trusts are operating) and
the Korea Fund which was listed on the New York Stock Exchange two
years ago. Foreign securities firms have also been allowed to make
limited investments in domestic securities firms and to open repre-
sentative offices in Korea, although they are not yet permitted to
conduct domestic business.
(b) The second stage of liberalization, atmounced in November 1985, per-
mits domestic companies to issue convertible debt securities on
international markets under guidelines set by the government.
(c) The third stage, due by the late 1980s, would allow foreigners to
malke unlimited investments in Korean securities. Korean securities
would also be listed on overseas stock exchanges, and the government
would permit limited securities business by securities firms abroad
on the basis of reciprocity.
(d) The fourth and final stage is presently targeted for the early
1990s. At that time, domestic investors would be allowed to invest
in foreign securities, and foreign securities could be listed on the
Korean exchange. There would be no-limit liberalization of securi-
ties business by securities firms at home and abroad.
3.28 Stage one has been very successful in terms of attracting investor
interest. Two open-ended investment trusts for the issuance of beneficial
certificates for foreigners were established in 1981 with initial limits of
$1k million each. The performance of both trusts was good, and in 1983 each
trust was increased by $10 million, bringing total funds to $50 rAillion.
Three additional funds were established in 1985 with total funding of $90 Mil-
lion (see Table 3.4). These trusts are now fully subscribed, but so far the
government has not granted another increase in capital.
3.29 The Korea Fund, Inc., a closed-end investment company registered
with the USISEC and listed on the NYSE, invests primarily in Korean stocks; it
began with uu originial public offering of $60 million in August 1984. Since
then the stock has typically traded at a hefty premium over net asset value
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(about 7SZ at one sta W and a new tranche of $40 million was successfully
launched in mid-1986.3-/
3.30 Stage two was initiated in November 1985 when the government
announced that-Korean companies with net assets exceeding 50 billion won
(about $56.8 million at that time) and stock yielding dividends of more than
20X were allowed to issue convertible securities in international money mar-
kets; some 16 companies presently meet these criteria. Three companies
(Samsung Electronics, Daewoo Heavy and Yukong) have since issued convertible
debentures in the cumulative amount of $80 million. Each issue was priced at
what appeared to seasoned market participants to be the issuer's advantage
but, because of the scarcity of Korean equities in international markets, was
fully subscribed with ease. A number of international investment companies
are now eager to participate in underwriting issues by other Korean firms.
Table 3.4: PORTFOLIO FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA
Fund Amount Date of establishment
($ million)
Korea International Trust 25 Nov. 1981
Korea Trust 25 Nov. 1981
Korea Fund /a 100 Aug. 1984; Apr. 1986
Korea Growth Trust 30 Mar. 1985
Seoul International Trust 30 Apr. 1985
Seoul Trust 30 Apr. 1985
Venture Fund 5 Dec. 1985; Apr. 1986
Convertible Debentures /b 80 Dec. 1985-May 1986
Total 325
/a Including second tranche of $40 million launched in April 1986.
Th Comprising issuances of three private c.:mpanies: Samsung Electronics
($20 million); Daewoo Heavy ($40 million) and Yukong ($20 million).
C. Further Promotion of Foreign Portfolio Investment
3.31 The step by step approach taken by Korea is sound and reasonable.
However, given the initial interest shown in the first two stages of Korea's
39/ The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector oriented
component of the World Bank, has been instrumental in launching both
tranches of the Korea Fund and in supporting measures, such as the
establishment of a domestic bond rating agency, to promote the develop-
ment of the Korean securities market.
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internationalization plan and the need for long-term funding and diversifica-
tioti away from debt, Korean authorities ought to consider stepping up the pace
of liberalization to take advantage of the favorable investment climate,
particularly at this point when the country's trade position is strong.
3.32 Korea's investment trusts and overseas funds, as well as issuance of
convertible bonds by Korean firias in international markets function as bridges
to the domestic equity market. They create familiarity with the Korean corpo-
rate names and even generate healthy corporate publicity. The government
could promote internationalization by expanding participation in the various
investment trusts operating on the KSE. The success of the Korea Fund has
created interest among underwriters avid fund managers to undertake similar
efforts in the US market and elsewhere. Additional funds similar to the Korea
Fund couH,be established on other exchanges abroad to tap interest in those
markets.
3.33 The second phase of internationalization could also be promoted
further. Korean firms should be encouraged to issue convertible bonds in the
Euromarkets--with appropriate pricing and straightforward conversion fea-
tures. The process of tapping international securities markets by corporate
names should even go a stage further in the next few years through issues by a
greater number of companies in a number of different.currencies. The Japanese
experience with convertible bonds issued in the Euromarkets has been a
positive one.
3.34 The government should also now consider allowing the issuance of
foreign depository receipts as a way of attracting further overseas portfolio
investment. American depository receipts (ADRs), for example, are vehicles by
which shares of foreign companies can be traded in dollar denominations and in
bearer form in the US domestic market. They are used for the trading of
40/ Of course, the establishment of stock funds abroad is also dependent on
the rules and regulations of the particular exchanges involved. It may
also be argued that, with the opening of the Seoul stock exchange to
direct purchase of Korean stocks by foreigners within a few years there
should no longer be a need for Korean stock funds in overseas markets.
This overlooks the psychology of international investors, however,
particularly that of smaller individual investors who are much more
comfortable in purchasing stocks on local exchanges.
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shares in companies based particulay in Europe and East Asia. This system
has grown rapidly in recent years.e-
3.35 Afteir further expanding the first two phases, the government should
consider advancement of phase three of its internationalization program. 
It
could do this by promoting better acceptance of foreign portfolio investment
and by undertaking measures to strengthen the domestic capital market.
3.36 Overcoming Reservations Concerning PFI: One of the main constrainta
to direct portfolio investment in developing countries arises from fear of
"creeping control." This concern is often exaggerated. Unlike direct
investment, portfolio investment usually means minority investment; it is
aimed at an attractive financial return rather than control. As mentioned
earlier, the principal sources of foreign capital are pension funds, which 
are
not interested in the responsibility of control and in fact rarely vote 
the
shares they do hold. They tend to limit their holdings in any one enterprise
to 2-5X of outstanding stock, in order to minimize risk and avoid difficulty
in selling. This is the type of capital in which Korea should be most
interested.
3.37 Additional safeguards can be instituted, however. Korea already 
has
placed restrictions on the level of foreign portfolio investment in individual
Korean companies and industries permitted to the various stock funds so far
established. Other countries have taken pragmatic steps to allow free equity
markets but at the same time to minimize possible foreign control. Germany,
for example, limits the extent of foreign control of domestic companies by
creating separate classes of shares. Ordinary shares have voting rights;
preferred shares do not, but instead their claim on dividends is a cumulative
one and takes precedence over that of ordinary shareholders. Foreign
investors are allowed to invest in preferred shares only.
3.38 Sweden, in 1982, created "free shares" which are available to
foreign investors. Creation of these shares was the result of a major change
in legislation to allow non-residents greater access to the Swedish equity
41/ To create an ADR, the shares of a company are purchased on the local
exchange in question and held in safe custody; the custodian is normally
a bank. The bank then issues a certificate which represents the shares
in question. The certificate usually represents a package of shares
which brings the value of the certificate in line with the value of
actively traded shares in the U.S. domestic market. Certificates are
denominated in dollars and traded as a security in their own right. Any
market maker in the "over the counter" market in the US will deal in ADRo
on behalf of its client. The possible disadvantage of ADRs is that they
effectively turn registered shares into bearer shares; therefore, a com-
pany cannot trace the ownership of its shares. Limits on the amount of
equity held in the form of ADRs can, however, prevent concentrttion of
ownership. Up to 202 of equity in individual companies has been held in
the form of ADRs.
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market.4./ Companies are required to obtain special permission from the
central bank to issue free shares, but all major companies, except banks and
certain other specified companies which cannot have foreign ownership, have
been granted this permission. There is a limit to the amount of free shares a
company can issue. In most cases this is up to 20% of its voting capital.
Most free shares, however, are issued as so-called "B" shares, which hold
reduced voting power (1/10 of a vote). Therefore, it would be possible for a
company to sell, say, 40% of its equity abroad but less than 20% of voting
shares. During 1982 and 1983, more than SKr 7 billion of shares were sold to
foreigners through this instrument.
3.39 There is also concern expressed that foreign investors will be buy-
ing shares in domestic companies at unfairly low prices. Low share valuation
in Qften caused by restraints on or insulation of equity markets. Foreign
portfolio investment should, in fact, help to raise share valuations by
injecting greater demand; as mentioned earlier, this would stimulate capital
gains for existing domestic investors and company owners and, in turn, stimu-
late new equity issues if priced at market.
3.40 A variant of the low price argument is the contention that Korean
firms will have to offer high yields to foreign investors in order to attract
and keep them and this will eat into retained earnings and damage the pro-
spects of company expansion. While, in genere',- it is correct to expect that
equity investors will require higher compensation in the long run than debt-
lenders because of their assumption of greater risk, this does not necessarily
mean that company expansion has to be sacrificed. Higher returns can be
offered in the form of capital gains and investors may indeed be positively
inclined towards firms whose dividends are kept low because earnings are
plowed back into company expansion. Furthermore, many investors will be
attracted even if dividend return is low provided the stock helps them reduce
their overall risk. Studies show that despite their lower-than-average return
Korean stocks would be preferred by US investors because of their risk diver-
sification characteriatics (Anckonie and Chi, 1986).
3.41 Finally, another concern is the possible volatility of foreign
portfolio investment, creating sudden shifts of flows in and out of the stock
market, and the related effect on the currency. Indeed, there are swings in
stock market activity. But share price volatility is often most extreme in
thinly capitalized stock markets with narrow ownership, which can lead to
insider trading. To the extent that diversification of sources of capital
creates a broader market, foreign portfolio investment could actually foster
greater liquidity and stability. Also, in practice most foreign institutional
42/ The experience of Sweden may offer a useful parallel for Korea. Around
1980-81, the Swedish government realized its domestic stock market was
not mature enough to give full valuation to its companies; thus companies
were encouraged to issue primary shares in London or New York. This
stimulated overall market valuations and later stock market activity at
home, by drawing attention to the investment opportunities in the
domestic market.
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investors establish minimum and maximum exposure levels by country, industry
and individual company. Changes in portfolio composition often occur by not
making new investments from net available cash flow, rather than from net
disinvestment. Moreover, there is some evidence that foreign portfolio
investment is countercyclical.
3.42 Also, investor interest depends on a positive view of the domestic
economy, the domestic capital market and the individual company. Foreign
investors are presently attracted to Korean stocks because of the strength of
the Korean economy and the healthy prospects of individual companies. To the
extent that greater access to equity further enhances corporate financial
health and expands the availability of long-term funding for needed economic
expansion, investor optimism should be reinforced.
3.43 Strengthening the Domestic Securities Market: The Korean capital
market suffers, at present, from a number of shortcomings which are being
overlooked by international investors rushing to get a piece of a product in
scarce supply. Once Korean equities are freely available to those investors
the extent of foreign interest in them will be largely determined by the scope
and pace of measures undertaken to strengthen and reform the domestic capital
market. In the long run, the most effective way of making Korean equities
more acceptable internationally will be to make them more acceptable
domestically. Measures which Korea ought to consider now to strengthen the
domestic capital ma Mt to facilitate greater foreign and donestic portfolio
investment include:
(a) Pricing and Dividend Policies: Since par value reference pricing
has no economic significance the government should discourage it.
The level and quality of earnings should be the main determinants of
issue price. The practice of linking dividends to par value should
also be discouraged. Individual companies should have complete
flexibility in determining dividends on the basis of corporate
profits and investment needs.
(b) Technical Changes: Allowing stock splitting, thus lowering the
average stock price, would broaden the market by enabling more
individual investors to purchase stocks. Facilitating block tradin
would also encourage market development. The capitalization of the
Korea Securities Finance Corporation (KSFC) could be expanded so as
to enable it to undertake this function until individual securities
houses are strong enough to do so. Over-the-counter trading should
also be encouraged to facilitate the supply of capital to small and
medium companies. Again, since Korean securities houses do not yet
have the capital to make a stable and sustainable OTC market, the
ability of the KSFC to support such trading might be enhanced.
43/ These measures are more fully described and discussed in Appendix 3A.
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(c) Regulatory Measures: These would include enhanced disclosure and
more standardized accounting practices, more competitive
underwriting procedures, stronger investor protection measures,
enhanced regulation enforcement powers for the KSE, and training to
enhance professionalism and technical capabilities in the operation
and overview of securities markets.
(d) Enhancing Domestic Demand: Domestic institutional investors such as
pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds play a signifi-
cant role in mobilizing savings and promoting the domestic stock
market in many countries. To the extent that regulations prevent
them from doing the same in Korea there is a case for regulatory
reform. Public education as to the role and advantages of
securities can also be useful in enhancing demand.
(e) Bond Market Measures: To alleviate the bias against equity further
government efforts are needed to promote the use of non-guaranteed
bonds. At present bank-guaranteed bonds serve essentially as
surrogate loans. The use of credit ratings should also be promoted
so as to bring about more effic.ient pricing relative to risk and





Appendix 3A: Strengthening the Domestic Securities Market
1. The importance of developing the domestic capital market appears to
be generally accepted by Government. This is clearly evident in the guide-
lines for capital market development contained in the Sixth Plan. Among other
objectives, the Plan seeks to facilitate the raising of capital through direct
finance in the corporate sector. Towards this end the Plan seeks to
(i) sharply increase the supply of tradable securities (through tax and
financial reform); (ii) raise investor confidence by means of exercising
stringent control over trading and requiring improvements in corporate
accounting practices; (iii) increase the variety of securities to meet
investor and issuer preference te.g., preferred stock, convertible bonds);
(iv) reduce the bias in favor of issuing government guaranteed bonds so as to
promote a viable, self-sustaining bond market; (v) enhance the underwriting
role of securities companies and to broaden the range of business activities
open to such companies. Government objectives are expressed in general terms
in the Sixth Plan. Specific actions need to be taken, however, if these
objectives are to be realized. The remainder of this appendix discusses some
specific measures that are required for the strengthening of the domestic
capital market. They fall into several categories, listed below as (i)
Pricing and Technical Changes, (ii) Institutional Measures, (iii) Market
Development Measures, and (iv) Bond Market Improvement Measures.
(a) Pricing and Technical Changes
2. Pricing and Dividend Policies. Past restrictions on issuance prices
of new stocks have been progressively relaxed over the past few years: now
issues can theoretically be priced at market and companies are permitted to
offer 100% of new shares at market prices (up from 40% previously). Neverthe-
less, the infrequency with which market-price issues have actually been
floated during the past three years and the continuing "guidance" role of
securities regulators in this regard suggests that the idea of market-pricing
as opposed to par-value pricing has not yet become firmly rooted. Since par
value prictag has no economic significance, the government should now
encourage full liberalization of pricing--to build a system whereby the level
and quality of earnings are the main determinants of pricing for new issues
and where market value underpins the pricing of rights issues.
3. Dividends still tend to be paid at a certain percentage of par
rather than in consideration of profitability and corporate policy. Individ-
ual companies should have complete flexibility in determining dividends on the
basis of profits. Greater education and further government promotion is
needed to encourage investors to look for potential capital gains rather than
annual income.
4. Other Technical Changes. Other changes could also stimulate greater
participation in the market. For example, allowing stock splitting, thus
lowering the average stock price, would broaden the market by enabling more




tends to raise market valuations and facilities diversification. It could
also have the positive effect of reducing the sanctity of par value. In
London, the average stock price is $2.50; thus 100 shares cost, on average,
$250.00, an amount accessible to small investors. Korea's average stock price
is double that, despite a lower per capita income.
5. Facilitating block trading would encourage market development. The
role of the Korea Securities Finance Corporation (KSFC) as a market maker
could be expanded, taking on a more innovative role. The KSE is currently
limited by having no ability to cross blocs of shares at negotiated prices
within the market. In other countries, brokers are expected to perform this
function outside the market, but a shortage of capital limits the ability of
Korean houses to perform this function well. KSFC presently has the capital,
reputation and related expertise to undertake this role in an expanded way
until securities houses are strong enough to do so. Such activity also needs
to be well regulated to prevent manipulation.
6. Over-the-counter (OTC) trading is a natural extension of such a
function and is important particularly for small to medium, high-growth
companies seeking to raise equity. OTC markets have developed in parallel
with most stock exchanges with security companies building up an inventory of
unlisted stocks which they buy and sell for their own account. Relatively
smaller companies use this market because it avoids listing costs and demands
less disclosure. The bulk of shares in stock markets are traded over the
counter (although the value of turnover on the exchanges is higher because of
the larger companies listed on the exchanges). Development of OTC trading
makes sense given the government's interest in facilitating the supply of
capital for small- and medium-size high technology manufacturing companies.
OTC trading in Korea, as it exists presently, is dominated by bond
transactions rather than equities. Since Korean securities houses do not have
the capital to make a dynamic OTC market in equities at present, KSFC might
seek to expand its support to this activity.
7. Efforts to assure good back-office functions, automation, comurunica-
tions and custodial functions are also extremely important, particular to
foreign investors, in order to avoid any settlement problems.
(b) Institutional Measures
8. There are several institutional changes which could promote a
healthier equity market as well as encourage foreign portfolio investment.
These include improved disclosure and accounting practices and introduction of
corporate information services; an improved underwriting system including
greater foreign participation; further development of the regulatory struc-
ture; and, finally, continued public education and training to enhance profes-
sionalism and technical capabilities in the operation and overview of securi-
ties markets.
9. Disclosure and Accounting. Adequate accounting and auditing are at
the heart of a properly functioning financial system. Investor confidence in
both the securities and equities markets in Korea would be boosted by greater
availability of corporate financial information--from independent sources and




10. In the absence of integrated, timely and reliable corporate informa-
tion, both initial corporate issues and development of a secondary market are
impeded, affecting the size and liquidity of the market. Under the supervi-
sion of the Securities Exchange Commission and its Securities Supervisory
Board (SEC/SSB), steps have already been taken to require listed companies to
publish reports, but the information may not always be sufficient to enable
investors to make informed judgments. The production of better company infor-
mation under the supervision of the SEC/SSB also needs to be supported by a
more effective system of disseminating that information. Development of inde-
pendent corporate information and analytical services also must be encou-
raged. Furthermore, in many Western countries, it is common for company
officers to give regular briefings to investment analysts, to develop fuller
appreciation of the company and its financial position. This practice could
be encouraged in Korea. Better disclosure will develop also as companies
realize it is in their own interests as an aid to raising cheaper funds in the
securities markets.
11. The accounting and auditing industry is also relatively new in
Korea, and there is an insufficient supply of accountants. Greater attention
is needed to developing further a professional accounting association for cer-
tification and licensing, development of uniform accounting principles and
auditing standards and establishment of standards for financial reporting.
The Korean government may want to consider sponsoring a study by a qualified
outside firm to suggest ways to encourage development of the industry and
improve accounting and auditing standards.
12. Certain specific improvements in corporate accounting could enhance
the analysis and valuation of companies. First, traditional accounting
methods have tended to obscure information on consolidated companies, particu-
larly the status of intercompany loans and equity investments. When intercom-
pany relationships are not specifically spelled out in audited financial
statements, the result is uncertainty in the minds of investors as to the true
state of affairs of a company or group of companies. Improved disclosure
could help boost investor confidence. Second, Korean firms do not fully
adjust the value of their assets to reflect inflation, thus fixed assets can
be undervalued, again affecting valuation of the company. In this regard,
however, Korean accounting practice is similar to that of many advanced
countries and, indeed, better than some (e.g. Japan).
13. Underwriting System and Development of the Securities Industry. The
system suffers from a number of weaknesses resulting from the fact that too
little is left to market forces. Securities companies do not compete in all
respects for the management of issues. Fees for underwriting and managing
issues of both equities and corporate bonds are also fixed by the regulatory
authorities instead of by negotiation between the issuer and the management/
underwriting group. The reluctance to price at market also affects the under-
writing function. What occurs is that commitments to underwrite are not, in
practice, always firm; this allows underwriters to get around pricing
guidelines. This further raises the cost of issuance for a company. The lead
manager, who is most closely in touch with potential investors, really should
have the freedom to work with the company to decide the amount, pricing and
fee structure and to.form the underwriting group. The government could help




correct the problem by changing the nature of its guidance to underwriting
institutions' and ultimately allowing greater competition.
14. There is also merit in promoting some changes in the securities
industry. The seven principal securities companies are owned by leading
conglomerates; this has helped them to develop an adequate capital base, but
it has also contributed to the public perception of insider control of the
equity market. It may be appropriate to encourage the dilution of conglom-
erate ownership in these companies. At the same time, the various companies
in the industry (merchant banks, securities companies and finance houses)
might be encouraged to form larger groupings in order to obtain economies of
management resources and larger capital bases (in order to undertake larger
underwriting commitments). This process would be enhanced by the Government
moving to a negative list of activities rather than the present positive list
which specifically dictates the activities of different companies in th-e
industry. The negative list should be rather short, retaining primarily the
basic distinction between commercial and trust banking on the one hand and
securities-related business on the other.
15. Foreign securities companies could play a role in providing capital
and management resources as well as the latest financial techniques. Allowing
foreign companies to take a significant (though not controlling) shareholding
in domestic securities companies could be beneficial, as it would facilitate
greater transfer of market know-how. Foreign companies have recently been
permitted to take on a total 101 shareholding in Korean securities companie,s
(maximum 5Z per investor). This size of holding is probably too low to get
the full benefits of foreign involvement in terms of better management,
increased capital adequacy and access to more sophisticated market instru-
ments.
16. Regulatory Concerns. The government has traditionally been heavily
.nvolved in the financial and securities markets, because of its desire to
support the industrial and export sectors of the economy. It is now gradually
moving away from past detailed control to a broader supervisory role. This
can only be achieved, however, as these markets strengthen (with institutional
changes such as those discussed above) and develop their own self-regulatory
capabilities, thus reducing public concern over possible market manipulation.
It may be appropriate at this junction, therefore, for the Ministry of Finance
to sponsor a review by outside consultants of mechanisms for improved self-
regulation of the securities industry as well as for appropriate governmental
supervision. Such a review at this time might identify changes or directions
for policy which could enhance investor confidence in the market.
17. Professional Training. Through the Korean Securities Dealers
Association (KSDA), a self-regulatory body of brokerage houses, and other
auspices, specialized training could be organized for the professionals
responsible for the operation and supervision of the securities market. That
training could cover analytical techniques for valuing equities and different





(c) Market Development Measures
18. Use of Tax Incentives to Encourage Issues. The most direct way of
stimulating new issues in the market is through tax concessions. Tax incen-
tives accorded in the 1970s helped create the initial surge of the stock mar-
ket in Korea. They have been progressively removed since 1978, and the
difference in corporate taxation between listed and unlisted companies is now
only about 3%. Naturally, the tax system should ultimately be neutral between
listed and nonlisted companies. Temporary tax discrimination may be justified
only to stimulate capital market development and perhaps mitigate other dis-
tortions, if the latter cannot be removed directly. The government may want
to consider reintroducing tax incentives, perhaps on a temporary and decreas-
ing basis, to encourage companies to go public, if measures on the demand side
cannot alone create the incentive to attract companies into the market. Some
relief might also be offered on new issues of presently listed companies where
the proceeds are used, for example, for new investment in emerging technolo-
gies, new product development or export oriented investment.
19. The government also has a particularly powerful tool in respect of
estate taxes. It might consider lifting or delaying such taxes on profits
received from primary stock issues. Such an approach would be designed to
attract old family or closely held enterprises, who have so far feared going
public. One could also consider relaxing estate taxation on money invested in
new equity subscriptions or for issues where the proceeds are going to tar-
geted industries. The Cooreman provisions of the Belgian LeClerq law during
1982/83 incorporated such measures. Among other tax advantages, death and
gift duties were exonerated for ten years on special shares which were issued
to raise capital for investment specifically in Belgium. Such measures were
extremely successful in encouraging formation of risk capital.
20. Attracting New Investors. While the emphasis of this paper is on
foreign portfolio investment, there is also considerable scope for further
attracting domestic investors to the equity market. There is a much greater
role for pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds, which so far
have not been very active in the Korean market, in mobilizing individual
savings and channeling them to the equity market. Only about 31% of Korean
shares are held by private corporate investors, including insurance companies,
although this is up from 15% in 1972. This compares with a current 66% in
Japan and 581 in the UK (1984 data). For example, the Japanese insurance
market, second largest in the world after the US, is a particularly vital
source of long-term funds for Japan's heavy industrial companies and is the
country's biggest institutional investor, with 26% of outstanding shares
listed on the Tokyo exchange.
21. The participation of institutional investors, both dorilestic and
foreign, can offer the following advantages: (i) a likely continuous net
inflow of new funds to the market; (ii) a core of investors with a long
investment horizon, giving the market more stability; (iii) development of
professional fund managers, who can evaluate stocks on a more professional
basis than individuals generally do; and finally tiv) the institutional base
for an increased private placement capability for placing debt of higher-risk




vide a better alternative to the existing curb market). The government there-
fore, ought to consider mbasures to stimulate the further proliferation and
financial strength of such institutions, providing them also with greater
flexibility to invest in equities. A step in this direction is the recent
government encouragement of insurance companies to invest a greater share of
funds in equities (September 1985 in the past they have shown greater inter-
est in debt securities.
22. While the insurance industry has been developing well, thanks to
initial government support, the formation of pension funds is relatively
undeveloped in Korea. The three major funds--for government workers, teachers
and the military--are only partially funded, and just a small percentage is
presently invested in equities. Efforts should be made to fund these pension
plans fully, to develop professional funxd management and, finally, to diver-
sify the investments of those ftunds. There are few pension schemes set up
within companies; the traditional retirement benefit is a lump-sum severance
payment, deducted from a company's current income. For social security
reasons as well as savings accumulation, consideration should be given to
developing funded corporate pension schemes. Given the cash flow constraints
of many Korean companies, implementation would have to be gradual, however.
Alternatively, creation of independent pension schemes could be promoted,
perhaps under the aegis of the insurance companies and funded individually.
23. Tax deferred retirement and amployee savings plans should also be
further encouraged. Existing plans (such as Korea s Employee Savings Plan)
are a good beginning but are not considered to be generous enough to be com-
pelling to potential participants. They might be liberalized further, allow-
ing a higher tax credit for investment in equities. This type of tax incen-
tive program has been successful in mobilizing capital in a number of coun-
tries where it has been implemented. The Monory Law in France and similar
measures in Sweden and Belgium are good examples; the Korean government may
want to study these programs carefully.
24. Sweden, for example, provided considerable impetus to its equity
market by offering incentives to small investors through investment funds.
Individuals subscribe to the funds by paying in regular monthly savings for a
period of five years. The funds, managed by banks and financiai - titutions,
are invested in the equity market; the individual subscribers benefit not ortly
from the investment returns but also from special tax concessions. The growth
of these funds were primarily responsible for the strong rise in equity prices
and turnover in Sweden's stock market in 1982/83. Market valuation rose from
SKr 136 billion to SKr 324 billion in the course of six months, and turnover
was the third highest in the world in that year. To moderate that growth, tax
concessions were modified in March 1983, but the funds continue to make a sig-
nificant contribution to the market.
25. Further encouragement of existing investment trusts to invest in
Korean equities is needed. Unit trust investment represented less than 5% of
the total domestic equity market in 1983. While there are nine institutions
(three investment trust companies and 6 merchant banks) authotized to under-
take the management of unit trusts, only a few are really active. KITC, the




liquidity, it finds it difficult to buy &nd sell shares without moving the
market against itself. This illustrates the need for incentives to expand the
number of investors.
26. Greater efforts should be undertaken to educate and inform the
public concerning the advantages of investments in the securities market. A
stock market is typically not part of the common tradition of savings and,
therefore, this process will take some time. It involves developing financial
journalism in publications and on radio and TV; it calls for education at the
university and secondary levels; and it demands better individual investor
information from the securities industry. As a start, the public needs to
understand particularly the advantages of using tax-deferred savings plans and
the participatory features of investment trusts, because of the advantages of
diversified and long-term investments.
(d} Bond Market Improvements
27. Policies in the bond market affect the equity market too and there-
fore are also considered here. To alleviate the bias against equity, further
government efforts ate needed to promote laster movement of the bond market
away from bank guarantees. Actually, these two sources of long-term funding
should be complementary. Active, free-standing and liquid equity and bond
markets would both enhance a healthier, diversified corporate finance struc-
ture. The experience of the United Staites is probably the best example of
this complementarity because both markets are so fully developed there.
Equity is an important source of long-term funding in the United States and
provides balance to compani2s' capitalization structures and needed financial
flexibility; the level of equity judged necessary depends on the industry and
particular circumstances of the company. Bond financing, however, is the
largest source of long-term financing in the United States. But the maturi-
ties of those bonds are indeed long-term (up to 30 years), unlike Korean bonds
(3-5 years). Furthermore, the variety of instruments in the US bond market
and strong secondary markets provide diversity, liquidity and transparency--
appealing to both corporate issuers and investors. Instruments are constantly
being developed to meet issuers' and market needs. The securitization of debt
enables companies to reach directly a broader pool of investors, often at
lower initial cost than with loans because the existence of secondary markets
offers liquidity to those investor3. And, to the issuers, secotdary markets
provide the discipline, as well as the opportunity, of a continuous market
price for their debt instruments.
28. In Korea, promotion of the equity market should go hand in hand with
measures to encourage greater independence and deepening of the domestic bond
market--leading to greater innovat ion and hopefully development of longer-term
instruments acceptable to investors. Some of the measures discussed above in
the context of equity market development should help: higher disclosure and
audit standards, independent corporate information and analytical services, a
strong competitive underwriting system and improved regulation.
29. Use of credit ratings would also facilitate development of a bond
market independent of the banking system and government support. Credit
ratings benefit the range of participants in financial markets, including
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equity investors. They provide an independent assessment of companies and
differentiation of credit quality. That encourages more efficient pricing
relative to risk. The ratin,gs process also promotes increased disclosure and
indeed corporate discipline. It puts pressure on potential issuers to improve
their financial structures in order to lower the cost of borrowing. Ratings
also can be expected to promote wider underwriting and facilitate placement
with investors. Encouragement for the rating and research activities of the
one-year-old KBRI and other nascent rating and information services will be
extremely important in creating a self-standing domestic securitias market.
30. Internationalization of the equity market should also have positive
spillover effects in the bond market--by introducing foreigr. approaches and
financial technology as well as competition from expanding funding options.
For example, as Korean companies become more comfortable with the issue of
convertible bonds abroad, it may encourage them to issue convertible bonds in
the domestic market, something which is iaot commonly done. Convertibles could
well be the vehicle by which to encourage companies to enter the domestic
equity market and to woo traditional bond investors into equities. The
conversion terms could be fized to encourage maximum conversion at an early
date in order to improve debt/equity ratios. The government might consider
tax incentives to encourage such issues. Also, internationalization should
stimulate the giowth and sophistication of the securities industry in Korea,
with positi7e effects on the bond market too, assuming that regulatory changes
have beaen made. Finally, there is a reiterative or self-fulfilling process
that goes on. As diversification continues through a stronger, more active
equity market and greater access to foreign markets, it should encourage
investor confidence and acceptance of other diverse long-term funding instru-
ments, as well as eventually internationalization of Kerea's debt securities
market too.





Appendix 3B: The Japanese Experience with Internationalization
1. The capital market structures of Japan and Korea, at various points
in time and at different stages in their development, have many parallels.
Both have relied primarily on indirect finance, usually bank loans, to fund
corporate growth--encouraged by the government's interest rate and credit
allocation policies. Both governments e-rcised considerable control, if not
ownership, in the financial sector. In apan, close interlocking relation-
ships were formed between the large city banks and major corporations, assur-
ing easy access to bank funding. In Korea, government control manifested
itself through considerable owmership of the banking system. The result in
both cases was high debt burdens an-d less flexible corporate finance. Inter-
nal sources of finance, such as retained earnings, were lower, reducing the
ability to fund new investment internally. Moreover, control over the finan-
cial sector stunted the development of alternative funding sources and instru-
ments. Prior to the 1970s the equity market was very limited. The immaturity
of the capital markets,contrasted sharply with the growing sophistication of
their economies.
2. Beyond the parallels, however, there also are key differences in
Japanese and Korean markets. Japan has a much larger domestic population upon
whose savings it can draw. Korea's economy, of necessity, has been much more
open. It has had to rely more heavily on foreign debt to finance its develop-
ment. Its industries are also more dependent on foreign markets than Japanese
industries Are. And, most importantly, there are different external circum-
stances facing Korea now, compared with those faced by Japan at a similar
stage of development--technological competition and protectionism in the
developed markets and cost competition with other newly industrializing
countries. Because of these factors, Korea cannot wait as long as Japan did
before liberalizing its capital markets. It needs a financial sector which is
strong and diversified to meet the funding needs of a growing and increasingly
complex industrial structure. It must reduce its high corporate debt in order
to achieve greater operating flexibility. And, finally, it needs to diversify
its heavy foreign funding away from solely debt financing on which it is
running up against the sovereign limits of banks.
3. Actually, it is the Japanese experience with liberalization of its
capital markets over the past 15 years which Korea should consider more care-
fully. That experience proiides some positive feedback concerning the effect
of liberalization on corporate finances. In the case of Japan, structural
changes in the financial system began in 1974, the year that marked the end of
the era of hiah economic growth and transition to an era of slow growth after
the first oil crisis in 1973 and the recession in 1974. Many Japanese compa-
nies at that time found themselves overextended, without the ability to
weather easily the economic downturn. And the safety net of close banking-
corporate relationships showed strain. As one commentator notest "It became
clear that the presence of large loans from city banks was no longer the
insurance policy it was once thought to be, as the Daiwa Bank wrote off Eidai
Sangyo, a top housing company, the Sumitomo Bank refused new credits to the




trading firm Ataka and Compg7y, and the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank refused funds to
Kohjin, the textile maker."'-
4. The overwhelming predominance of indirect financing began to lessen
gradually from 1974 onwards, as corporati.ons sought to rely further on inter-
nal sources of funds and sought external financing increasingly through direct
means, such as the issue of straight and convertible bonds and new shares at
home and abroad. At the same time, steps "'ere z.2ken to remove or alter regula-
tions relating to interest rates and the scope of financial activities. In
fiscal 1970, firms raised 34.5% of long-term funds from internal sources, in-
cluding retained earnings, depreciation and reserves (Table 3.5). That share
had risen to 50.7% by 1979. The share of new external funds raised through
direct means stood at 10.4% in fiscal 15W73, but had risen to 17.2% by 1980.
New share issues in the growing Tokyo stock market doubled to Yen 1,270 bil-
lion during the 1970s. During this period, the market also made the important
transition from issues of shares at p&r to issues at market value.
Table 3.5: SOURCES OF LONG-TERN. FUNDS RAISED BY JAPANESE CORPORATICONS
IN FISCAL 1970 AND 1979
Source 1970 1979
(Y billion)
Retained earnings 562 1,465
Depreciation 1,619 2,736
Other internal sources 44 9
Reserves 211 204
Subtotal of internal sources 2,436 4,414
Capital increase (principal) 348 175
Capital increase (surplus) 59 412
Debt securities issued 374 736
Long-term bank loans 132 78
Subtotal of external source 4,059 4,297
Total long-term financing 6,495 8,711
Ratio of internal financing to total (37.5%) (50.67%)
Debt securities redeemed 179 546
Long-term loans repaid 1,490 3,856
Net external long-term funds raised 2,390 -105
Net total long-term financing 4,826 4,309
Ratio of interal financing to
net total long-term financing (50.47%) (102.43%)





5. One of the mo,; important developments towards the end of the 1970s
was the influx of Japanese borrowers into the Euromarkets. The domestic bond
market was very restricted for corporate borrowers because of government regu-
lations; Japanese companies were able to replace these sources of funds with
securities issued in Europe. In 1977, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) liberal-
ized access to markets by companies of all sizes (prior to that, only a few of
the largest and most highly rated companies were allowed to tap the Euromar-
kets). Decontrol was then finally completed with the enforcement of the new
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in December 1980. The MOF
retained the right to monitor the flow of foreign issues thkough a reporting
system.
6. The reforms created a wave of new issues in Europe. Total bond
issues overseas (straight and convertible) surged from $1,495 billion in fis-
cal 1976 to $3,598 billion in fiscal 1980. Funds raised abroad increased from
0.07% of total external financing in fiscal 1973 to 7.1% by fiscal 1980. The
attractions of borrowiing in Europe included: more competitive interest rates
on foreign funds than often available at home; the opportunity to borrow in
foreign currencies, anticipating foreign currency receivables or as a means of
diversifying liabilities; publicity and market familiarity for those export-
oriented firms listed in foreign securities markets; and, finally, diversity
of funding.
7. In recent years there have been imaginative tailorings of Japanese
issues to make them attractive to specific markets. Convertible bonds have
been particularly popular with medium-sized, high-growth companies. Since
1977, a large variety of convertible issues have been launched in the Euromar-
kets; a smaller number of convertible bonds have been floated in the United
States. Since 1980, Japanese companies have raised over $20 billio/,equiva-
lent from the sale of convertible bonds in foreign capital markets.-
8. The change in corporate financing has had a major impact on the
Japanese financial system. It has injected new life into the securities mar-
kets. It has also improved the depth and trading volume in the domestic
Japanese money market. Medium-sized Japanese firms now face a broader range
of funding options. A greater number of top-rated Japanese firms, attractive
to foreign investors, are offering more new shares for sale. Finally, also,
there has been an institutional effect. The process of financial liberaliza-
tion has moved the balance of power away from the commercial banks, who are
now developing new services themselves in order to compete, to the Japanese
securities houses which constitute the fastest growing sector of the Japanese
financial system. The resulting diversification and specialization offers the
impetus to further growth of the financial sector.
9. This experience suggests that Korea should not wait as long as Japan
did before liberalizing and opening its financial sector; indeed, Korea may
not be able to afford to, given its dependence on external funding and its
continued need for funds to finance corporate growth and technological




IV. FUTURE FINANCING OPTIONS: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
A. DFI during the 1970s
4.01 During the 1970. the scale and pattern of DFI in Korea was
controlled by the government through a comprehensive set of guidelines and
regulations. Elaborate criteria were set up to screen DPI applications so as
to keep out projects which might offer significant competition in domestic or
overseas markets to local firms as well as projects which essentially provided
only capital and not much technology. The level of foreign ownership was
effectively limited to 501 by a plethora of guidelines which made it difficult
to obtain approval for a majority foreign owned venture. Furthermore, the
minimum scale of investment was set at $50,000 per project, and gradually
raised to $500,000 in 1979, to prevent small-scale, footloose investments
seeking only to take advantage of Korea's low-cost labor in assembly and
packaging operations. All considered, Korea possessed one of the more
forbidding environments for DFI in this period, especially when compared to
those offered by several other countries in its peer group.
4.02 Because of the discouraging host environment DFI played a relatively
minor role in Korea's development in the 1970s. It typically amounted to less
than 51 of gtoss foreign capital inflows as compared to 85X for Singapore, 501
for Kong Kong, 251 for Brazil and between 121 and 181 for Mexico, Argentina,
Philippines and Indonesia. A similar comparative picture emerges when one
looks at the ratios of the relevant stocks (see Table 4.1). Also, DFI in
Korea was confined to relative,ly few industrial sectors such as chemicals,
electronics and hotels. Sectors with large domestic sales (foodstuffs and
pha,.-maceuticalsp for example) as well as those with established export markets
(textiles for example) did not feature much DFI (see Table 4.2). A further
consequence of Korea's attitude towards DFI was that the forms it took were
largely those in which control often rested with the local partner. Less-
than-majority-owned joint ventures increased relative to majorityowned
ventures during the 1970s. Licensing agreements also grew in importance and
became the preferred form of technology transfer in many sectors.
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Table 4.1: SHARES OF DFI IN TOTAL EXTERNAL LIABILITIES
Stock of Ratio of
Stock of external debt, DFI to total
DFI, 1983 1983 liabilities
Countries ----(billions of US dollars)----- (X)
Korea 1.8 38.9 4.4
Argentina 5.3 44.4 11.6
Brazil 24.6 88.0 21.8
Mexico 13.6 89.4 13.2
Indonesia 6.8 30.4 18.3
Philippines 2.7 23.9 10.9
Hong Kong 4.2 5.5 43.2
Singapore 7.9 0.7 91.9
Malaysia 6.2 15.9 28.1
Turkey 1.2 17.5 6.4
Source: IMF (1985) and staff calculations.
Tabl2 4.2: VOLUME AND DISTRIBUTION OF DFI /a
(US$ million)
Cumulative
Sector 1972-76 1977-81 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total
Agriculture 5.2 6.3. 1.3 1.1 0.6 3.7 19.3
Manufacturing 427e3 223.3 122.3 102.9 264.3 181.9 1574.9
Textiles 57.5 2.5 3.0 1.9 1.9 0.8 72.5
CLemicals 146.1 120.2 41.3 7.6 6.7 44.7 378.4
Machinery 30.3 39.6 9.8 5.7 131.5 50.7 277.5
Electronics 83.0 107.8 19.2 41.4 67.5 55.8 386.2
Services 132.6 188.1 64.2 163.7 154.2 346.2 1060.8
Hotels 10.20 70.5 28.1 155.7 118.4 312.3 713.0
Total 565.2 587.7 1&7.8 267.8 419.0 531.7 2655
/a On approval basi;.
so-'Ce: Econ n- iPa-i ne Bo-dr
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4.03 Among the reasons often advanced to explain the relative decline of
DFI flows to developing countries during the 70's are the shift of world sav-
ings to OPEC countries and the availability of bank loans at very low interest
rates. It has been argued that the supply of investible funds fell relative
to that of loans because OPEC countries, not having technology or management
to offer, disposed of their windfall gains in the form of increased bank
deposits. These factors may have been important in Korea's case also but were
probably of lesser consequence than a number of domestic factors, some beyond
and some within policy control. Among the former must be counted Korea's poor
endowment of natural extractable resources and problem with national security
and political stability. Among the latter must be counted such factors as the
reluctance to allow foreign firms to acquire dominant positions in the economy
and to benefit from the special incentives offered by Government to promote
the manufacturing sector. Since Korea developed its industrial base in
considerable measure through special incentives there was an understandable
disinclination to see some of those go to foreign firms and eventually become
part of their repatriable profits. Furthermore, the industries that were to
form the bulk of Korea's manufacturing sector were mostly simple in their
technology needs--they required mostly foreign capital and not foreign manage-
ment expertise. For a variety of reasons, therefore, Korea ma ntained a
generally restrictive and stand-offish attitude towards DFI. -
4.04 Present Policy towards DFI. Government policy towards DFI experi-
enced a reversal in 1980 when, in an attempt to cope with an economic crisis
featuring high inflation, negative growth, growing debt-service difficulties
and a large balance of payments deficit, a broad-based program of trade and
financial liberalization was adopted. Among the elements of $8 s program were
several measures to liberalize the regulations governing DFI. s Since then
the scope for DFI has generally been expanded and the procedures simplified.
In particular, under a set of guidelines adopted in July 1984, an automatic
approval system and a negative list system have come into operation which now
make Korea one of the more open or least restrictive countries as far as
regulations governing DFI are concerned. Only 82 of Korea's 999 industrial
sectors are prohibited to foreign investment and a further 215 are subject to
strict restrictions. The remaining 660 sectors are now open. Among the
44/ Among the strictly economic concerns that DFI has often raised are
whether such inflows simply substitute for domestic savings and invest-
ment and whether they affect the balance of payments adversely by entail-
ing import-intensive production. A recent study of the effects of for-
eign direct investment (Shin, 1985) suggests that neither of these
concerns are valid for Korea. It finds no statistically significant
substitution relationship between domestic and foreign investment nor any
adverse effects on the balance of payments during the 1970s. Koo (1984)
is of the opinion that the balance of payments impact of DFI has been
"positive, substantial and increasing in recent years."
45/ Government's program tco liberaliv-0 DFI regulations was endorsed i n the
second Structural Adjustment Loan arranged by the World Bank for Korea in
1983.
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522 sectors that are classified as manufacturing about 86Z are now open. In
the open sectors, a project is given automatic approval if the amount of
foreign investment is not more than the equivalent of $1 million and the ratio
of foreign investment is'less than 50X. In addition to more liberal guide-
lines for investment and the standard guarantees for repatriation Korea now
encourages iFI also through its trade and financial liberalization policies
which permit greater flexibility in decisions regarding sourcing of inputs and
disposition of outputs, in the use of financial facilities, in the management
of liabilities and in foreign exchange dealings. The liberalization program
should also enhance Korea's competitiveness and thereby make it even more
attractive a haven for DFI.
4.05 The improved environment for DFI since 1980 has shown encouraging
results. The amount of DFI approved has increased each year since then and
grew to over $500 million in 1985. Up to 1981 the cumulative volume of such
investment was around $1.2 billion. Since then the cumulative stock has more
than doubled to $2.6 billion (see Table 4.2). Such investment is becoming an
important source of funding and technology in several sectors (such as
automobiles and electronics) that are now at the leading edge of Korea's drive
to attain developed-country status.
B. Future Context of DFI
4.06 Since the 1970's, both the domestic and the international environ-
ments have changed and are changing in ways that suggest that a country like
Korea would benefit considerably from a future external financing program that
emphasizes equity instruments in preference to debt. The international
financial environment has changed in several respects. Firstly, because of
the considerable adjustment and restructuring that took place in response to
high energy costs and inflation during the last decade the OECD corporate
sector has reduced costs, increased productivity and strengthened finances,
thereby becoming a substantial repository of investible capital. This feature
has been significantly bolstered by the substantial drop in the price of oil
during 1986. The distribution of world savings is now shifting to the OECD
non-financial corporate sector. Secondly, the experience of the debt crisis
in the early 1980s has encouraged a preference among investors for marketable
instruments as opposed to illiquid instruments.
4.07 The domestic environment has changed substantially also. Korea is
now a semi-industrialized country with a sizable pool of strong and savvy
domestic entrepreneurs some of whom have built world-class conglomerates. One
indication of the growing confidence of Korean entrepreneurs is the substan-
tial number of joint ventures and licensing agreements arranged in recent
years at the initiative of Korean producers. The danger that foreign invest-
ments might choke nascent domestic enterprise is practically non-existent
now. Indeed, where once it was feared that large foreign companies would
establish oligopolistic control over the economy, it is now thought that a
dose of foreign compatition would serve to counteract and reduce oligopolistic
domination of the economy by doimetic conglomerates.
4.08 The role of government has also been changirvg such that the
promotion of specific industries through special incentives is not expected to
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be a major factor in future industrial and financial policy and performance.
A program of liberalization is under way in accordance with which the variety
of incentives provided to the domestic manufacturing sector through trade and
credit policies is being reduced. As a result the argument that foreign
investors would benefit from special incentives needed only by domestic
industry will have less relevance in the future. Furthermore, the program of
liberalization will create a market-determined structure of relative prices
for domestic and traded goods and factors (e.g. domestic credit, foreign
exchange, wage costs) and hence the possibility of multinational firms taking
advantage of distorted prices will be minimized. Given a strong indigenous
entrepreneur group and given a set of appropriate, market-oriented domestic
macroeconomic policies, there is little reason to fear 'exploitation' by
foreign investors.
4.09 DFI may also be important to Korea for reasons related to trade
diplomacy. Korea now depends heavily on the ability to import technology and
capital goods and to export finished and semi-finished manufactures. Should
either activity falter, Korea would be affected significantly. There is some
fear that, in the future, the sort of technology Korea needs (in automotive
and electronics, for example) will not be available "off the shelf" but will
come jointly with foreign management and equity. Korea is now moving into
areas which require sophisticated advanced technologies which they are
unlikely to obtain through old-style licensing agreements. A case in point is
video tape recording (VTR) technology which Japanese proprietors are unwilling
to part w>h outside the controlled arrangement of a joint or wholly owned
venture.- There is also some fear that the rate of export gr3wth will be
severely affected by OECD protectionism. Active trade diplomacy with a view
to minimizing the risk of a sharp reduction in technology transfer or in
export growth and diversification should have high priority on the Korean
strategy agenda. Among the elements of such diplomacy should be a greater
emphasis on the potential role of direct foreign investment in offsetting the
risk of trade disruptions, in maintaining an inward flow of high technology as
well as in relieving the pressure of protectionism in export markets. The
larger the stake that OECD corporations have in Korea's industrial growth the
better the chances that they will look upon trade disruption with disfavor and
will rally with Korea against attempts to restrict trade.
4.10 Finally, as already indicated in earlier sections, equity inflows
are advantageous in that they have many desirable characteristics from the
perspective of external liability management. With equity inflows peoject
risk is spread, repayments are linked to the ability to pay and a wide range
of investors is attract:d. Furthermore, since the degree of reinvestment is
partly determined by economic policies and incentives provided by the host
46/ This unwillinfness is rooted in the apprehen.sion that Korean licensees
might learn quickly and strike out on their own, thereby threatening
Japanese market share in VTRs just as has happened in the case of color
TV sets, a product the Koreans learnt to manufacture with the help of
licensing agreements with US and Japanese firms.
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country, there is a greater possibility of employing DFI flows to aid in the
adjustment process in the event of an external shock.
4.11 The Cost of DFI in Korea. One measure of the cost of DFI is the
amount of earnings remitted out of the host country or, more usefully, the
ratio of dividend remittances to the total stock of DFI. This measure enables
a comparison to be made with the cost of incurring debt as measured by the
interest rate. Normally one would expect the cost of DFI to be higher than
the cost of debt since the foreign investor bears greater risk and has to be
compensated for doing so. Thus DFI could involve a greater foreign exchange
cost for the host country than debt. However some part or all of the
repatriable earnings can be retained and reinvested, an occurrence whose
probability increases with the profitability of investing in the country. If
a sufficient fraction of such earnings are retained it is quite possible that
the foreign exchange cost of servicing the investment, i.e. the ratio of
remittances to investment, may be lower than the cost of servicing an equiva-
lent amount of foreign debt. This is clearly an empirical matter. Table 4.3
gives some comparative data for the case of Korea. It appears that in the
1980s Korea has serviced DFI at a lower cost than it has serviced external
debt. On average, it has paid almost 10% on its debt but less than 5Z as
dividend remittances. Even during the 1970's, despite the prevalence of lower
interest rates, debt servicing tended to be more expensive than equity
servicing for Korea (Koo, 1981). These direct, short-run cGst comparisons
are, of course, only indicative. Indirect costs or long-term costs may make a
difference. For example, the cost of servicing equity may be underestimated
in Table 4.3 to the extent that equity investors enjoy capital gains and those
may be quite substantial in an inflationary environment. It is, at any rate,
possible to claim that DFI does not necessarily impose a larger short-run
servicing cost in terms of dividend remittances.
Table 4.3: DIViDEND REMITTANCE RATES VERSUS INTEREST RATES
-()
Effective rate of /a Effective rate of /b











la Calculated as ratio of intere-t payment to average foreign debt
outstanding.




4.12 The pr,eceding discussion may be sumnarized as follows: DFI would
appear to hold several advantages for Korea in the present stage of its
development: it may be'useful from the point of view of liability management,
it may be necessary for the transfer of some types of sophisticated technology
and it may play a positive role in trade diplomacy. It also appears from the
evidence that DFI has not been a comparatively expensive financing option in
the past. Some of these considerations, particularly that of the transfer of
certain technologies, are reflected in Government's attitude towards DFI as
embodied in the Sixth Plan.
4.13 Sixth Plan Targets. Direct foreign investment has been given a more
prominent role in the external financing program associated with the Sixth
Plan than was the case with previous Plans. The objective of increasing DFI
inflows has now become an integral part of the external liability management
strategy adopted by Government. Such inflows are expected to grow from around
$250 million per annum (on a disbursement basis) at present to $700 million
per annum by 1991. Given that the projected external financing requirements
will grow at a lower rate than that expected for inflows of DFI, the ratio of
DFI to both flows and stocks of external liabilities can be expected to
grow. According to projections prepared by the Economic Planning Board, DFI
inflows will make up about 11% of total foreign capital inflows (of $6.6 bil-
lion) in 1991, up from about 4X currently. It is expected that around 90X of
Korea's industries will by then be open to DFI.
4.14 While present regulations and domestic macroeconomic policies
provide an appropriate environment for DFI Korea might benefit from some
active promotion in Europe so as to broaden the sources of funds, as at
present the bulk of DFI in Korea is accounted for by Japanese and US firms.
As liberalization progresses it may also be useful to increase the ceiling for
investments to qualify for automatic approval. The present ceiling of $1 mil-
lion may prove to be restrictive for certain types of technology-intensive
investments in which other developing countries may also be interested and for
which, therefore, speed of approval and low "transaction" costs for the for-
eign investor may be critical. Indead the ultimate goal must be to provide
parity of treatment across dg, stic and foreign ventures as far as licensing
and approvals are concerned. Parity of treatment should encompass the
simultaneous withdrawal of special incentives (e.g. tax exemptions) th&t apply
to DFI but not to domestic ventures together with the elimination of specific
disincentives and restrictions.
47/ In the future it i- quite possible that the limiting factors will not be
at the level of macroeConomic policy or genera' regulations but at the
level of the firme It is possible that DFI will be limited if Korea
develo-s a reputation for labor union problems, joint venture partner
problems or discriminatory treatment by bureaucrats. The political
climate will also be a relevant determinant.
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C. Quasi-Equity Investment
4.15 Since the early 1970s alternatives of foreign direct and foreign
portfolio investment have emerged which also provide a link between debt-ser-
vicing costs and a project' s outcome. These "new forms of investment" (Oman,
1984) aim at "unbundling" the typical direct investment package into its con-
sistent components--for example, capital, technology and control. The
objective of the new forms of investment is to permit the host country to
single out those features of a project that foreigners have a comparative
advantage in supplying and to contract for these features while retaining
overall control of the operation. In this way host countries aim to enhance
local firms' access to world export markets, to increase the local share of
economic rents derivable from extractive industries, to encourage the transfer
of "appropriate" technologies, and to increase local entrepreneurship atad man-
agement skills. The following are the most common new forms of investments:
joint ventures, licensing arrangements, franchising, ma Mement contracts,
production sharing, revenue sharing and profit sharing,
4.16 While the new forms of investment embody the desirable characteris-
tics of capital inflow outlined in Chapter 1 to a significant extent, in two
important respects, they may be somewhat less favorable than foreign direct
investment: there is some shifting of project risk back to the host economy
and the returns on some new forms of investment may be less related to ability
to pay. With regard to ability to pay, the returns to the foreign investor
48/ A joint venture normally implies the sharing of assets, risks and pro-
fits, and participation in the ownership of a particular enterprise. To
be cansidered different from standard DFI the host country should hold at
least 50% of the equity. Occasionally, under a "fade-out" agreement, the
foreign investor may agree to reduce his share over time. Licensing
agreements are contracts under which a foreign investor provides the lo-
cal licensee with access to technology or know-how most commonly in re-
turn for royalties or a percentage of sales or profits. Franchising is a
particular type of licensing agreement whereby the local franchise is
provided with a package not only of technology and know-how but also lo-
cal exclusively and management assistance, generally in return for royal-
ties. Management contracts stipulate that a foreign company manage a
project or enterprise in the host country. The skills usually provided
by the managing firm include knowledge of international product and
financial markets and access to funding. A production sharing agreement
entitles the lender to a specified proportion of the output of a project
in return for an input of capital, technology, marketing and management
skills (Lessard, 1985). This form of investment is frequently used in
the extractive industries. as an alternative to direct investment. Under
revenue shAring and profit sharing arrangements t1he foreign investor
shares respectively in the revenue or profit generated by the project;
these forms of investment come progressively closer to full direct in-
vestment, since the foreign investor acquires an interest in the outcome
of the project but without any share in ownership.
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under a number of types of new investment do not depend upon the project's
profit performance; for example, royalites are frequently based on the
quantity of production or on gross revenue, measures which need not reflect
the success of the project (by linking returns directly to outcomes, joint
ventures are the exception). In most other respects, the inflow characteris-
tics of the now forms of investment are very similar to those of direct
foreign investment. Since both types of investment are project related there
is significant risk dispersal within the host economy, the maturities are
related to the life of the project, foreign currency exposure does not arise
and both types of investment tend to reduce the proportion of capital flows
provided by the international banking sector.
4.17 The new forms of investment also have certain disadvantages for the
host country. First, they tend to provide incentives for foreign investors to
sell plant, equipment and services to developing countries, often financed by
bank credits thereby exacerbating debt servicing difficulties. Secondly, the
balance-of-payments advantages of the new forms may be less than expected as
licensing arrangements are often used by multinational corporations as an
alternative means of transfer pricing. Finally, host country control may in
practice be quite limited, mainly because of lack of management and technical
expertise.
4.18 From the point of view of the foreign investor the new forms of
investment offer a number of potential advantages. Where the degree of risk
differs across the categories of activity bundled together in traditional
direct investment, they permit exploitation of comparative advantage in risk
bearing. This unbundling should, therefore, enable the host country to
package risk in a manner best suited to various investor groups. For example,
licensing and franchising agreements are more likely to appeal to multi-
national corporations while revenue and profit sharing might attract support
from institutional investors since they are, in effect, project loans with an
opportunity to participate in upside potential. In general, foreign investors
see the new forms of investment as means of minimizing project risk while a
the same time maximizing the leverage of the capital invested.
4.19 Application to Korea. Two new forms of investment dominate in
Korea--joint ventures and licensing agreements. The number of less-than-
majority-foreign owned joint ventures is significant and has increased
relative to wholly-owned and majority-ownei firms. Licensing agreements,
especially by local firms and joint ventures, have also been important and
their number has grown faster than investments in majority-wholly-owned-
foreign firms (Koo, 1984). The trend, particularly since the early 1970s, has
been one of a noticeable increase in the importance of these two new forms
relative to traditional direct investment.
4.20 Korea's rapid technological advance during the 1960s and 1970s has
been cited in support of the hypothesis that new forms of investment offer
important advantages over traditional foreign direct investment in the area of
technology transfer and thQ developrent of local technological capacity (Oman,
1984). The argument is that once in possession of this technology Korearn
firms would be in a position to challenge for export markets worldwide whereas
under the traditional forms of investment the output of Korean firms would in
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certain circumstances be determined by the foreign investor. On the basis of
licensing agreements Korea was in fact able to acquire the most sophisticated
technology including that in the shipbuilding and steel industries, Korea's
export-led industrialization has overwhelmingly been directed and controlled
by nationals who have relied heavily on indigenous effort through various
forms of learning-by-doing and an emphasis on arm's length transactions in the
use of foreign resources. Thus, the new forms of investment seem more appro-
priate for a country like Korea which is in the latter stages of
industrialization.
4.21 From the point of view of the desirable inflow characteristics,
there is little to choose between investment in the form of venture capital
and licensing agreements on the one hand and traditional direct investment on
the other, although the latter may have a somewhat better ability to pay and
risk sharing features. By comparison with general obligation finance all
three types of investment perform very satisfactorily. However, the new forms
of investment may be preferred when account is taken of the Korean preference
for limited foreign ownership of domestic firms, of the ability of local
entrepreneurs to exploit the opportunities presented by the new forms of
investment and of the likelihood that capital inflows in this form would be
more suitable to Korea's present phase of economic development. While the
choice between the various new forms of investment would be mainly based on
industrial policy considerations, from the narrow point of view of debt
management preference should probably be given to joint ventures over
licensing agreements because of their superior ability-to-pay feature. None
of the other new forms of investment seem particularly relevant to Korea.
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V. ELEMENTS OF A DESIRABLE FINANCING STRATEGY FOR KOREA
A. Assessment of Instruments
5.01 The preceding chapters (and appendices) have discussed, inter alia,
desirable external financing objectives for Korea and the extent to which
various conventional and innovative international capital market instruments
might be suitable for Korea. Since a large number of instruments has been
covered it may be useful to review their properties in the form of a matrix
(see Table 5.1) which cross-classifies instruments by desirable inflow
characteristics.
5.02 There are considerable differences in the extent to which the
various instruments embody the desirable inflow characteristics. Indeed, the
gap between the ranking of direct investment and the various types of
portfolio investment on the one hand and general obligation finance on the
other is quite striking, clearly illustrating the disadvantages of the latter
type of finance for developing countries. The high score of the former
instruments reflects the fact that they do not give rise to currency exposure,
their maturities are related to the life of the project,.debt service depends
on project success while risk is effectively shifted to the foreign investor
and not to the host government. Moreover, these forms of investment would
diversify the sources of external finance away from international banks and
would also be in a form that would facilitate the attainment of macroeconomic
objectives in Korea. The other instruments included in the table embody the
desirable characteristics to a greater or a lesser degree. The next highest
ranking group of instruments are the new forms of investment which are also
project and enterprise specific. The differences between the new forms of
investment and direct/portfolio investment are not significart: some licens-
ing arrangements have the disadvantage that, if the return is in the form of
royalties, it may not be related to project profitability while, in the case
of joint ventures, there ^s some shifting of project risk back to the host
country.
5.03 Instruments that increase the flexibility of debt service obliga-
tions tend to score surprisingly well given that they all take the form of
loans. In the case of graduated payment loans and shared equity loans this
high score is partly explained by the fact that debt service unde- these
instruments is related t6 project success while the extended maturicy feature
of variable maturity loans is particularly attractive. Moreover, since all
three types of loan can be used for project financing they would tend to pro-
mote risk dispersal in the economy. Also, if such loans were successfully
contracted, they would of necessity tend to diversify the sources of Korean
borrowing. However, as indicated in Chapter 2, it is unlikely that such
innovations in the area of syndicated credits will be available to Korea on
financially attractive terms in the iumediate future.
83 -




Longer Diversified Risk Risk ability Diversity
Instruments maturities currencies sharinp dispersal to pay of sources
Portfolio Investment H H H H H H
Direct Investment H H H H H H
Now Forms ox Investment
Licening agreements H H 1 H 1 H
Joint ventures H H 14 H H H
Smooth Real Debt Service
Index-linked bond m1 11 L ' L N H
Constant debt service FRN M M L L m1 m1
Risk Shiftin
Comodity bonds m1 14 H L H H
Trade bonds 1 M H L H H
Increased Flezibility
Flezible maturity loan H M L H 1 H
Graduated paymnt loan 11 M N H H H
Shared equity loan M M 1 H H H
Non-Recourse Financing 14 L. H H HL
Ceneral Obligation Finance
Standard Loans L M L L L L
Standard Bonds 14 m1 L L L M
Code: Extent to which instrumnts embody desirable characteristics: L * little
M - Moderately; H a to a large aetent.
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5.04 Potential instruments that shift risk such as commodity and trade
bonds also rank relatively highly. The major differences between these
instruments and other risk-shifting instruments (such as direct and portfolio
investment) is that the former would appear to require a government guarantee,
as well as the fact their maturity and currency characteristics may be
somewhat less favorable. Nevertheless, from the borrowers' perspective, these
instruments have many attractions.
5.05 Non-recourse financing and instruments that smooth real debt service
payments rank lower (although even these would represent a marked improvement
over general obligation finance). Rather poor risk sharing and risk dispersal
features together with the fact that although real debt service has a smooth
time profile it is not related to ability to pay, reduce somewhat the benefits
of index-linked bonds and constant debt payment FRNs. Non-recourse financing
scores highly on risk dispersal and transfer but less so on the ability to
pay, currency and diversity-of-sources characteristics, in which respects it
resembles general obligation financing.
5.06 Financing Constraints and Opportunities. A logical conclusion to be
drawn from the preceding discussion is that, from the borrowers' point of
view, the composition of capital inflows should be largely in the form of
direct and portfolio investment, new forms of investment and trade bonds and,
to a lesser extent, instruments that increase repayment flexibility and non-
recourse loans. As a financing strategy, however, this approach would not be
realistic. This is so first because it p8ys little regard to the existing
pattern of capital inflows into Korea; secondly, because it ignores investors'
preferences as revealed in the trend to securitization and thirdly, because
some of the instruments are new to international financing and may not be
available to Korea at financially attractive and competitive terms.
5.07 The share of syndicated bank loans in Korean inflows of medium- and
long-term capital has declined from around 90% in the late 70's to about 55%
in recent years. Over the same period bond issues increased sharply to about
30% of total inflows. Direct investment and portfolio investment between them
however, still account for less than 5% of such inflows. in view of these
shares and the trends behind them it would be unrealistic to expect a rapid
shift away from reliance on general obligation finance although much could be
done within this category of finance. This observation has consequences for a
future strategy for external financing: in the short-run efforts should be
concentrated on adjusting the existing array of instruments to bring them more
into line with the desirable inflow characteristics; in the longer run,
however, it should be recognized that the existing structure is not immutable
and a strategy aimed at promoting greater use of equity instruments is both
possible and desirable.
5.08 As well as satisfying borrowers' requirements, instruments designed
to improve the composition of developing countries' capital inflow should be
consistent with investors' preferencen and in particular with the trend
towards securitization in international capital markets. This trend towards
securitization involves a shift in credit flows from bank lending to market-
able debt instruments and has manifested itself in both a sharp increase in
the share of international credit in the form of securitized assets as well is
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in the development, within the syndicated loan market, of instruments that
increase the negotiability of traditional bank assets. The rise in the rela-
tive importance of bond markets has reflected the absence of debt-servicing
difficulties in these markets and the fact that it has become cheaper for
prime non-bank borrowers to raise funds through these markets than from
banks. The securitization trend implies that Korea should look more to the
note and bond markets and less to syndicated loan arrangements for future
finance as indeed it has been doing in recent years.
5.09 Another aspect of the recent rapid innovation in international
credit markets is the blurring of the distinction between bond and equity mar-
kets. The vast amount of convertible bonds issued over the last decade has
served to condition investors to view bonds and equities as part of a spectrum
of investment instruments rather than as two separate markets. This develop-
ment has stimulated the development of hybrid securities.which allow investors
to receive dividends or participate in profits without putting them under the
same obligations or permitting them the same rights as ordinary share-
holders. Such arrangements have the advantage of not undermining the existing
ownership structure of a company and have proved to be very popular with
investors. The growing preference for equity related debt suggests that Korea
should explore this market segment to a greater extent in the future.
B. Short-Term Debt Strategy for Korea
5.10 The discussion in Chapter 2 has indicated that Korea has
historically had few degrees of freedom to maneuver in international capital
markets: it has not had access to fixed rate US dollar or Eurodollar facili-
ties, the secondary market in its bonds is illiquid, its paper is narrowly
held, it has had only limited opportunities to avail of long-term maturities
and some of its traditional bankers have been reducing their exposures
recently.
5.11 Recent developments in the international trade and finance arena,
however, provide grounds for conside Wle optimism with regard to Korea's
future external financing situation. It would appear from these develop-
ments th.at, in the foreseeable near term, the available supply of external
funds will exceed the demand for such finance by Korea and, as a consequence,
the terms and conditions attached to future financing arrangements will move
in Korea's favor. More importantly, the near future offers an excellent
49/ These favorable developments are principally the substantial decline in
the price of oil and in internationai interest rates and the sharp appre-
ciation of the Japanese yen relative to the Korean won. Should the cur-
rent alignment of prices be sustained, it is extremely likely that Korea
will move into a balance of payments surplus situation (of $4 billion in
1986 and to $3 billion per annum and beyond). Its external financing
requirements will thus be substantially reduced for the medium term (from
$6.8 billion in 1985 to $1.6 billion in 1986 and $6.5 billion per annum
(on average) during 1987-91, according to EPB projections) despite rising
amortizations.
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opportunity for Korea to modify its external liability structure in more
desirable directions.
5.12 The Supply of External Finance. The oil price drop of recent months
has, apart from reducing Korea's need for external finance, led to two deve-
lopments which have increased the potential availability or supply of such
finance to Korea. First, it has boosted the OECD's financial surplus and
second it has forced such oil dependent countries as Indonesia and Malaysia to
reduce their expenditures, thereby reducing the demand for external finance
among East Asian developing countries. Thus, 1986 should see a large OECD
(but mostly Japanese) financial surplus chasing dwindling lending opportuni-
ties in East Asia.
5.13 These developments are likely to have two consequences for Korea.
First, its spreads should decli'ne since Korea now presents one of the few good
lending opportunities to foreign bankers in their East Asian operations. Some
evidence of this its already available. Spreads on syndicated credits for
Korea have declined compared to 1985. For example, Korea Exchange Bank (KEB)
arranged a $375 million dollar loan in March 1986 which was structured as
follows: two years at 0.5% and six years at 0.625Z above LIBOR respec-
tively. This compares with a KEB loan for $400 million dollars in March 1985
which was structured as three years at 0.625% and five years at 0.75% above
LIBOR respectively. It is thought that spreads will decline even more towards
the end of the year as the demand for funds by traditional East Asian
borrowers continues to slacken.
5.14 A second consequence of recent developments is that more and more of
Korea's e=ternal funding is likely to come from Japan. In the first instance,
among OECD countries Japan has been the major beneficiary of the oil price
drop. This windfall has added to its already huge trade surplus. In the
second instance, Japanese financial institutions have better knowledge of the
Korean market than their European counterparts. Thirdly, the previously domi-
nant US banks have been reducing their exposures to Korea for the past three
years for reasons related to their changing global strategies and changing
capital-asset regulations in the wake of the Latin debt crisis. For all these
reasons, it seems likely that much of the new external financing business in
Korea, be it loans or bonds, will be taken up by the Japanese. It is thought
that they picked up 70% of the net increase in Korean exposure in 1985 and may
pick up a higher share in 1986. Indeed, they have been most aggressive in
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competing for Korean bu 7 ess this year by softening terms ahead of and more
than their competitors.-
5.15 Korea should be able to take advantage of the external finance
enviroment it faces currently not only to reduce the average cost of its
financing but also to improve the structure of its liabilities. Indeed it is
precisely in such a "borrowers-market" situation that the scope for borrower
innovation is greatest. Some of the steps that Korea might consider are
discussed below.
Possible Actions in the Loan and Bond Markets
5.16 Maturity: It has been noted in (in Chapter 1) that while Korea has
made much progress in reducing the proportion of short-term debt in its total
liabilities there is room for improvement in the medium- and long-term
category. In general, longer maturities are more expensive for the borrower
but, under present market circumstances, the increase in cost should be
minimal. Given the lack of alternative opportunities in the East Asian region
for banks and other investors, and given Korea's excellent economic prospects,
investors should be willing to provide 15 to 25 year maturities to Korea. It
is important for Korea to establish a precedent since once a precedent is set
in obtaining a loan or floating a bond of a certain maturity the market
generally finds it easier to accept "repeaters" on the same or better terms.
In order to set such a precedent Korea must forgo a part of Lhe reduction in
spreads that it can expect under present market conditions but it should be
willing to do so since the relative price of W1 ra years of maturity in terms
of spread points is currently very favorable.- It might also be noted that
it is far more likely that such maturities will be available for FRN's than
for conventional syndicated credits. Furthermore, even with FRN's, the longer
maturities cannot be obtained straight away. Korea may have to build towards
them in stages, by first issuing say a 15 year note successfully and then
following it up at reasonable intervals by issues of 20 year and 25 year
maturities.
50/ Discussions with the Japanese financial community suggest additional
reasons why the Japanese appetite for foreign business is likely to
grow. A process of financial deregulation is underway in Japan which
involves some relaxation of the regulations governing foreign lending and
investing. Furthermore, the number of institutions that are involved in
foreign lending is also growing--insurance companies, leasing companies,
regional banks, and securities houses are increasingly encroaching upon
the preserve that was once largely that of the major Japanese commercial
banks.
51/ Obtaining longer maturities should also be facilitated by the fact that
the capacity of large Japanese commercial banks to undertake long-term
lending has recently grown because of deregulation in Japan which has
increased these banks' ability to raise long-term funds from domestic
sources.
... ei .b. ,.. .t . . -. t. -.. ..... i-f....a9;9d#jSi«i ft%Wg
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5.17 Swaps: Korea should also conintue altering the currency and
interest-type mix of its liabilities through the use of swaps. For example,
as already noted, Korea has virtually no direct access to fixed-rate US or
Eurodollar facilities but has excellent access to fixed and floating rate yen
facilities. It should consider trading on its comparative advantage and swap
sc,me of its floating rate yen or dollar liabilities into fixed rate dollar
ones. Of course, the timing of the swap should be carefully considered since
terms and conditions vary from day to day. What is being recommended here is
that an active currency management strategy be adopted as a part of the over-
all debt management program.
5.18 Coordination: In the syndicated loan market, there would appear to
be a continuous stream of Korean syndications: some streamlining of these
borrowings would appear to be desirable. The 'sovereign' borrowers also fail
to diversify their funding requirements or to segment the international bank-
ing market. This strategy enables banks to 'hold-the-line' on spreads, refer-
ence rates and other charges on Korean facilities. A more effective strategy
might involve seeking proposals from lead banks which would be specially tar-
geted at different segments of the banking market: this would enable Korea to
benefit from the competition being provided at present by Japanese banks.
This would require significant coordination of the three 'sovereign'
borrowers' activities in the syndicated-loan market. An alternative market-
segmentation strategy would be to approach the bond market rather than the
bank loan market. Since this market has more participants it is less
oligopolistic and less subject to rate fixing maneuvers. By developing a
significant alternative source of funds via the bond market Korea can also put
pressure on its syndicated credit suppliers to reduce their spreads, fees and
other charges.
5.19 Prepayment: In view of the decline in international interest rates
and spreads, the greatest benefit to Korea, in terms of cost savings, would
come from the replacement of existing loans with facilities reflecting
existing market conditions. Korea's current attempts to prepay some existing
loans and to refinance some others at more favorable terms can, therefore, be
understood. The only note of caution one might sound here is that the option
of prepayment and/or refinancing should be carefully evaluated so as not to
impair existing relationships with traditional lenders. However, considering
the extent of similar renegotiations that have been conducted recently,
-especially by sovereign borrowers, Korea's attempts to benefit from existing
market conditions should not damage its access to international financial
markets.
5.20 Private versus Public Debt: The sharp improvement in Korea's econo-
mic prospects occasioned by the decline in the price of oil and the apprecia-
tion of the yen relative to tke won heralds new opportunities for Korea in in-
ternational capital markets. Korea now anticipates sizable balance of pay-
ments surpluses over the near future and its major private corporations are
now in a position to establish significant market shares and brand-name pre-
sence in OECD markets. As a result the need for public or semi-public borrow-
ing for balance of payments purposes is declining while the prospects of
12~~~ :.-.L- w..et>Z-wttX~tS &XY>:r.-s Xt W< . :j.$-44U:r.u+t.. [-q.tD .... tDYz4ir,sibQXgd'i1SfiiS
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Korean corporations being able to borrow in their own names, and without
government-guarantees, are improving. The opportunity exists, therefore, for
Korea to encourage a shift from public foreign debt towards private non-gua-
ranteed debt. This would have the benefits of dispersing default-risk away
from the Government and increasing the familiarity of Korean corporate names
in international capital markLts. Towards this end Government should encour-
age private borrowers to adopt financial management, accounting and disclosure
practices that will help them in converting their bright economic prospects
into enhanced access to external finance. Any marketing effort undertaken to
promote the semi-public names can also have positive spillover effects for
private Korean corporate names. The recent assignment of favorable credit
ratings to Korean sovereign risk by Moodys and S&P's also bodes well for pri-
vate Korean names although the advantage is m'ore likely to be perceived in short
and medium term financing arrangements thar% in access to long-term funds.
5.21 Bond Market Strategy: Korea will continue to need to undertake a
certain amount of public borrowing in the future in order to refinance some of
its existing debt (amortizations are projected at between $4 and $5 billion
per annum over the next five years). It may also need to borrow if its
balance of payments situation deteriorates on account of exogenous shocks such
as increases in oil prices and interest rates or sharp declines in OECD growth
rates. While the prospects of significant deterioration in the balance of
payments are dim it would nevertheless be prudent to develop a public
borrowing strategy that improves on past experience. As part of this
strategy, debt securities such as FRN's should be pursued in preference to
syndicated credits over the near future because, if approached appropriately,
these instruments offer greater scope for reducing costs, lengthening
maturities, increasing diver 'ication of funding sources and incorporating
borrower-driven innovations.-1 Investors prefer bonds to loans because of
the relatively greacer liquidity offered by bonds. To obtain liquidity they
are prepared to accept finer spreads than they would in the case of loans.
Korean bonds, however, have proved not to be very liquid partly because of the
Korean practice of coming to the market many times with small issues rather
than coming fewer times but with larger issues. Dealers in the secondary
market need to maintain inventories of each issue in order to effectively make
markets in these issues. There are, however, considerable economies of scale
in the holding of inventories, which tend to raise the costs of secondary
market trading in small issues and thus impair liquidity. This in turn
52/ This is not to say that syndicated credits should be abandoned. There is
one very good reason why even comfortably off borrowers should not damage
their links with traditional bank lenders: times can change and banks
can be useful on 'rainy days'. In Korea's case, however, it would appear
that the existing amount of business in the form of syndicated credits is
so large that even a substantial reduction should not affect its long
term relationships with its bankers. Indeed some reduction in business
would permit-the rebuilding of "credit reserves" with many traditional
lenders and lessen the pressure on exposure limits that has been worrying
them in recent years.
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implies that Korean isgj7s typically carry a yield premium to compensate for
the lack of liquidity 0- In this context, it is also worth noting that the
size of swap-related issues needs to be quite large in order to make the swap
worthwhile to all participants.
5.22 It is possible that the publhc sector banking institutions suffer to
some extent from the general perception that Korea's financial sector is weak
and underdeveloped and from the lack of awareness of Korean 'names' in most
capital markets. If this is the case, then Korea may be paying more for not
borrowing in its own name. The differential terms obtained at times in both
the syndicated loan and FRN markets by Korea's 'benchmark borrowers' also tend
to support this proposition. While it is difficult to be definite on this
issue, on balance the evidence would seem to suggest that Korea would benefit
from a switch to 'full' sovereign borrowing.
5.23 A bond market strategy that would stand the best chance of
overcoming the present perception of Korean paper would need to combine the
following elements: (a) the size of issue 54ould be large, say a minimum of
$250 million, so as to generate liquidity;- (b) the issues should be in
government name so as not to be compared with the past history of Korean FRN's
associated with the 'semi-sovereign' borrowers; government name is most likely
to insure a longer maturity and generally better terms as well as to attract a
wider investor base; and (c) care should be taken to ensure that lead managers
are chosen for their non-bank placement capabilities so as to reduce debt-
concentration in banks.
53/ Another reason advanced for the poor experience of Korean bonds is
political risk. Political risk is considered to be high for Korea
because of its security problems. This makes it difficult to attract
non-bank investors to Korean paper since such investors have poorer
knowledge of country details and tend to react more strongly than banks
to adverse political news and rumors. The greater the perceived
political risk, the more likely it is that Korea's external financing
needs will be met by large international banks who have a history of
lending to Korea, and the more likely it becomes that such financing will
be in the form of syndicated credits rather than bonds.
54/ On the matter of size of issue the following points should also be
noted: (a) In some markets there is a 'standard' size of issue set by
custom or precedent while in other markets the size of issue is regulated
by the monetary authorities; for example, in Japan "samurai" issues are
limited to a maximum of Y 30 billion for issuers with a double A
rating. (b) If financing needs are limited and diversification across
markets is a priority then there may exiet a tradeoff between si:.e of
issue and diversification; because more markets have to be tapped each
market must be approached with a smaller issue than if the total
financing needs were to be met from one market.
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5.24 Marketing: There also is potential for reducing the concentration
of bond-holding in banks and reliance on floating rate funuing. The greatest
potential would initially appear to be in the Japanese market, but the
European, especially the Swiss, markets also warrant further consideration.-
In this respect, it might be worth considering a major marketing effort to
attract European fund managers' interest and overcome their lack of familia-
rity with the Korean situation. Current market circumstances are favorable
for the initiation of a major marketing effort by Korea.
5.25 Euronotes and Commercial Paper: The Euronote market also has
potential for reducing spreads and attracting non-bank investors. Since
corporations are both borrowers arns lenders in this market, Korea's
conglomerates may be able to attract the type of investor that would be more
familiar with them. In addition to the Euronote market the US commercial
paper market offers great potential for diversification. Access to both
markets should be enhanced through the acquisition of a US credit rating.
5.26 Convertible Debentures: Advantage should be taken of the current
market preference for hybrid securities in general and the strong interest in
Korean convertible debentures in particular. The three issues floated so far
have met with an enthusiastic response despite their carrying terms which were
very favorable to be issuers. Further issues should be encouraged and the
program of equity market liberalization in this particular regard should be
accelerated to take advantage of market conditions. Bonds with equity
warrants attached are also an attractive possibility. Since Korean equities
are in high demand it would be smart to include them in bond packages in such
a way as to kenefit from that demand.
C. Composition of Inflows in Medium- and Long-Term
5.27 The question now arises as to the most appropriate composition of
capital inflows for Korea in the medium and long-term. The scope for improv-
ing the terms of bank lending to developing countries to bring them more into
line with the identified desirable characteristics is quite limited, essen-
tially because banks have liabilities that are fixed in money terms and are,
therefore, constrained to seek assets with a similar property. The more
fundamental departures from the traditional forms of lending to developing
countries that would be required to incorporate these characteristics are far
more likely to develop in the capital markets and in direct participation by
multinational companies. Participants in these markets include a wide array
of institutions most of which do not face the accounting constraints on
accepting more innovative assets that the banks do.
55/ The Swiss are widely known for their placing power given the sheer weight
and number of their private customers. As the Economist (September 6,
1986) notes, "Choosing a Swiss bond issue is like choosing a new Mercedes
rather than an old Ford; it may cost more but you are sure of getting to
where you want to be."
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5.28 Many of the instruments listed in Table 5.1 would be consistent with
trends in international capital markets. Index-linked bonds, constant debt
service FRNs, trade and commodity 7onds and, of course, portfolio investment
are all securitized instruments.-6 However, the three loan instruments
considered - variable maturity loans, graduated payment loans and shared
equity loans - could not be regarded as marketable assets (unless loans under
the latter instrument could be converted into shares, in which case they would
be equivalent to convertible bonds). Moreover, the indefinite maturity
feature of the flexible maturity loan and the uncertainty with regard to the
timing of amortization under the graduated payment loan would render both
these instruments unattractive to banks and possibly less attractive to other
institutional investors as well. Thus, having considered at some length the
most desirable financing options for Korea from the borrower's point of view
and (more briefly) from the lenders' perspective, it might be concluded that
index-linked bonds and particularly trade bonds are the only new instruments
likely to prove acceptable to both parties.
5.29 Korea should, in the medium to long term, aim to increase
substantially the share of capital inflows in the form of equity investment.
New types of instruments identified as being suitable for Korea--especially
trade bonds--should also be explored keeping in mind, of course, that such
bonds have never been issued and considerable technical hurdles may need to be
crossed.
5.30 There are numerous reasons for recommending such a strategy. First,
the high share of exports in GDP makes Korea exceptionally vulnerable to
external shocks and suggests that a high priority should be attached to risk
minimization by way of relating debt service to ability to pay. Secondly,
Korea's large gross financing requirements up to the end of the decade means
that it has a continuing need for secure and significant sources of funds over
this period. And, thirdly, the development of private sector mechanisms to
spread business risk is essential given that the guarantee of Government
"bailouts" can no longer be taken for granted (in accordance with the
professed intentions of the Government). The matching of these considerations
with the securitization trends in international financial markets including
the tendency for a growing share of savings in industrial countries to be
directed to non-bank financial institutions suggests that Korea should aim to
tap the broader international markets for its medium-term needs. Moreover,
with the growing integration of bond and equity markets worldwide, investment
managers are tending to look beyond the major industrial countries for invest-
ment outlets and Korea with its buoyant export growth and industrial structure
comprisinS large privately-owned firms, has a head start on most developing
countries. Thus, Korea would be well placed to capture a major share of any
trend towards equity investment in developing countries. A strategy of
56/ It may also be noted that the approach represented by the various new
forms of investment corresponds with the "unbundling" of risks in
financial markets as evidenced by the recent tendency for separate.
pricing of the interest, liquidity and maturity features of financial
instruments.
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concentrating on project specific financing should be quite feasible for Korea
given that its fiscal deficit is relatively modest, thereby reducing its need
for general purpose finance.
5.31 In keeping with this goal Government should strongly consider
expanding the existing investment trusts for foreigners to purchase Korean
stocks and establishing additional funds, similar to the Korea Fund, on other
foreign stock exchanges. Such measures will increase the familiarity of world
capital markets with Korean equities and can be implemented quickly. The
extent of foreign control of local companies could be limited by the issuing
of non-voting shares such as those available in various European countries.
Over the longer run the success of a strategy of relying to an increasing
extent on portfolio investment will require improvements in the functioning of
the,domestic capital market and in corporate accounting and disclosure
practices. The development and implementation of measures to bring about .such
improvements will take time and should be taken up as soon as possible.
Otherwise there exists the possibility that the enthusiasm with which foreign
portfolio investors are greeting various stages of the market-opening program
will fizzle out once the market is technically open. To !uaintain interest and
dynamism after that point it will be necessary to attend to the various tech-
nical, ' cal, institutional and market development measures already
listed JOt
5.32 There is also a place for the new types of instruments identified as
having characteristics particularly useful for Korea--index-linked bonds and
especially trade bonds. With the reduction in inflation index-linked bonds
may be less relevant today; they are, nevertheless, a useful weapon to have in
the armoury in the event of a resurgence of world inflation. The trade bond
has an especially attractive feature for Korea: it represents a means of
securitizing the performance of the economy as a whole and in this way is
fully consistent with recent trends in international financial markets. As
yet this instrument has not been issued on financial markets. Moreover,
financial innovations of this type would normally be accepted by financial
markets onLy if first issued by prime borrowers. However, if the considerable
technical difficulties with these bonds could be overcome the favorable
implications of recent oil price developments for Korean economic growth and
for Korean exports would increase the attractiveness oi Korean trade bonds for
foreign investors. Although the combination of a government guarantee and
likely high returns to investors might seem overgenerous, this would be
balanced by the fact that debt service would be directly related to export
earnings.
5.33 Risks and Safeguards. Mention has already been made of the risks
associated with lifting restrictions on capital movements in and out of Korea
in order to facilitate foreign direct and portfolio investment (see paras.
1.36-1.40). It is worth re-emphasizing here that the risk of macroeconomic
instability arising from the possibility of large and volatile capital flows
is limited in Korea's case by the fact that such liberalization of capital
58/ For details see Chapter 3 and Appendix 3A.
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movements as will be necessary will be occurring in a very strong macro-
economic context featuring a modest fiscal deficit, a strong current account,
an undistorted exchange rate, low inflation and a tradition of economic
-policy-making of high calibre and credibility. Thus the best way for Korea to
contain the possible risk of macroeconomic instability would be to maintain
the economic policy regime it has in place currently. Moreover, complete or
immediate liberalization of the capital account will not be necessary to
attract greater amounts of equity inflows--partial and selective
liberalization should suffice. At the A- time, monitoring of "large"
capital movements should be continued_ " Finally, the risk of losing control
over domestic assets through portfolio foreign investment can be reoved by
restricting such investment to a clas of non-voting shares or by imposing
percentage ceilings by firm or industry.
5.36 In sumary, a major theme of this report has been that capital
inflows to Korea should increasingly be in the form of equity investment.
Such a strategy would seek to tap and package the dynamism of the Korean
economy in a way that would appeal to a wide range of foreign investors and
would be consistent with the recent trend towards securitization in
international financial markets. In this way Korea would take a positive step
towards the model of financing dominant in the industrial world, a world which
on the basis of many economic fundamentals it is ready to join.
59/ The matter of permitting Korean nationals to acquire foreign financial
assets (fourth stage of capital market liberalization program) falls
outside the scope of this report. At any rate that stage is at least
five years away and considerable experience with capital market liberali-
zation will have been gained by then to allow an informed decision to be
made.
* - - .
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